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Ab stract 
On the face of it, terms like 'the author,' the canon,' literature' - 
and its many sub-categories, 'lyrical poetry,' Australian short fic-
tion,' and so on - appear simply to describe essential, objective, posi-
tive, things. While such terms are certainly descriptive, they have a 
much more fundamental function, in fact constructing the two 
main properties that make up cultural activity of a text-based kind: 
who can be thought of and who counts in cultural production; and 
what can be thought of what counts as a cultural product. 
Questions about who makes and values certain kinds of texts 
are questions about the nature of the cultural field in which agents 
and their products compete. They are questions which attempt to 
dislodge the view that literature can be thought of as a set of cultural 
products which exhibit special features (literary features) that can be 
identified by disinterested users of this literature. In order to answer 
such questions, as I try to do in Part 1, I have cast my net widely 
across a range of literary, sociological, historical and institutional 
theories to uncover some of the practices that determine how agents 
operate in the cultural field, to show how 'the author' and 'the text' 
are not simple, objective categories to be consumed by 'the reader.' 
Rather, 'the author,' the text' and 'the reader' are the outcomes of 
contests between various players, embedded for longer or shorter pe-
riods in the practices current in the field. 
So-called post-structuralist theory and the cultural theory of 
Michel Foucault, in problematising cultural production, provide a 
useful starting point for an examination in Chapter 1 of the problem 
of the author, authority and authorising as social practices. No 
longer free-standing and neutral, cultural producers and the texts 
they produce become interested parties in a cultural system. But 
such a view opens up a new set of problems: to do with the view of a 
cultural producer or text as a kind of automaton in the system; and 
to do with the question of the capacity for social agents to effect 
change in that system. I turn to social theory in order to explain how 
it is that social agents are more than the ghosts in the machine that 
post-structuralist theory might suggest, at once able to obey and to 
change the prescriptions that pre-exist at any particular cultural 
moment in which texts are used. 
To see why particular kinds of cultural agent and product 
characterise and endure in the cultural field requires an understand-
ing of the historically constructed and institutional ways in which 
the field works. Writing and reading books are institutional practices 
and the agents who have, since the eighteenth century, been credited 
in western culture with the central place in this cultural production 
have, as I try to show in Chapter 2, continued to occupy this position 
by virtue of institutions which foreground writing as a product of 
the originary genius of the individual, autonomous and copyright-
owning author. Authors, that is, are products of historically particu-
lar social practices which apply in the field of cultural production. 
They occupy a social position which has been reasonably durable, my 
focus in Chapter 3, because the chronically recurring commercial 
and pedagogical practices embedded in institutional behaviour con-
tinue to have a hand in the consecration of the individuals who 
achieve the name 'author' and in the initial production and subse-
quent valorising of particular 'literary' texts. 
My method in Part 2 is to examine several case studies in order to 
see how agents and institutions in the cultural field work in more 
detail. My focus is to show how short story anthologies, critical stud-
ies and other key practices construct 'Australian short fiction.' 
Anthologies are a major institution in the production and reproduc-
tion of the sub-field of 'Australian short fiction.' They help to de-
termine what is to count as 'Australian short fiction,' who are to 
count as writers, editors and critics of 'Australian short fiction' and 
how 'Australian short fiction' is to be read. Apparently objective cul-
tural landmarks like 'The Bulletin style,' Australian women's writ-
ing' and 'The Balmain school' - case studies examined in Chapters 4 
and 5 - each owe a great deal to short story anthologies. 
Anthologies are not, of course, the only institutions that de-
termine the sub-field, as I show in Chapter 6. Reference guides and 
critical studies function in the same way, determining, for example, 
what 'fiction' or 'the work of David Malouf means and how it is to 
be read. But the personnel who produce, deliver and consume 
certain kinds of content, the activity that dominates the sub-field of 
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'Australian short fiction,' are also maintained by means of other 
institutions, like 'small magazines,' Australia Council grants and 
'Writers in Residence' programs, writers' festivals, and so on, my 
focus in Chapter 7. 
In the pages that follow I suggest that there is some kind of 
bedrock 'reality,' an objective mechanism that constructs the object 
called 'the cultural field' that my analysis has 'uncovered.' Besides 
this archaeological trope, a favourite of mine, my 'case studies' also 
imply a kind of quasi-scientific objectivity. Analytical 'study' stands 
outside, usually above, the 'cases' which I scrutinise in Part Two. But 
if I am right, if texts are the products of always contestable and his-
torically contingent social practices, then the same must be true of 
my own text too: it is as much a case to be studied and, if studied, can 
be shown to be equally the product of always contestable and contin-
gent social practices. This is not cause for panic, merely for caution. 
My thesis is not an attempt to get any closer to the truth, only to sug-
gest how we might reorientate ourselves to some texts. 
PART 1 
BOOKS DO NOT MAKE THEMSELVES: HOW 
BOOKS GET TO BE, AND GET TO BE VALUED 
AS 'LITERATURE' 
Introduction 
Let me begin with a story. In March 1995 I was teaching Creative 
Writing at the University of Tasmania. In our first classes my 
colleagues suggested we ask our students to judge the literary merit 
of three short stories, an exercise that had been used, apparently 
successfully, the previous year. We writers and Creative Writing 
teachers had no doubt which short story was the best. The 
judgements made by my students, however, indicated that a variety 
of interests determined how the stories were read. Most gave top 
ranking to a story which exhibited some familiar features: a 
narrative structure that introduced a limited set of characters, 
images and ideas; an attention to image and rhythm; an ending that 
signalled closure in the manner of a fable. But others chose a story 
which explored the relation between two women dominated by a 
man. In conversation with my colleagues after the classes I was 
struck by the degree of amazement and frustration they felt that so 
many students got it wrong. What was it, I wondered, that we were 
doing? What had we hoped would happen? The episode occurred 
just as I was beginning this thesis, picking at the scabs of the deeply 
unstable category which we call 'literature,' a category most of us 
tend to think of as a simple, positive object. 
What the short story judging began to help me to see was how 
every discourse is shaped by the discourses which surround and 
weave through it. The competition was played out largely between 
the discourses of the academy — promoting the value of 'literary 
merit' — and feminism — promoting the value of the representation 
of women — and the function of the texts themselves was to signal 
those wider discourses. What impressed me was how deeply 
embedded those discourses were and how apparently naturally and 
habitually we were able to make judgements that were driven by 
them. It was only later that it became clear to me how 
fundamentally the academic institution — in which, after all, the 
episode was played out — determined the winning story. There was, 
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of course, only one. The episode displays the two central features of 
the making of literature: the politico-institutional, often pedagogical, 
relation by which literature is constructed, in this case expressed in 
the authority of the teacher to determine literary values for the 
student; and the largely unconscious, habituated character of the 
process, in this case expressed in the automatic, 'natural' but by no 
means unmediated ease of judging as well as in my colleague's' 
confounded reaction when some students automatically and 
'naturally' judged differently. 
A description of the way literature is made depends on one of 
two opposing notions. On the one hand, literature can be thought of 
as a way of valuing all those cultural products which fill an 'open 
category' as determined by practices - like reading, studying, writing, 
publishing, and so on - which are located in time and space and 
which are contested by social agents - like readers, students, critics, 
writers, publishers, and so on - who have an interest in 
determining the products in this category.' On the other hand, 
literature can be thought of as a set of cultural products which 
exhibit special features (literary features) which can be characterised 
by essential, objective, positive, formal properties which exist 
immanently in the text as identified by disinterested users of this 
literature. 
Fortunately, the view that literature is an open category of 
certain products deemed to be 'literature' by those who use them and 
which are constituted and reconstituted by such use is not novel and 
can marshal a range of sociological, historical and institutional 
theories in its support. There are two fundamental arguments that I 
want to borrow from these theories: first, all social practice, 
including the making of literature, is produced and reproduced 
according to inculcated social norms, which agents habitually use or 
contest; and, secondly, in at least the specific case of literary 
production, such habituated or contested practices are located over 
time and politically and institutionally in a field of competing 
interests. The status of literature as literature depends, of course, on 
the relationship of readers to texts but also on a wider range of social 
practices that determine how literature gets to be, in a material 
sense, but also how literature is prescribed and consecrated, in an 
evaluative sense. In order to describe this process I attempt to chart 
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the social, historical and institutional 'rules of the game' which 
determine who and what counts in the literary field in Australia, in 
general terms to begin with in the first part of the thesis and then by 
describing a number of case studies in more detail in the second part. 
My argument is that literature is always (and only) characterised by 
those products and personnel who hold sway in the literary field at 
any one time. This implies that the literary field is at every moment 
a field of contestation: over definitions, theories and descriptions 
(that is, control) of what counts as literature, especially the literary 
canon; over the practices involved in using (that is, making) 
literature; over access to the material means of production of 
literature; and over the relation of the literary field to other fields 
(where a social agent in the literary field, for example, sells literary 
labour or capital in the market economy). In theorising and 
describing such a field this thesis is not a pure and objective analysis. 
Rather, it is implicated in its own academic field in just the way 
literary books are in the literary field. It is the product of an 
institutionally circumscribed series of practices - to hypothesise or 
theorise, to research, to report, to cite and, not least, to argue with 
originality. The first steps in that series that have led, often 
contingently, to the production of this thesis have been so 
submerged that this apparent first step, the introduction, is really 
some way beyond the notions and practices with which this project 
actually began. This makes it only a kind of introduction, especially 
given that in the writing or the reading of it the notions it contains 
may already be familiar, already 'introduced.' As a result, in each 
time and space in which it is read it will be a different introduction 
or no introduction at all. In its defence, however, introductions are 
always and necessarily generically conventional things, 
conventional ways, that is, of framing the narrative that follows. 
1 0 
I This is the view of literary theorists like Tony Bennett and John Frow. For Bennett, 
literature is "a category of discourse ... [which is] a part of the existing constitution and 
functioning of literary practices, institutions and discourses." See Tony Bennett, Outside 
Literature. London: Routledge, 1990, 5-6. Frow refers to the "set of practices of signification 
which have been socially systematised as a unity and which in turn regulate the production, the 
reception, and the circulation of texts assigned to the category" as 'the literary formation.' See 
Frow, Marxism and Literary History. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 84. 
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Die Hard: the persistence of 'The Author' 
[lit would be worth examining how the author became in-
dividualised in a culture like ours, what status he has been 
given, at what moment studies of authenticity and attribu-
tion began, in what kind of system of valorisation the au-
thor was involved, at what point we began to recount the 
lives of authors rather than of heroes, and how this fun-
damental category of 'the-man-and-his-work criticism' be-
gan. 
Michel Foucault .' 
It would be worth examining the extent to which Foucault's decentring 
of the author has restructured textual studies. His famous essay 'What 
Is An Author?' has made Foucault into something of a patron saint of 
any analysis which wishes to problematise the formation of literature, 
and it is no accident that he should be so often quoted. But it is 
Foucault's 'authorliness,' his authorial presence and continuing author-
itative use, that are precisely and ironically at issue both in his essay and 
its consequences. The field of textual production is, as Foucault argues, 
governed by particular historically constructed and by no means 
'natural' author-functions.' By exposing these Foucault wished to de-
mythologise and to challenge the prevailing valorisation of the author 
as an unproblematic, individual genius/ creator. But the career of 
Foucault and the particular essay 'What Is An Author?' show that those 
functions die hard. Rather than creating a 'stir of indifference' 
(Foucault, 'What Is An Author?' 160) the author-functions that operate 
within and around Foucaules own essay appear to have been especially 
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durable and powerful. Given the insistent quotation from Foucault's 
essay and the spawning of titles on the author-function, were anyone 
else to ask, 'What difference does it make who is speaking?' (160) in 
'What Is An Author?', the unavoidable answer would be, 'every differ-
ence in the world.' 2 And it is precisely this world, that is, the power-
laden materiality of social action, particularly actions to do with texts, 
which is the subject of inquiry here. 
How are texts embedded in a context which makes them mean-
ingful and, further, at all useable; how does such a context constrain the 
individuals (or groups) who use (that is, write, read, buy or teach and 
talk about) texts; and how is it that individuals (and groups) are able to 
make changes to the ways they use them? Foucault's original project in 
'What Is An Author?' was to account for the first question. However 
much he may, in the later version of 'What Is An Author?', have 
wished to dismantle the privileging effects of the author-functions he 
outlines, however he may have wished to contest existing author-func-
tions and politicise the implications of recognising them ('What differ-
ence does it make who is speaking?'), the world of political, institu-
tional and conventional textual practices that constrain textual produc-
tion has remained insistently in place. 3 Despite making them visible, 
the historically specific institutions of writing, pedagogical and reading 
practices by which texts are 'inhabited' have remained forceful. 
Foucault was, of course, right to foreground the consideration of 
the historical and political context or 'extra-text' which has so fruitfully 
problematised literary and cultural studies. Following Foucault's exam-
ination of the author-function, texts have become subjects for analysis 
as particular cases of appropriation (typically concerning what Foucault 
calls 'literary' texts), cases of kinds of authorial construction (which 
make 'authors' into psychological subjects reflecting back on the text), 
and cases in which the author is no longer originary but a circumscrib-
ing form of constraint (148-59). Foucault's method has encouraged an 
examination of the material and social conditions in which texts oper-
ate. He is an ideal patron saint for studies such as this one, having estab-
lished a useful antidote to the 'textual turn' of the post-structuralists. 
The 'death of the author' is dependent on making such a textual 
turn. The textual analytical method of Roland Barthes (at least the early 
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Barthes) and Jacques Derrida is quite at odds with Foucault's historically 
and socially located contextual method. By 'bracketing out' the text from 
its embedding context as Barthes does it is possible to analyse the play of 
a pure chain of signifiers, but this is as much as simply to bracket the so-
cial and material conditions of discourse out of analysis. Language (the 
play of signifier and signified), because unlocated or dislocated in the 
post-structuralist method, becomes radically undecidable. It is precisely 
by relocating it in relation to the social, conventional referents and to 
the social, material institutions which govern the production of any 
text or stretch of speech that it becomes possible to see language as a 
relatively stable thing. 
While meaning is in theory potentially indeterminate or poly-
semous or diffused, in practice people do manage to make meaning be-
cause discourse is conventionally and institutionally constrained. 4 
When people make meaning by engaging in a discourse that is medi-
ated by the particular institutions of textual production, that is, when 
they are 'writing' or 'editing' or 'reading' besides publishing, selling, 
buying, cataloguing books, and so on, they do so because that discourse 
is equally constrained by the habits that they bring to and recreate by do-
ing it. That is, people know what to do with books because there are re-
producing and enduring ways of writing, reading, handling and talking 
about books. This is because there are durable ways in which institu-
tions like publishing, literary criticism, the pedagogical organisation of 
'canonising' text lists, the legitimising of appropriate responses by stu-
dents, and so on, construct and constrain what it is that we do with 
books. 
In taking up an adversarial position against the post-structuralist 
view of the indeterminacy of meaning there is a danger. To argue for 
the material and social conditions that underlie human agency is to ar-
gue against the post-structuralist 'bracketing-out' of those material and 
social conditions and the consequent privileging of the now au-
tonomous text. But at the same time it is only possible to see the matrix 
of material and social conditions which have problematised the hith-
erto unrecognised processes underlying textual production because of 
the post-structuralist questioning of 'literature.' In other words, my cri-
tique of some elements of post structuralism depends on the post-struc- 
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turalist undermining of literature as some kind of received category 
that results simply from the marriage of the true minds of the genius 
author and the attentive reader. 
By denying the natural primacy of 'the author' and 'the author's 
meaning' the post-structuralists usefully reworked the way we can 
think about the text as a form of 'activity, a production.' 5 Yet 'the in-
finite deferral' of the signified (Barthes, 'From Work to Text,' 76) in this 
activity weakens the analytical purchase that post-structuralism 
otherwise offers. By methodologically 'bracketing out' the text from the 
institutions and conventions which operate in the production and use 
of texts, the post-structuralist analysis reaches an impasse: it cannot 
usefully explain how it is that 'literature' actually gets to be produced, 
that is, it cannot answer the question: how is it that writers of texts actu-
ally do (know how to) write? To ask this is, of course, the same as ask-
ing: how is it that readers come to read and make shared or communi-
cable understandings derived from a text? 6 
The burden on a theory of the material and social conditions for 
the production of texts, and specifically of 'literary' texts, is to try to an-
swer these questions which are, fundamentally, to do with the agency of 
individuals, in order to show how writers, readers, critics, and so on are 
more than 'judgemental dolts' mechanically responding to the social 
system which they inhabit. My argument, then, is that actors involved 
in textual production are more than simply reactive to the system. 7 
LITERARY THEORY 
What gains and losses are evident in the post-structuralist method? 
Roland Barthes repositions the literary critical enterprise as an explica-
tion of 'the rules governing the production of meaning.'8 Jacques 
Derrida repositions it similarly as the deconstruction or de-sedimenta-
tion of meaning, 'tracing ... a path among textual strata in order to stir 
up and expose forgotten and dormant sediments of meaning which 
have accumulated and settled into the text's fabric' (Harari, 'Critical 
Factions/Critical Fictions,' 37). Both projects privilege the text as the 
autonomous, self-sufficient object of enquiry. Texts become, simply, 
autonomous stretches of language, in which 'the author is never more 
than the instance writing, just as I is nothing other than the instance 
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saying I: language knows a "subject," not a "person," and this subject, 
empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it, suffices to 
make language "hold together." 9 Language, now apparently self-suffi-
dent, constructs itself (Barthes, 'Death of the Author,' 146). This au-
tonomy comprises a rejection of the valorising context in which the text 
is located and of the appeal to the authority of the author in questions 
of interpretation. (The concentration on the text itself, or the word on 
the page is not, of course, a necessarily radical step, given that a similar 
reading strategy was practised by critics of the Leavisite or Practical or 
New Criticism schools.") 
The move that is characteristic of much of Barthes's theory is the 
attempt to isolate the text from the material and social conditions in 
which he finds it. This isolating is the point of the prescriptive urgency 
in his essay, 'From Work To Text'. In this essay, if 'the work is concrete, 
occupying a portion of book-space (in a library, for example); [while] the 
Text ... is a methodological field' (Barthes, 'From Work To Text,' 74), 
texts can be analysed according to a new strategic methodology which 
need not recognise the constructed and constraining functions of the 
context in which the text hitherto was seen to exist. Barthes is at pains 
in this essay to labour the binary distinction between text and work in 
order to validate his claim to treat the text in isolation. 1 [T]he work can 
be seen in bookstores, in card catalogues, and on course lists, while the 
text reveals itself, articulates itself according to or against certain rules. 
While the work is held in the hand, the text is held in language: it exists 
only as discourse' (75, emphasis added). The distinction involves an 
interesting relation. The work is here subject to the institutions that 
determine value, while the text is independent of such determinations. 
This dislocating of value, especially in distinguishing 'high' and 'low' 
fiction, was, of course, a principal objective in Barthes's strategy. But the 
important effect is to isolate the text from the institutions and 
conventions (for example, bookstores, card catalogues, course lists) that 
define the way the text is produced and taken up. 
If the distinction between the work and the text holds good, the 
text can be said somehow autonomously to reveal and articulate itself. 
But how the text does this remains, in 'From Work To Text,' problem-
atic, especially when texts reveal and articulate themselves 
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Intertextually' (77), according to the 'collaborative' play' of readers read-
ing (79-80). Even so, proposing the autonomy of the text provides 
Barthes with significant analytical purchase, allowing him to appre-
hend and account for an indeterminate diffusion of meanings because 
the text is independent of the sorts of conventional and institutional 
practices which now, for Barthes, only construct and constrain what we 
do with works. The 'dilatory ... plurality of meaning' (76) Barthes is able 
to claim depends on the fact that the text 'cannot be apprehended as part 
of a hierarchy or even a simple division of genres' (75). By locating the 
text in discourse, as a kind of pure, unconstrained language, Barthes 
attempts to minimise the problematic of value: all texts become equal 
discourses which work in similar ways, according to similar observable 
structures.'" Yet such a dislocation also has another consequence: it 
prevents Barthes from being able to explain how an autonomous lan-
guage or discourse which is independent of socially located canonising 
hierarchies or the conventions of genres can establish rules for interpre-
tation. Even so, Barthes's distinction between work and text enables the 
fruitful corrective to a reductive criticism of the-man-and-his-works or 
'the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction ... [as] the author 
"confiding" in us' (Barthes, 'Death of the Author,' 143) in which 
literature is simply reified as 'that which is the subject of criticism,' and 
the meaning of the work as 'that which is discovered by criticism.' 
Given the difficulties that underlie Barthes's case, it might be 
useful to consider the political strategies that organise his distinction be-
tween work and text. Barthes's strategic claims for the 'orphan text' 
(Barthes, 'From Work to Text,' 78) and the 'infinite deferral' of meaning 
(Barthes, 'Death of the Author,' 147) can be understood in terms of the 
political situation underpinning his position, that is, in terms of the 
need to challenge orthodox literary models. This informs the polemical 
nature of the claim he makes to represent the vanguard in literary 
theory.12 Barthes refuses the relevance of contextual considerations in 
order to distance himself from previous theories which do in some way 
account for the context of the text and he does this in order to stake a 
claim to theoretical innovation. This is the particular strategy he brings 
to the consideration of the authorless text, where the real target is 
Criticism '[which]  is today undermined along with the Author' (147) 
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and to the distinction between work and text, but it is an endemic 
strategy, useful in maintaining the distinctiveness of structuralist and 
post-structuralist theory (and, of course, of any new theory, including 
the theory developed here). 
The strategy can be seen in play in the early essay, 'Authors and 
Writers' 13 where Barthes uses it to organise a similar work/ text-like dis-
tinction for authors/ writers: '[t]he author participates in the priest's 
role, the writer in the clerk's; the author's language is an intransitive act 
(hence, in a sense, a gesture), the writer's an activity' (Barthes, 'Authors 
and Writers,' 190, emphasis added). Works and authors are social 
products while texts and writers are linguistic processes. What is the 
source of such binary distinctions? For one thing, Barthes's 
methodology originates out of a linguistic model of social action (the 
familiar Saussurian pedigree for structuralist theory as a whole) which 
encourages the use of explanatory language metaphors: 'language, that 
model institution'(191) 'can provide the initial terms and principles .., 
[so] it seems reasonable to elect linguistics as a basic model for the 
structural analysis of narrative' (Barthes, 'Introduction to the Structural 
Analysis of Narratives,' 259). For another, his theory is the beginning of 
a development from and reaction against the structuralist emphasis on 
the fixed rules of langue. The effect is to transpose the langue/parole 
distinction in Saussure's linguistic model onto the work/text or au-
thor/ writer, in order to claim the limitless possibilities of process — the 
fluidity of parole, text, writing process — as the proper focus of analysis. 
Barthes's move enables him to claim a field of interest and vari-
ous theoretical models at the same time and in opposition to 
alternative reductive or positive kinds of literary criticism. But the 
significance of 'An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of 
Narratives' lies in the transitional moment in which it was written. 
Barthes is, here, in transit between structuralism and post-
structuralism. Annette Lavers sees 1959-60 as the turning point in 
Barthes's career, the period where he turns from 'textualism' to 
'contextualism,' or at least towards a theory that can account for the lif e-
cycle of the literary work. 14 The essay is that moment in which Barthes 
jumps from a structuralist to a post-structuralist account, where he 
describes reading, (the processes that construct meaning by engagement 
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with a text — Roland Barthes reading Goldfinger), as though describing 
observable and classifiable units in the text. Given the linguistic model 
that organises his thinking, where the text has the status of either 
langue or parole, Barthes is unable to conceive of the making of 
meaning in a text as simultaneously constrained (by conventional 
practices of using texts) and diffused (by particular, idiosyncratic 
practices). In the nature of a still structuralist analysis, Barthes's own 
multiplying reading practices are reified as diffusing units in the text. 
Having bracketed out the text from its context, that is, having consigned 
the constrained work to the oblivion of a socially structured kind of 
langue, Barthes is left with the inescapable conclusion that the text can 
offer only diffused and finally indeterminate meanings without being 
able to explain how it is that social agents frequently do similar sorts of 
things with texts. Or almost. 
At the end of 'Introduction to the Structural Analysis of 
Narratives' Barthes imports into textual analysis the sort of context he 
quarantines out in 'From Work to Text.' Introduction to the Structural 
Analysis of Narratives' ends, interestingly, with a contextual account of 
narrative: 'every narrative is dependent on a "narrative situation," the 
set of protocols according to which the narrative is "consumed" (287). 
Given such a narrative situation, 'however familiar, however casual 
may today be the act of opening a novel or a newspaper or of turning on 
the television, nothing can prevent that humble act from installing in 
us, all at once and in its entirety, the narrative code we are going to 
need' (287-88). To claim that a 'narrative situation' as 'the set of 
protocols' triggers 'the narrative code we are going to need' is as much 
as to claim that the text operates within the kind of constraining and 
constructing context which elsewhere Barthes discounts. The 
contextualist analysis which explains why agents do similar sorts of 
things with texts is coming in the back door. 
Why does Barthes return to a social theory that he would other-
wise wish to reject? The analytical purchase derived from seeing the 
text as the site of infinite possible meanings does enable Barthes to ac-
count for the way enduring texts (say, Shakespeare's plays and sonnets) 
can meaningfully be appropriated by people across space and time. That 
is, Barthes provides a workable account of the transposability of texts. 
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But in order to show why this transposing has not actually led to the 
disintegration of the text (to infinitely diffused and incompara-
ble/incommunicable Shakespeares) he needs to step outside the lin-
guistic model, to the 'protocols' and 'codes' of social theory. In order to 
disguise this sociological turn, in a move typical of the structuralists, 
rather than acknowledging the linguistic in the social he imports the 
whole of social action into linguistics. 15 The theory that Barthes out-
lines in 'The Death of the Author' is a theory of intertextual relations. 
The field occupied by those (readers and writers) who engage with texts 
'has no origin than language itself' (Barthes, 'Death of the Author,' p. 
146) and the reader is also a text, 'without history, biography, psychol-
ogy; ... simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the 
traces by which the written text is constituted' (148). Given that the 
grounds for textual practice are only textual, readers somehow realise 
themselves ('hold together the traces') in reading without having any 
extra-textual history, biography, psychology. They are merely textual 
moments which, somehow, are able to resist the radical unintelligibility 
that is consequent on occupying only 'that neutral, composite, oblique 
space where our subject slips away' (142). In such a theory, where the 
practices described are also the only constituting grounds of those prac-
tices, readers somehow pull themselves up by their own bootstraps, so 
to speak, to a position in which intelligibility is possible. 
There are, clearly, problems with Barthes's account of textuality. 
But there are gains to be made from a post-structuralist reading of the 
text as a process of discovering or uncovering its 'infinite' irreducible' 
meanings. Such a view of textual production (I mean the production of 
the text as a meaningful thing, producing it by writing or reading it or 
by reviewing it, cataloguing it, and so on, in particular ways) 
emphasises the particular strategic practices that make a text. It stresses 
that a text is not fixed or given but must be 'made to go,' in Barthes's 
terms (Barthes, 'From Work to Text,' 80), 16 or be reproduced by the 
deconstructing or de-sedimenting of those 'repositories of a meaning 
which was never present, whose signified presence is always recon-
stituted ... belatedly,' that is, after the fact or in the fact of reading, in 
Derrida's terms.17 Meaning, in this view, is constructed in the process of 
using the text and can change over time. What is to be gained from this 
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is a way of explaining how texts are 'made to go,' how they are 
(re)produced according to particular institutional and conventional 
constraints in common ways for different users, and how coherent and 
dynamic social and material conditions construct changing meanings 
over time and space. What is, most significantly, lost in Barthes's 
account is the function of the agent in the process of textual production. 
For Barthes, just where the text is open and where it is closed to playful 
reading, that is, just where the text encourages active manipulation and 
elsewhere merely passive consumption, is uncertain. Lacking any social 
theory of action, it remains unclear how much agency the reader 
actually has. Further, it remains unclear how much agency the writer 
has and, a closely connected problem, how the writer is able to effect 
change in the ways texts are produced. In other words, given only the 
bracketed text, Barthes does not, and cannot, explain how writers can 
opt to produce the possibilities for more open and more closed readings. 
Indeed, so far as the writer is concerned, the only freedom available 
occurs, according to Barthes, during the instant of choice between the 
otherwise coercive possibilities in language. 18 
A few words are in order here regarding my method in dealing with 
Barthes's theory. I am, according to his own method, critiquing his the-
ory as a text. But why a critique of Barthes? If, as I have argued, his posi-
tion is limited by certain academically circumscribed possibilities then 
so is mine. In dealing with the material and social conditions which 
underpin textual production, in dealing with questions of writing and 
reading, I am bound to a relation to post-structuralism of one kind or 
another. This is because anybody dealing with literary theory is bound 
by a relation of synthesis with and antithesis to previous theoretical po-
sitions. My method is not, however, quite respectful. My dealing with 
Barthes is, as he would put it, 'not a peaceful operation' (Barthes, 'From 
Work to Text,' 73). Where he brackets out the social and material 
conditions which underlie textual production, my oppositional move is 
necessarily to bracket them in. But the options which are available to 
me are strictly limited. I can accept Barthes's method, revise it or refuse 
it but cannot ignore it. The same was true for Barthes. Barthes's method 
can be traced back to Husserl's attempt to get at the deep structures of 
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the mind by means of his essentialising 'phenomenological reduction,' 
the 'bracketing out' of unwanted intrusions into a theory of immediate 
intuition or abstract consciousness. This trace illustrates how, for 
Barthes and for Heidegger before him, the same options of accepting, 
revising or refusing, in this case accepting, revising or refusing 
Husserl's method, are necessarily brought into play. Those intrusions 
that Husserl brackets out Heidegger just brackets back in. He does so not 
only because it easily wins the argument but because there is little else 
he can do. 
The bracketing out is so fundamental a step that any following 
step must account for it in one way or another. And the same pattern 
can be observed in the phenomenologically influenced bracketing 
method of the Russian Formalists and the consequent historicist reac-
tion. 19 So when Barthes uses the same bracketing method the rules of 
the game have been played out already. By bracketing back in all that 
practical, historically accountable social activity that underlies the uses 
of texts I am quite simply undercutting Barthes's position and demon-
strating my own. By bracketing out the world of works from his own ac-
tivity in theorising, Barthes may pretend that his own practice and re-
ception is outside of the world of works. But by bracketing that world 
back in to the analysis it is possible to see both how Barthes, or any 
other writer, produces a theory within circumscribed possibilities that 
result from the specific social and material conditions in which the 
writing occurs and is received and dealt with in future, and equally how 
my theory is bound to those very same conditions. The fact that my ar-
gument here is so circumscribed is, of course, an advantage for my ar-
gument, because I am claiming that the context in which I operate is 
central to the very argument I am able to make or even think. It is 
equally a disadvantage for Barthes's argument because he is claiming 
that the text (for example, his essay 'From Work to Text') 'articulates it-
self.' 
The methodology of Michel Foucault aims precisely to uncover and ac-
count for those social and material conditions which underpin all insti-
tutional and conventional practices, including those institutional and 
conventional practices that surround and pervade the text. The 'author- 
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functions' that Foucault describes, that is, those institutions and con-
ventions that circumscribe the use of all texts, explain how and why it is 
that textual meanings tend not to proliferate infinitely, even though 
any text has the potential to do so. 
In 'What Is An Author?' Foucault articulates a new model for 
understanding the functions of the institution of the author or, in the 
version of the essay in Josue Harari's edition, 'author functions.' Rather 
than being the individual source who 'naturally' produces a text, 'the 
author' is considered problematically, as the set of prescriptive practices 
that constrain the way in which a text is understood and used. This set 
of practices is usually, in Western cultures, assigned to particular physi-
cal individuals called 'authors.' According to Foucault, 'Mlle author's 
name manifests the appearance of a certain discursive set and indicates 
the status of this discourse within a society and culture' (Foucault, 
'What Is An Author?' in Harari, 147), or, to use the earlier version of 
the same essay, 'the name of an author is a variable that accompanies 
only certain texts' (Foucault, 'What Is An Author?' in Bouchard, 124), 
which are, typically, 'literary' texts. 20 The author is, therefore, not a 
cause but a product of discourse, that is, a 'characteristic of the mode of 
existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within 
society' (Foucault, 'What Is An Author?' in Harari, 148), or, to use the 
earlier version again, 'the function of an author is to characterise the 
existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourses within a 
society' (Foucault, 'What Is An Author?' in Bouchard, 124). Texts exist, 
circulate and operate in constrained ways which are, so far as Foucault 
is concerned in 'What Is An Author?', a result of the policing powers of 
the institution of the author. Such functions include the power to 
appropriate certain discourses as objects which can then be protected, to 
the advantage of those who hold the 'ownership rights' (literally, the 
copyright) to the discourse-as-object, or censored, to the disadvantage of 
those who hold 'ownership rights' (because to censor a book is to censor 
its writer(s)). The institution of the author, further, provides greater 
protection to some texts than to others. Foucault explains how 'literary' 
texts were, until the late seventeenth century, circulated freely, without 
necessary reference to the author's name, while 'scientific' texts 
depended on the authority of their authors. This position, Foucault 
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claims, reverses towards the end of the seventeenth century so that: 
'Ew]e now ask of each poetic or fictional text: from where does it come, 
who wrote it, when, under what circumstances, or beginning with what 
design?' (Foucault, 'What Is An Author?' in Harari, 149). 21 
All of these, at first sight, natural questions are highly problem-
atic, as Foucault notes. They establish the grounds on which a text can 
be dealt with as literary in the first place. They are also, necessarily, ret-
rospective constructions, salvaging authorless texts from the wilderness 
of collaboration (for example, 'Homer') or non-ascription (for example, 
'William Langland'). And they conceal the institutional nature of au-
thoring (a third aspect of the use of the author) by suggesting a 'realistic 
status' for the author as a 'psychological projection' of his or her texts. 
The critical apparatus that makes as its subject the man-and-his-works 
(where the works unproblematically are taken to reflect the man) is the 
specific target here. 
Critics ... try to give this intelligible being a realistic status, 
by discerning, in the individual, a 'deep' motive, a 'creative' 
power, or a 'design,' the milieu in which writing originates. 
Nevertheless, these aspects of an individual which we des-
ignate as making him an author are only a projection, in 
more or less psychologising terms, of the operations that we 
force texts to undergo, the connections that we make, the 
traits that we establish as pertinent, the continuities that we 
recognise, or the exclusions that we practice. (150) 
Such reconstructions of the author are, for Foucault, merely one aspect 
of the author-authority in the text. Further embedded 'in' the text are 'a 
certain number of signs referring to the author ... personal pronouns, 
adverbs of time and place, and verb conjugation' which, to the extent 
that they do not refer to the real speaker, signal a 'plurality of self' (152) 
which is typical of texts with author-functions.22 
There is a problem with Foucaules argument here, in that such 
signs as personal pronouns, adverbs of time and place and verb conju-
gations are equally evident in other texts or stretches of discourse in 
which the author-function is not present, in letters, diaries, corporate 
reports, joke telling, and so on, and such signs have the capacity to refer 
specifically to the present writer or speaker or to equally plural selves. 
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That is, Foucault has no good grounds on which to claim that the plu-
rality of self in recognisably authored and institutionally consecrated 
texts is specific only to those texts. All texts are always capable of carry-
ing a plurality of selves, depending on the way the text is taken up. To 
argue against Foucault here is, however, only to argue against his 
residual inclination to mark the 'literary' text as somehow distinct in its 
internal features from other types of text. This does not restrict the ap-
plication of his argument to an examination of the social and material 
conditions for the production of 'literature.' In fact, quite the reverse is 
true. The fact that 'literary' texts are not in any way 'internally' different 
from other types of text, that is, the fact that they work in the same sorts 
of ways as other texts, suggests that 'literature' is simply what is con-
structed by the 'literary' context: it is 'what gets taught.' 23 This means 
that distinctions between genres and styles are not internal to the text 
but external, the product of descriptions and ascriptions and pedagogical 
prescriptions.24 
However much it is possible to quibble over the extent to which 
the text is dependent on institutional and conventional markers, what 
remains useful in Foucault's account of the author-function is his repo-
sitioning of the argument. After 'What Is An Author?' it is (or should 
be) no longer possible for a literary critic or theorist to consider the au-
thor in an unproblematic way. Foucault prises open the terms of debate 
to make it possible to consider the relation of the subject (the writer, 
reader, critic, student) to the text. It reverses the way we consider the 
production of the text so that the author becomes one functional (rather 
than the original) variable in the production of the text as a socially 
useable artefact. It denies the privileged protection and constraining of 
the text associated with the author whose function is, in Western cul-
tures at least, to 'impede ... the free circulation, the free manipulation, 
the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction' 
(159). 
To demonstrate this, let me consider the construction and 
continuing reconstruction of Shakespeare as a cultural commodity. 
Shakespeare provides an especially neat example of Foucault's argu-
ment, and the neatness is not by accident. Foucault's repositioning of 
the way Shakespeare can be dealt with is a major aim in 'What Is An 
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Author?' (146) and the stimulus to much current Shakespeare re-
search.25 What we mean by 'Shakespeare' is constructed by the institu-
tional ways of dealing with 'Shakespearean texts,' the Shakespeare 
canon,' Shakespeare in production,' Shakespeare scholarship.' All of 
these institutions are problematic. What 'counts' as a Shakespeare text 
varies according to the editorial emphasis placed on assessments of 
'historical accuracy' or 'corruption' (following the Folio or Quartos or 
bits of both), the use of 'historical' or modern spelling, the degree of 
(in)attention to aspects of performance, and so on. What 'counts' in the 
canon is similarly dependent on particular cultural concerns to do with, 
for example, the value of autonomous and collaborative authorship. 
And 'who' Shakespeare is thought to be depends on the cultural climate 
which emphasises academic learning (the small Latin and less Greek), 
performance (Shakespeare as a playwright), poetry (the Shakespeare of 
the sonnets), and so on. All of these institutions construct what we 
mean when we speak or write about Shakespeare, so much so that the 
academic industry which uses 'Shakespeare' as grist for its mill has now 
become its own subject, examining the grounds on which the industry 
itself is founded. 
The field of analysis has widened mightily since Foucault wrote 
his ground-breaking essay. As he points out, the constraints on and the 
constraining power and authority of Shakespeare depends on the veri-
fication of 'Shakespeare' texts: 
if we proved that Shakespeare did not write [the] sonnets 
which pass for his, that would constitute a significant 
change and affect the manner in which the author's name 
functions. If we proved that Shakespeare wrote Bacon's 
Orga non by showing that the same author wrote both the 
works of Bacon and Shakespeare, that would be [another] 
type of change which would entirely modify the function-
ing of the author's name. (146) 
More recent discussion takes Foucault's method a step further, so that 
what is meant by 'Shakespeare' depends on the way the poems and 
plays are edited and taught and on the way the plays are produced, so 
that, following the Berliner Ensemble's 1986 production of Troilus and 
Cressida, for example, '[a] story that has always been understood as a 
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misogynist parable of female infidelity is now seen as a misanthropist 
parable of male betrayal and brutality.' 26 And even that 'always' be-
comes problematic. I know only that Shakespeare may have conceived 
of the play from a misogynist perspective, seeing Cressida in a certain 
way (which I can only guess at, not inhabiting the cultural milieu avail-
able to him), and that contemporary productions make different read-
ings of Shakespeare 'thinkable,' and so, for example, can reconstruct 
Shakespeare from a, feminist perspective. 
Foucault's work on the 'author-function' has, for obvious rea-
sons, become central in literary theoretical debate. His problematising of 
the author is both an inescapable fact and the source of fruitful possibili-
ties in literary studies and is now embedded in the institutional prac-
tices (the analytical methods, text lists, course structures) of academic 
institutions. But his questioning of the authoring and authority of a text 
is just one aspect of a wider examination of the various constraints on 
discourse. In dealing with discourse, Foucault argues, 'its appearance 
and its regularity, ... we should look for its external conditions of exis-
tence, for that which gives rise to the chance series of these events and 
fixes its limits.' 27 Those external conditions include explicit prohibi-
tions against, for example, the recognition of discourses by those who 
are insane or untruthful; constraining institutions such as secondary 
commentary, the personalising psychological projections of authorship 
and the depersonalising tools of disciplines which govern the textual 
possibilities of discourses; and the constraining effects of rituals and dis-
course communities or fellowships which govern the broadly social 
uses of discourses (Foucault, 'Orders of Discourse,' 7-30). The author as 
an institution of constraint here is merely one institution among many. 
Why did the question of the author come to occupy the place it does in 
Foucault's essay, 'What Is An Author?' and why has this essay and its 
problematised author so overwhelmed literary theory? 
In 'What Is An Author?' Foucault is, firstly, engaged in a debate, 
or several debates, as Kevin Brophy points out in his analysis of the es-
say, most obviously with the school of 'the-man-and-his-work criticism' 
that is discounted at the beginning of the essay, but also with the 
Barthesian strategy of disposing of the concept of the author: 
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it is not enough to declare that we should do without the 
writer (the author) and study the work in itself. The word 
'work' and the unity that it designates are probably as prob-
lematic as the status of the author's individuality. 28 
(Foucault, 'What Is An Author?' in Harari, 144) 
While Barthes foregrounds the particular institution of the author, his 
method of dealing with it is inadequate: it is insufficient simply to legis-
late the problem of the author out of analysis. And because this is what 
Barthes attempts to do Foucault is bound in the academically circum-
scribed possibilities in which the debate about discourse takes place to 
deal with the problem. In beginning his discussion by appealing to an 
almost exhaustive area of possible research Chow the author became 
individualised in a culture like ours, what status he has been given, at 
what moment studies of authenticity and attribution began, in what 
kind of system of valorisation the author was involved, at what point 
we began to recount the lives of authors rather than of heroes, and how 
this fundamental category of "the-man-and-his-work criticism" began' 
(141)), Foucault establishes an alternative methodological field to the 
bracketed-out textualism of Barthes, and, to extend Barthes's orphan 
metaphor, 'fathers' a new inter-disciplinary field of research. 
The very fact that research into the material and social conditions 
for textual production is seen to be or claimed to have been stimulated 
by the particular essay 'What Is An Author?' has important conse-
quences for the place of the constraining institution of the author.29 
From being one institution among many in 'Orders of Discourse' it be-
comes central and originary in 'What Is An Author?' The irony in this 
is that the author (Foucault) and the text ('What Is An Author?') be-
come central and originary even in the act of disputing the centrality 
and originating power of the author in his text. Even though 'the au-
thor ... is not in fact the cause, origin, or starting-point of the phe-
nomenon of the written or spoken articulation of a [text] ... [but only] a 
particular, vacant place that may in fact be filled by different individu-
als,' 30 Foucault's authority and text are the cause, origin, starting point 
for a way of thinking because the place in the text has not, in fact, been 
filled by different individuals but by 'Foucault' in a way that is policed 
by the sorts of author functions I have considered above. 
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The text 'What Is An Author?' may, of course, escape its author 
in many ways, including the one that has been illustrated above, where 
the two versions of the essay are in a relation of mutation, the earlier 
version nominalising the personal 'functions of the author,' where the 
author is a concrete noun, the later version systematising the 'author 
function' as an abstract noun. Foucault, similarly, slips between the ear-
lier version that ends with 'the teasing, philosophical, open-ended "We 
can easily imagine [a culture where discourse would circulate without 
any need for an author]" and the later 'political, prophetic and anti-
bourgeois call for a revolution of sorts in fiction production' (Brophy, 
Creativity, 20). In examining the ambiguities of this mutation, where 
the status of the various possible versions of the essay - revisions, 
translations, rewritings - remains unclear, Kevin Brophy argues that 
'the hold of the author on the text here becomes tenuous and seem to 
slip' (20). But the policing of the texts remains formidable. In terms of 
the conventions of publishing, the two versions are merely copies of 
Foucault's and nobody else's original copyright text! Evidence of 
editorial input is suppressed (21). And in terms of the constraints of 
academic citation, to step beyond the text, few people refer to Harari's or 
Bouchard's essays. As Brophy points out, in the case of a third redaction 
in the Harari version of the essay reprinted in Paul Rabinow's The 
Foucault Reader, 'a photograph of Foucault's shaved head looks 
straight out at the reader as if the man is about to speak' (21). 'What Is 
An Author?' belongs to Foucault. 
The way Foucault's own text is read and taken up indicates the 
power of the author as an institutional constraint: simultaneously, the 
essay attacks and constrains the attack on the authority of 'the author' 
and its own author. With astonishing neatness, the mild neutrality of 
Foucault's interest in the constraints on discourse is played out in the 
struggle and contradiction between what the text ostensibly says (which 
is that author functions are questionable historical, artificial constraints 
that may be broached) and what it actually does (which is, in practice 
each time the theory is taken up, to reinforce the constraints on author-
ity which it seeks to question). The history of the deployment of 
Foucault's essay would reveal how every discourse operates as the locus 
of political struggle and ideological contention. But the fact that 
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Foucault and his texts cannot (or cannot yet) escape the power of the in-
stitutional constraints on discourse is, paradoxically, proof of his posi-
tion. It shows that language is political, used always within a practical 
social context, in Foucault's case the context of the academic hierarchy, 
to dispute over, seize or protect material goods, kinds of privilege or 
prestige. If we always use discourse in general in this way we do not do 
so consciously. We locate ourselves unproblematically in 'the natural 
order of things' so that practices like writing or reading particular books 
in particular ways, knowing which particular books to buy, and so on, 
appear not to be political practices at all. How it is that we operate in 
such an unproblematic way, failing to see the politics of our practices 
will be considered at the end of Chapter Three. For the moment there is 
a more pressing problem to face. 
At the end of 'What Is An Author?' Foucault substitutes the term 
'subject' for the now problematic term 'author.' In doing so he enables 
us to deal with the problem of the author, authority and authorising as 
social practices. But he also opens up a new set of problems to do with 
the subject, namely: the relation of the subject as a kind of effect of the 
causal system in which he or she operates; and the question of the ca-
pacity for subjects to effect change in that system. To frame such prob-
lems in terms of the relation of subject to text is to ask: how is it that 
subjects 'know' what to write or read, which way or ways to write or 
read, or what books to buy in the first place? These are, to use the ter-
minology of Foucault, questions of the relation of dependency in the 
'insertion' of the 'subject' in a 'system of dependencies' (158), or, to use 
the more analytically fruitful terminology of social theorists, questions 
to do with the praxis of social agents. In order to see how books get to 
be, that is, how people do know how to and what to read or write or do 
with books I shall turn to social theories of action. 
SOCIAL THEORY 
When an individual sits down to write or read, his or her actions and 
expectations are already constructed, institutionally defined by previous 
practice and, often, by pedagogical routines. So, any 
author who sits down to write a text, at the edge of which 
lurks a possible oe uvr e, resumes the function of the author. 
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What he writes and does not write, what he sketches out, 
even in preliminary sketches for the work, and what he 
drops as simple mundane remarks, all this interplay of dif-
ferences is prescribed by the author-function. It is from his 
new position, as an author, that he will fashion - from all 
he might have said, from all he says daily, at any time - the 
still shaky profile of his oeuvre. (Foucault, 'Orders of 
Discourse,' 14-15, emphasis added) 
Foucault's description provides considerable purchase on the interplay 
of the 'internalised' and the 'actual' practice of writing. When the au-
thor sits down to write, there exists a set of usually abstract expectations 
and concrete practices. But, again, the account presents as many prob-
lems as it attempts to explain. The oeuvre that lurks at the edge of the 
text is, simultaneously, imagined (the author's projected oeuvre at the 
completion of his or her career), actual (in the works of the author that 
may already exist for purposes of comparison) and retrospective (in the 
critical reception of the work over time). That is, for Foucault, the o e u-
vr e which in some way influences the text exists 'in' the author (as an 
imaginary thing) and 'outside' of the author (in the material and criti-
cally reconstructed existence of the set of works). The unresolved ten-
sion in Foucault's model of the author-writing-the-work can be seen in 
the ambiguity of the prescribed interplay of differences. Where 
'interplay' suggests some freedom for the writer, 'prescribing,' in which 
the scripting is constrained by some kind of pre-scripting, does not. Nor 
does it explain the degree of the relation of dependence of the writer to 
that prescribed set of author-functions. 
Several social theorists have wrestled with the sort of problem 
that remains unresolved in Foucault's account, that is, with the prob-
lem of the freedom and constraints within which human actors possess 
agency. Social theory may be of some use in attempting to explain why 
it is that social actors engage in practices (like using books) that are regu-
lar, regulated and enduring but that are also open to the possibility of 
individual creativity. Social theory, that is, may help to explain why it 
is that social actors are able to use (write, read, buy, talk about) books in 
both received and new ways. Pierre Bourdieu, most promisingly, has 
been enthusiastically harnessed in the pursuit of an explanation of the 
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social practice of such cultural production as writing 'literature.' 
Bourdieu's attraction lies not least in his account of cultural capital and 
the related concept of the field of cultural production and in the fact 
that his position on cultural production is deliberately opposed to the 
emphasis on structures that is typical of structuralism. But his interest 
for social theorists lies mainly in his account of habitus. Habitus, ac-
cording to Bourdieu refers: to those 
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, 
that is, as principles which generate and organise practices 
and representations that can be objectively adapted to their 
outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends 
or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to 
attain them. Objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without be-
ing in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be 
collectively orchestrated without being the product of the 
organising action of a conductor; 31 
or to 
an acquired system of generative schemes ... [which make] 
possible the free production of ... the thoughts, perceptions 
and actions inherent in the particular conditions of ... 
production ... [but] not along the lines of a mechanical de-
terminism; (Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 99) 
or to 
the strategy-generating principle enabling agents to cope 
with unforeseen and ever-changing situations ... [,that is, to] 
a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, inte-
grating past experiences, functions at every moment as a 
matrix of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to the analogi-
cal transfer of schemes permitting the solution of similarly 
shaped problems;32 
or to that concept which satisfies the 'theoretical intention ... to get out 
from under the philosophy of consciousness without doing away with 
the agent, in its truth of a practical operator of object constructions;' 33 or, 
finally, to a habituated 'second nature' or 'feel for the game' which 
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gives its possessors a 'nose' or 'feeling', without any need for 
cynical calculation, for 'what needs to be done,' where to do 
it, how and with whom, in view of all that has been done 
and is being done, all those who are doing it, and where 
(Bourdieu, Field of Cultural Production, 95; see also 234). 
Bourdieu's care in defining habitus is well justified because in ar-
ticulating the concept of habitus he intends to resolve one of the major 
preoccupations of sociology, the problem of agency itself. The critical 
pressure on his definitions, the fact that they will be and have been 
prised apart to see how they might work (or, more to the point, might 
be broken), forces Bourdieu to assimilate the problems of social theory 
into the definition itself. So the negative conditions which the concept 
is supposed to resolve ('without presupposing a conscious aiming at 
ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain 
them,' without being in any way the product of obedience to rules,' 
'without being the product of the organising action of a conductor,' not 
along the lines of a mechanical determinism' and 'without doing away 
with the agent') and the positive conditions which the concept is sup-
posed to enable ('making possible the free production of thoughts, per-
ceptions and actions,' enabling agents to cope with unforeseen and 
ever-changing situations' and 'infinitely diversified tasks') are explicitly 
written in. The problem for Bourdieu is to account for the gap between 
the previous, pre-given and predetermining positions (and the disposi-
tions that come with them) which agents inherit and the current dispo-
sitions which agents use to act in ways which are variable or free. The 
point of his account of habitus is to attempt to wrestle the agent free 
from his or her determining background, allowing the possibility of 
novel action. In this account the agent becomes central because his or 
her capacity to think, feel, act, and so on, is not seen to be systematic but 
incorporated, that is, literally embodied in his or her habitual yet adapt-
able dispositions (broadly, his or her socially and culturally normative 
knowledge, attitudes, expectations, including mannerisms, posture, 
dress sense, accent, and so on). As Bourdieu claims, 'via habitus, practi-
cal sense and strategy, what is reintroduced [into social theory] is agent, 
action, practice.'34 The account of habitus as that space between the so-
cial system and the individual practice of agents, that bodily incorpora- 
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tion of a seemingly intuitive 'feel for the game' appears to offer consid-
erable promise in explaining how it is that writers inherit a socially and 
culturally normative knowledge and actually deploy it in new ways. 35 
Every version of Bourdieu's account of habitus (as can be seen in 
the definitions above) is particularly sensitive to the problem of deter-
minism and seeks to avoid it in a rhetorical way. So the habitus is al-
ways emphatically asserted to be improvisatory, strategic, orienting, 
generative in order to avoid its being considered to be the mere me-
chanical interface between previous predetermined systems and cur-
rent ones.36 Such rhetorical insistence is, at first glance, persuasive but 
in fact masks a weakness in the concept. This is not to say that habitus is 
not useful. For my purposes it makes the agent central in the account of 
cultural (re)production but it does not account for agency in terms of 
the capacity for novelty. The strategic point of Bourdieu's position on 
rules and strategies is precisely to come to grips with this difficulty. As 
he acknowledges: 'Mlle notion of strategy is the instrument I use to 
break away from the objectivist point of view and from the action 
without an agent that structuralism presupposes' (Bourdieu, 'From 
Rules to Strategies,' 62). Strategy is, in Bourdieu's definition, 'the 
practical sense as the feel for the game ... acquired in childhood, by tak-
ing part in social activities, especially ... in children's games' (62-63). 
Now, leaving aside the fact that this is an unusual, non-rational defini-
tion of 'strategy,' Bourdieuis conclusion is false. He argues that the 
'good player,' because he or she possesses such a 'feel for the game,' 
'does at every moment what the game requires' (63), and doing what 
the game requires 'presupposes a permanent capacity for invention ... to 
adapt to indefinitely varied and never completely identical situations' 
(63, emphasis added). In other words, strategies have become habitual 
and adaptable at the same time. If that is the case then Bourdieu has a 
powerful tool indeed to account for the possibility that agents inherit 
social and cultural knowledge and are able to deploy it in new ways. But 
is that the case? Why does 'doing at every moment what the game re-
quires' presuppose a permanent capacity for invention?' Given a sim-
ple game, say, noughts and crosses, the possible moves are preordained. 
Learning the winning moves might be the result of an extremely tem-
porary moment of adaptation and knowing how to win is dependent 
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on knowing those moves. But most games are not so simple and, as a 
result, most games do allow for some degree of invention; the more 
complex the moves in the game, the greater the possibility for inven-
tiveness. But the variability that Bourdieu is locating in the strategies of 
agents is false. Variability is more properly a product of complexity in 
the system (the number of moves the game allows) than a product of 
the agent's strategies (the ability to generate a number of moves). 
In an excellent essay on rules and strategies, Charles Taylor ex-
plicitly invokes Bourdieu's account of strategies. Taylor's `To Follow a 
Rule ...' explains how it is that we understand how to follow a rule 
without having to know all of the (possibly infinite) instances of the 
rule. We can understand and misunderstand rules, he argues, follow-
ing Wittgenstein's game theory, because lulnderstanding is always 
against a background of what is taken for granted, just relied on.'37 That 
is, following a rule, regardless of the fact that we can articulate the rule 
if need be, is fundamentally a practice. 
For instance, when I stand respectfully and defer to you, I 
may not have the word 'deference' in my vocabulary. Very 
often, words are coined by (more sophisticated) others to de-
scribe important features of people's stance in the world. ... 
This understanding is not, or is only imperfectly, captured 
in our representations. It is carried in patterns of appropri-
ate action: that is, action which conforms to a sense of what 
is fitting and right. An agent with this kind of understand-
ing recognises when he or she or others 'have put a foot 
wrong.' His or her actions are responsive throughout to this 
sense of rightness, but the 'norms' may be quite unformu-
lated, or formulated only in fragmentary fashion (Taylor, 
`To Follow a Rule ...' 51, emphasis added). 
This kind of understanding is, Taylor believes, what Bourdieu means 
by habitus (51). But Taylor's account, quite rightly, shifts the emphasis 
onto 'background' not inventiveness, understanding being 'responsive' 
to rather than 'generative' of 'patterns of appropriate action.' The prac-
tice of agents becomes the product not the cause of the social system. 
Taylor's essay provides Bourdieu's concept of habitus with some preci-
sion but does so at the expense of Bourdieu's claim that habitus is that 
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dynamic link between system and agent. Agents understand the rule, in 
Taylor's account, because they embody the system in their background 
knowledge. This does, of course, sit comfortably with Bourdieu's ac-
count of habitus as the embodied 'feel for the game' but it negates the 
claim that habitus is generative or inventive. Rather than explaining 
the capacity of agents to effect mutation, what this modified concept of 
habitus now gives us is an account of the way that agents are able to ne-
gotiate their way through a hugely complex soda! system. 
In attempting to explain the possibility for change in what now 
appears to be an extremely deterministic model of social action, 
Bourdieu and others who use the concept of habitus tend to introduce 
system complexity into that model. Scott Lash, for example, accounts 
for the possibility for change in Bourdieu's social model by explaining 
'transposability' (the capacity by agents to transfer practices acquired in 
one field to another which is, in Bourdieu's account, a property of the 
habitus itself) as the result of the interplay of differing areas or fields of 
the social structure, for example, the economic and cultural field 
(Bourdieu, Field of Cultural Production, 162). This model does not re-
habilitate the possibility for inventiveness by agents but does explain 
that the massive number of possibilities for interaction (however de-
terministic) will lead to some kind of permutation within the social 
structure. Similarly, John Thompson blurs the causal relation of habi-
tus to practice so that practice, rather than resulting from the disposi-
tions of the habitus, results from "the relation between the habitus, on 
the one hand, and the specific social contexts or "fields" within which 
individuals act, on the other' (Thompson, 'Introduction [to Language 
and Symbolic Powell,' 14). As in the model proposed by Lash, 
characteristics of the system are used to account for multiplicity and 
permutation. 
Bourdieu's emphasis on properties of the system is, itself, a kind 
of residual structuralism. It is evident, for example, in his rejection of 
the problem of the agency of the writer. The question, he argues, is 'not 
how a writer comes to be what he is, in a sort of genetic psycho-sociol-
ogy, but rather how the position or "post" he occupies - that of a writer 
of a particular type - became constituted' (Bourdieu, Field of Cultural 
Production, 162). Now, to account for the construction of the various 
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'posts' which the writer occupies is essential in explaining how various 
kinds of writers in general and 'literary' writers and their literature in 
particular get to be; but to disregard the capacity for kinds of conserving 
or transforming action by particular writers in the (re)production of 
these posts returns us to a kind of structuralism which can only explain 
(re)production in terms of an already existing system and cannot 
explain the dynamics of change in which individual actors conserve or 
transform the system. 
There is, of course, a logical problem with any explanation of so-
cial practices in terms of some kind of inculcated durable 'second na-
ture' or habitus: Bourdieu can only account for new or revolutionary 
practices by reference to the already existing habitus. That is, the same 
habitus which reproduces society in a conservative way can also some-
how reproduce it in a radical way. And if Bourdieu revises the theory 
so that dispositions which were once generated by the habitus become 
the product of objective conditions, he necessarily begs the question: 
what is it (and it cannot be the habitus) that changes objective condi-
tions? Such a position is evident in his account of the way that objec-
tive conditions and not the habitus produce the dispositions with 
which agents negotiate their way through social transactions. As 
Richard Jenkins notes in one of the few stringent critiques of 
Bourdieu's theory of habitus, the closest Bourdieu gets to explaining 
how habitus and particular dispositions are connected is to reverse his 
usual generalisation that habitus somehow produces dispositions. 
In reality, the dispositions durably inculcated by the possibil- 
ities and impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, opportu- 
nities and prohibitions inscribed in the objective condi- 
tions...generate dispositions objectively compatible with 
these conditions and in a sense pre-adapted to their de- 
mands.38 
That is, the dispositions of agents are generated not by the habitus but 
by the probabilities available in the objective world. As Jenkins points 
out, this is a problematic view. 
Even if people's behaviour is the result of the acceptance as 
probable of a future which would be similar to the present, 
how do they learn or identify that probability? In the first 
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instance it can only be through the internalisation (as chil-
dren) of the expectations about the future articulated by sig-
nificant (adult) others. It is those expectations which pro-
duce probabilities and create social reality, not the other way 
around. (Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 81, emphasis added) 
Further, if the habitus is indeed transposable to other fields, presumably 
in which the habitus was not previously a 'native' regular and regulat-
ing mechanism, how can it be used by agents to assess the appropriate-
ness of various ways of acting, speaking, feeling, and so on? Even fur-
ther, how can the probability be assessed that certain conditions will 
arise in which those ways of acting, speaking, feeling will be appropri-
ate; how can a habitus, once transposed to a field in which it was not 
previously regular, be thought to operate without conscious regulation 
as 'second nature,' and, finally, why is it that the habitus appears to be 
relatively internalised: transposable for some individuals in some situ-
ations but not for other individuals in other situations? 39 Not only is 
Bourdieu's explanation of the means by which agents acquire disposi-
tions (to think, feel or act, or to write, read or buy particular books, for 
example) bad social theory but it is also unable, finally, to account for 
the inventive or generative capacities of agents. Bourdieu's habitus is, 
unfortunately for my purposes, a 'black box' which merely occupies the 
problematic space required in Bourdieu's social model to allow some 
link between the determined social system and free social agents. 40 
Because the nexus between past positions and current disposi-
tions is framed as the habitus and the habitus is simply that space in 
which the two are supposed to coincide, Bourdieu is able to frame the 
rest of his theory of agents as 'position-takings' in various fields but is 
not able to resolve the possible or actual ways in which agency might 
work. Given the theory of habitus as it stands, Bourdieu's explanation 
is as much as to say that actors (or writers) only do new things in highly 
complex systems in which permutation is statistically likely. And habi-
tus merely allows them to negotiate their way through this system 
without needing constant reference to a map. Clearly this does not get 
us very far in attempting to explain the agency of individual actors. 
Anthony Giddens's structuration theory is an alternative attempt 
to articulate a theory of the relation between social agents and systems: 
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it is really a theory of agency.41 The appeal, of structuration theory is 
that it avoids the residual structuralism of Bourdieu's social model and 
provides an account of the way agents are simultaneously producers 
and products of the social structure. According to Giddens: 
[sltructure, as recursively organised sets of rules and re-
sources, is out of time and space, save in its instantiations 
and co-ordination as memory traces, and is marked by an 
'absence of the subject.' The social systems in which struc-
ture is recursively implicated, on the contrary, comprise the 
situated activities of human agents, reproduced across time 
and space. Analysing the structuration of social systems 
means studying the modes in which such systems, 
grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors 
who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of ac-
tion contexts, are produced and reproduced in interaction. 
Crucial to the idea of structuration is the theorem of the du-
ality of structure, ... [that is, that] the structural properties of 
social systems are both medium and outcome of the prac-
tices they recursively organise. (Giddens, Constitution of 
Society, 25) 
Giddens is at pains to emphasise the duality of social action as both 
medium and outcome, social agents as both products of past social ac-
tivities and producers of future social activities. To gain further lever-
age for a theory of agency, Giddens distinguishes between 'structural 
properties' and 'structures.' Structural properties are the highly endur-
ing institutionalised rules that enable recursive action; structures are 
the relations of transformation and mediation which act as the 'circuit 
switches' underlying and changing the social system (23-24). Structural 
properties are not themselves 'social products' but 'socially 
(re)producing' in day-to-day social action. If structural properties were 
products then they would already exist; presupposing that pre-consti-
tuted actors must at some time and place also have already existed in 
order to create them. This clearly runs counter to Giddens's project 
which is to explain the simultaneous, ongoing durability and adaptabil-
ity of the social system. Because structural properties are (re)producing, 
agents can be seen as the determined enduring products and the free 
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adaptive producers of social action. In (re)producing (that is, inheriting 
and adapting) structural properties, agents also reproduce the condi-
tions that make any action possible (26) and, regardless of the intentions 
of agents (for example, to conserve or change structural properties), all 
actions produce intended and unintended consequences. To sum-
marise, Giddens theorises the agent as the simultaneous product and 
producer of the institutions which enable recursive social action; struc-
tures are, furthermore, relational, that is, allowing for structural change 
as a consequence of the mediating relations between agents and the in-
stitutional constraints of structural properties; and all actions have 
(un)intended consequences, allowing for structural change as a conse-
quence of agents' actions whether they attempt to conserve or change 
the social system. 
Structuration seems to enable Giddens to have his cake and eat it 
too. He can explain the durability of social systems and their adaptabil-
ity in terms of the constraining and innovative practices of agents in 
their day-to-day actions. Agents operate according to more or less de-
termining generalised procedural formulae (somewhat like the 
'patterns of appropriate action' of Charles Taylor) in order to respond to 
or influence a range of social circumstances for which it would be im-
possible to specify individual rules. Such formulae direct our practical 
knowledge of ways of routinely negotiating social situations. Formulae 
may be 'deeply sedimented' in our day-to-day actions, apparently trivial 
and constantly invoked (for example, rules of language, conversational 
turn-taking, reading the line from the left to the right, and the page 
from top to bottom). Such intensively reproduced formulae are tacit, 
informal and weakly sanctioned because commonly held (21-23). They 
are of great interest for my purposes because, while deeply sedimented 
and apparently 'just there,' they are also, according to Giddens, formu-
lae which (re)produce durable a nd adaptable social practices as a result 
of their generalised function as procedural formulae. The unproblem-
atic appearance of most social practice - practice which 'just is' done in 
one way or another according to a largely inexpressive 'practical con-
sciousness' - and the capacity of agents to perpetuate or transform such 
social practices has considerable theoretical potential to explain how it 
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is that we 'just know' how to use texts and also how we are able to do 
new things with them.42 
Giddens's concept of regionalisation provides his theory of struc-
turation with further potential to explain how it is that we operate ac-
cording to conventional and innovative practice. Regionalisation refers 
to the 'situatedness' of any social practice. 
The situated nature of social interaction can usefully be ex-
amined in relation to the different locales through which 
the daily activities of individuals are co-ordinated. Locales 
are not just places but settings of interaction; ... settings are 
used chronically - and largely in a tacit way - by social actors 
to sustain meaning in communicative acts. But settings are 
also regionalised in ways that heavily influence, and are in-
fluenced by, the serial character of encounters. ...[T]he sub-
stantially 'given' character of the physical milieux of day-to-
day life interlaces with routine and is deeply influential in 
the contours of institutional reproduction. (xxv) 
The context in which social actions occur form settings which 
agents routinely draw upon in the course of orienting what 
they do and what they say to one another.... Common 
awareness of these settings of action forms an anchoring el-
ement in the 'mutual knowledge' whereby agents make 
sense of what others say and do.... Settings of action and in-
teraction, distributed across time-space and reproduced in 
the 'reversible [that is, chronically repeatable] time' of day-
to-day activities, are integral to the structured form which 
both social life and language possess. (Giddens, 
'Structuralism, Post-Structuralism and the Production of 
Culture,' 215) 
The regionalised character of social interaction, dependent on the con-
ventional 'stock of knowledge' specific to particular settings, usefully 
explains how we 'just do' know how to act and interact in a range of cir-
cumstances.43 Settings that are relevant to particular practices may be 
material or relational. For example, in reading a text in a particular way 
the reader is oriented according to: the material setting, that is, to the 
physical space in which the action occurs, the potential to gain material 
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access to certain texts, the material constraints of the kind of text, say, a 
paperback, a broadsheet or tabloid newspaper, and so on; and the rela-
tional setting, for example, the demonstration or hiding of the symbolic 
codes made available by the action of reading, say, a 'blockbuster' or 
'classic' paperback, the financial broadsheet or sports pages of a tabloid 
newspaper, the mutual knowledge held by present or possible co-
agents, the pedagogically constructed capacity to make use of one or an-
other text, and so on. 
Regionalisation refers to the isituatedness' of social practices and, 
as most of my examples of the orienting function of material and rela-
tional settings indicate, operates spatially, that is, where other social 
agents are present. But regionalisation is also durable over time in, for 
example, the sustained 'stock of knowledge' we carry as the result of 
previous, often pedagogical, experience of 'what to do with texts.' This 
temporal aspect of Giddens's concept appears to be most fruitful in ex-
plaining how it is that we use texts, just as we talk, in a way which is 
'indexed' according to the orienting settings in which the action occurs, 
because such indexing is, according to Giddens, as capable of producing 
'context-freedom' (215) as it is of producing constraints in terms of time 
and place. To apply the notion of the 'situated' and 'indexed' practice to 
the production - the using (writing, buying, reading) - of texts provides 
us with considerable analytical purchase. What we do with texts is 
'regionalised' according to the situation which indexes, that is, indi-
cates, particular uses. 
But such situatedness and indexing does not necessarily prescribe 
absolute and fixed uses: some situations (such as women's Star Trek 
slash 'fanzines' and their writing and reading groups for example) in-
dex radical manipulations of texts." Clearly, situations and the textual 
practices that they index occupy a dual space: they are located in the so-
cial structure that is manifested in the institutional and material world 
of schools, libraries, cataloguing protocols, book printing and binding 
practices, and so on, and in the socially acquired, habitual and actively 
transformable practical consciousness or stock of knowledge of social 
agents. So while situations are located in the social structure, for exam-
ple in the material space of, say, a classroom which indexes a (possibly 
temporary) respect for the text, they are also located in the agent, for ex- 
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ample in the relational space of, say, the knowledge of codes which in-
dex expectations and ways of using (and therefore even finding) certain 
kinds of narrative, symbol, kinds of character and characterisation, fea-
tures of various genres, and so on, which constrain what a particular 
text is thought to be. Such a situated knowledge is relational because it 
is constructed in, to stay with the same example, the pedagogical deliv-
ery and reception of expectations about certain texts where the text is 
used as a part of the relationship between teacher and student. 
To see the uses of texts in this way is to see the position of the 
duality of the structure in which textual practices operate: texts always 
exist and get used in ways which are situated. And the situations which 
index particular uses of a text are always at the same time i n the mate-
rial conditions which surround the text, in the text itself and in the 
agent who uses the text. The structure in which texts get to be and get 
used in particular ways is, then, always at the same time in and outside 
of the text, in and outside of the agent. In other words, the social struc-
ture is constituted in the practices which direct agents and which agents 
direct. Consider the practices which are generated by our practical con-
sciousness of different genres, for example, the rules and characteristics 
of the detective genre. (Genre is, of course, one cluster in the stock of 
knowledge of rules and characteristics alongside other basic indexing 
knowledge about texts - for example, that books are bound, bought, 
read over time, and so on.) The detective genre (re)produces (maintains 
and changes) expectations of kinds of possible plots, the setting up and 
resolution of typical kinds of problems, kinds of characters, stylistic 
characteristics and points of view. The generic rules that operate 
around and in the social use of detective novels do not exist only in the 
novels, or only in their readers or professional editors, reviewers, crit-
ics, or only in the market in which they are a commodity, but as a kind 
of typological knowledge that operates for and in all of them all of the 
time, changing over time and space. So our knowledge of the detective 
genre produces or instantiates the genre each time we draw on that 
knowledge. As Carolyn Miller argues, 'actors must create structure, for 
themselves and for others,.. .by relying, recursively, on already available 
structures, on shared classifications and interpretations, which neces-
sarily are social.'45 
43 
Of course, most of the time this stock of knowledge remains tacit 
and the practical way in which we draw on it reinforces its unspoken 
classifying power. Each time our practical consciousness instantiates a 
familiar and typical way of using a text it produces the structure that 
makes meaningful the using of the text in that way, yet it does this as 
though for the first time. For example, we might read Madame Bovary 
according to procedural formulae that index a response to psychological 
categories of characterisation and an expectation of the universal all-ex-
plaining knowledge of the narrator and in that reading we instantiate 
psychological characters and the omniscient narrative perspective as 
though Madame Bovary is the first moment in which they have ap-
peared. Alternatively, each time we call on procedural formulae typical 
to some other social experience, importing formulae which were pre-
viously alien to the text and thus adapting new formulae to old texts or 
making new texts with alien formulae, we thereby alter the structure, 
and so for the first time in fact change it. For example, we might read 
Madame Bovary according to procedural formulae that index a re-
sponse to the political categories of oppressed and oppressor and a ques-
tioning of the misogynist paternalism of Flaubert hiding behind his 
evasive 'nowhere present' narrator. Whichever way we read, whether 
we reproduce familiar and typical ways of using texts in which that way 
of using the text is 'just what we do' or reproduce new and oppositional 
ways of using texts in which that new way is 'what we do now,' we still 
produce and reproduce the text as the instantiation of the sorts of pro-
cedural formulae with which we negotiate every social experience. And 
each instantiation is always the only instantiation because the only one 
present and in use now. 
Structuration theory, then, provides us with a useful model to 
explain the capacity of agents to act within and change the social struc-
ture, for example, the structure in which the agent and his or her use of 
texts is embedded. But the theory is not without its problems. Margaret 
Archer takes Giddens to task for what she calls his 'conflation,' as a mu-
tually constructing agent-system, of two discrete social units - individ-
ual agents and the system in which they operate. 46 But Archer's project 
is, like Giddens's, to articulate a theory of the link between culture and 
agency. Like Giddens, she sees the agent as the instantiated moment of 
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expression of the social structure or, to use her term, the cultural sys-
tem, and her work can usefully explain the moment in which agents 
deploy their agency to effect change, a problem left unresolved in struc-
turation theory. 
Structuration theory, according to Archer, over-extends the anal-
ogy between language and cultural practice. Giddens's approach is to say 
that culture, just like language, is 'both order and ordering' (Archer, 
Culture and Agency, 76) but this produces two unresolved conse-
quences: social action becomes hyperactive and therefore volatile 
(because rules are always interpretable, allowing for change); and, on 
the other hand, social action becomes chronically recursive and there-
fore stable (because agents draw on rules which reproduce the social 
structure). Giddens needs volatility as a kind of 'wild card' to enable 
change but emphasises the recursive possibility in his model, according 
to Archer, in order to create a more recognisable description of social 
reality. But if, according to this emphasis, action is theorised as a prac-
tice of applying rules, we return to the old problem of determinism and 
the denial of the very possibility of agency itself. To get around this, 
Giddens positions the agent as both responsively ordered and genera-
tively ordering (whether he or she replicates or transforms that order). 
The problem with this view is that it cannot explain when actors are 
more and when less free, when transforming and when replicating the 
social order (86-87). This 'when' problem surfaces in the failure of struc-
turation theory to explain the way 'our open future is the next genera-
tion's constraints, just as the things restricting us are the product of the 
previous generation's use of its degrees of freedom' (91). 
The failure to explain when an actor is hyperactive (allowing so-
cial volatility) and when recursive (maintaining social stability) results 
from Giddens's concept of duality, that is, his refusal to separate in the-
ory the social system and the agent's social practice. Archer's project is 
precisely to separate them. Briefly, she argues that logically consistent 
cultural 'parts' are to do with what she calls 'Cultural System' integra-
tion. For example, if the ideas of X are consistent with those of Y, they 
are integrated parts in the Cultural System. By contrast, causally cohe-
sive relations between people are to do with `Socio-Cultural' integra-
tion. For example, if the ideas of X were influenced by Y, where Y is the 
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teacher, thinker, text, or whatever, they are integrated relations in 
Socio-Cultural practices. According to this view, the Cultural System 
pre-dates the practices of people: we are born into Cultural Systems 
which govern our present practices. This means, in turn, that Socio-
Cultural practices follow from (and then condition) Culturally Systemic 
characteristics (xvi-xxii). So: 
[t]here are logical relationships between components of the 
Cultural System .... There are causal influences exerted by 
the [Cultural System] on the Socio-Cultural ... level.... There 
are causal relationships between groups and individuals at 
the [Socio-Cultural] level .... There is elaboration of the 
[Cultural System] due to the [Socio-Cultural] level 
modifying current logical relationships and introducing 
new ones. (106, emphasis added) 
By differentiating the logical relations between systemic parts from the 
causal relations between actors, Archer is able to explain when actors 
maintain social stability and when they initiate change: they do so at 
the Socio-Cultural level when inherited practices are elaborated in such 
a way as to modify the current logical relationships of the Cultural 
System, which then exerts stabilising pressure on consequent practices. 
But Socio-Cultural practices need not elaborate the Cultural System in a 
modifying way. This analytical model, additionally, usefully explains 
why orderly (or disorderly) Socio-Cultural practices may have a strong 
influence or no influence at all on order (or disorder) in the Cultural 
System. The logical forms in which the parts of the Cultural System are 
expressed do not necessarily correlate with the causal relationships in 
which various material struggles or agreements occur between indi-
viduals and groups. Finally, Archer is able to explain how the Cultural 
System acts as a brake on Socio-Cultural practices and how Socio-
Cultural practices impel change in the Cultural System: 
the Cultural System originates from the Socio-Cultural 
level (culture is man-made), but ... over time a stream of in-
telligibilia escape their progenitors and acquire autonomy 
[in a corpus of existing intelligibilia] ... after which time we 
can examine how they act back on subsequent generations 
of people ... [and] since people go on making culture we can 
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investigate how new items enter the Cultural System and 
old ones are displaced.47 (144) 
Of course, Archer's temporal sequence assumes that her Cultural 
System exists somehow autonomously when it can only exist in its al-
ways and only instantiated moment of use in Socio-Cultural practice. 
Even so, Archer usefully provides an analytical model of the dynamic 
nature of interaction which is absent in Giddens's theory to explain 
when agents' actions have causal results in the maintenance of and 
changes to social knowledge and practice. 48 
So what? Social theory has taken us some distance away from the terms 
of the original problem and I'd like to return to those terms now. I left 
Foucault with the promising analysis of the author in terms of the poli-
tics of authority and authorising but also with the significant problem 
embedded in his account of writing as a practice somehow allowing an 
interplay within the prescriptions of that process of authoring and in-
terplay. Following a modified theory of structuration, it is possible to 
say that the 'internalised' practice of writing and reading and doing any-
thing else with books is structural in the sense that it precedes the ac-
tual practices of writers, readers, and so on. What it is possible to do 
with books is prescribed, to use Foucaules term. We are born into a cul-
ture in which textual practices already exist (and undergo change). But 
our practices are also 'internal' in the sense that they are indexed ac-
cording to the practical consciousness or stock of knowledge which we 
draw upon habitually and largely tacitly. These practices result from 
general procedural formulae which inculcate ways of doing things with 
books and, further, with textual relations which reinforce and make 
habitual that very stock of knowledge. Such relational practices and the 
possibilities for changing them occur in our socio-cultural interaction, 
or interplay, to use Foucault's term, which is, in turn, the result of 
structurally pre-given situations that determine what we know tacitly 
and do habitually to begin with. This means that our 'internally' held 
practices are 'externally' determined by characteristics of our inherited 
culture, and because that culture is instantiated in social interaction it is 
open to changes in practices which, in turn, determine the culture. But 
our practices are 'external' in another, more literal, sense because what 
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we do with books is constrained by the equally culturally determined 
material aspects of the textual artefact itself and the physical conditions 
in which we use them. Such material and physical conditions in which 
the practices of writing or reading are located are political, in that they 
are contested relations of power, and institutional, in that they are 
structurally durable. And it is to the politics and institutions of 
'authorising' that I shall now turn in the next two chapters. 
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Authorising: the historical construction of 
'The Author' in the field of cultural 
production 
There is no outside the text. 
Jacques Derridal 
Why is it that some writers get to be authors and others do not? And 
what accounts for the way some authors make it into literature's elu-
sive A-list and, a more difficult thing, stay there? One answer used to be 
that certain texts and, by inference, the unproblematically conceived 
authors who produced them, just are better than others. But to answer 
such questions adequately requires a contextual approach. In this 
chapter I want to look at the things that occur outside texts in an 
attempt to explain how authors and their texts are produced and 
maintained. In order to do this I shall try not just to explain why some 
authors get to have influence in the field of cultural production but also 
how textual production as a whole and the production of 'literature' in 
particular depends upon the historically contested and instituted 
practices that constitute the field itself. My interest here is not just with 
the place of writers in such production but with the interaction of 
writers, publishers, teachers, critics, readers, librarians, and so on, in the 
textual practices which construct the relative value we assign to the 
category 'literature.' 
To ask who counts in literary production, what counts as legiti-
mate literary production and who decides is to problematise the author-
as-originary-genius and to try to uncover the political and institutional 
practices which make the author in the first place. To answer such ques- 
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tions requires some analysis of cultural production as a system, as I do 
in the first part of this chapter, in a return to the social theory of 
Bourdieu. An historical account of the construction of the author, in 
the second part of the chapter, provides a practical demonstration of the 
political and institutional forces at play in the process of authorising. 
Those practices which centre on the publishing institutions that make 
the material product (material individuals called authors, their books 
and the merchandising apparatus which surrounds them) and those 
practices which centre on the pedagogical and other institutions that 
consecrate the material product (material individuals honoured by 
study, grants, prizes and frequently posthumous prestige, and their 
canonised books and oeuvres) will be considered in the next chapter. 
The politics of authorising is, as Michel Foucault notes, a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. 2 The author is, according to Foucault, one 
of a number of policing presences in and surrounding texts. Foucaules 
argument is that the power of the author, the author's authority, is evi-
dent in his or her text and also in the extra-textual social practices which 
circumscribe the uses of his or her text. If we consider the cluster of 
practices embedded in 'authoring,' authentication' and 'authorising,' it 
can be seen that the apparent innocence of the author in authoring his 
or her text is undercut by the institutional and power-laden practices in 
which authoring occurs. To survey this cluster of authenticating and 
authorising it might be fruitful to follow the record of obsolete and pre-
vailing senses of 'authentic,' author' and 'authority.' In fact, there is no 
option in the sort of critical exercise which I propose here but to obey 
the institutional and rhetorical authority of dictionary definitions and, 
given its institutional weight, the authoritative opinion of The Oxford 
English Dictionary.3 
According to dictionary practice, the authentic or authenticated, 
the author and the authority of the authorised are all tautologically 
enmeshed. 'Authen tic'ness refers to authority, originality or genuine-
ness and, in obsolete forms, to the possession of legal force or qualifica-
tion; 'authentication' refers to the proof of, or investing of a thing with, 
authority, the establishing of the title to credibility, the certifying of au-
thorship; 'authority' refers to the power to enforce obedience or influ-
ence action, opinion or belief, such power being in some way derived or 
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delegated or a conferred right or title and in some cases made material 
in a quotation or book; 'au thorising' refers to the setting up of, or giving 
legal force to, or giving formal approval to the authority of a thing; only 
the 'author' appears to be apolitical and non-institutional, referring to 
the person who originates or gives existence to a thing. 4 
There are several features of the process of enforcing etymologi-
cal definitions that illuminate the practices which circumscribe who 
gets to use certain texts in certain ways. In defining key words to do with 
authentication, authority, authorising and the author, The Oxford 
English Dictionary brings its own considerable authority to bear in de-
ciding which quotable uses are to be considered the authoritative ones. 
The remarkable institutional force of dictionaries is not that they 
'freeze' the decision on meaning and use but that they arbitrate on 
almost every debate over meaning and use in the last resort. As a result 
of such arbitration, authority and authentication, according to The 
Oxford English Dictionary, are matters of power originating outside of 
texts; they appear, now redundantly, to have been legal matters 
(although debate about the authenticity of cultural works and the 
ownership of copyrights in them are still to do with authenticity, I 
would suggest, in a legal sense which is far from obsolete). Control over 
authority/ authorising and the authentic/ authentication is, according to 
The Oxford English Dictionary, a matter of conferral or delegation. (It 
would be surprising, given the position of The Oxford English 
Dictionary as an institution of authority and authentication, if the defi-
nition of such control in terms of contest had not been suppressed.) The 
author gains access to authenticity and authority by virtue of his or her 
originality, on the one hand, and by virtue of enjoying a position of 
conferred or certified power, on the other. That is, authors might be 
born original creators or they might achieve originality but they have 
the power of authority/authentication/ authorising thrust upon them. 
The final and most problematic circumscribing practice revealed 
by my Oxford English Dictionary survey is that authority is thought 
somehow to be capable of residing in texts, that is, it is available as the 
authoritative opinion or authoritative author manifested in a text, to be 
drawn upon or appealed to. But to locate authority in a material artefact 
is, of course, to confuse the object with its social use. The opinion or au- 
54 
thor manifested in a text would not be authoritative but would become 
authoritative, as the other Oxford English Dictionary definitions have 
pointed out, as a result of the conferring of power on those texts in each 
instance of their use in approved ways. It is, of course, possible that au-
thority may be in the text but this is only in so far as the text is a socially 
situated object. A dictionary as a material object, for example, suggests 
certain expectations about the authority of its users by providing rhetor-
ical triggers with which readers are familiar, that is, which readers bring 
to their use of the text, and which are conventionally supposed to de-
note authority.5 The authority of The Oxford English Dictionary is in 
the text in the sense that readers bring certain expectations to their use 
of the text (say, the expectation to find listed words and the correspond-
ing prevailing definitions of those words; and, needless to say, those ex-
pectations have to be met in the practical use of The Oxford English 
Dictionary in order for the expectations to maintain the force of a con-
vention). But the authority is also outside of the text, conferred on the 
text as a result of, for example, individual and corporate attitudes to 
Oxford University Press, Oxford University, academic publishing, no-
tions of research, editing, quotation, and so on. But the force of these in-
stitutions masks what is otherwise a highly unstable practice of enforc-
ing meaning. 
In trying to pin down authority, authentication and originality 
the dictionary simply chases its tail in a process only obscured by the 
positivism of its entries, on the one hand pretending to establish a defi-
nition of a word by using words always in need of positive definition 
and on the other treating the to-be-defined word as established fact 
while it is in the process of being established (listed, described, and then 
verified by quotation). This deferral even in the attempt to authenticate 
authority neatly questions the positive grounds on which the power of 
the author and the authorised text appear to rest. If they were conceiv-
able prior to the age of mechanical reproduction, after Walter Benjamin 
the notions of positive originality and authenticity have become ab-
surd. What is left is only the social claim to originality and authenticity, 
observable in the practices which maintain them. 6 
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THE CULTURAL FIELD AND CULTURAL CAPITAL 
What happens when an individual uses texts (borrows, buys, writes, 
reads, shelves them, and so on) depends on the institutional and 
power-laden position of that individual in relation to other individuals 
or groups and other texts. In other words, texts are used in a field of cul-
tural practices. Such a notion is basic to Foucault's concept of the discur-
sive formation, that is, to that set of external conditions of existence or 
procedures which control, select, organise and redistribute discourses.7 
Pierre Bourdieu further expands the concept to encompass the entire 
range of social functions in and beyond discourse itself in an attempt to 
explain the structure and function of those practices which govern cul-
tural production in general and literary production in particular. 8 
Bourdieu's model of cultural production relies on three key con-
cepts, habitus, discussed in the previous chapter, the cultural field and 
cultural capital. While there are problems with the concept of habitus, 
Bourdieu's concept of field offers the considerable promise of being able 
to uncover the structural relations and practices which govern the use 
of literary texts. For Bourdieu, a field is: 
a structured system of social positions - occupied either by 
individuals or institutions - the nature of which defines 
the situation for their occupants. It is also a system of forces 
which exist between these positions: a field is structured in-
ternally in terms of power relations. Positions stand in rela-
tionships of domination, subordination or equivalence 
(homology) to each other by virtue of the access they afford 
to the goods or resources (capital) which are at stake in the 
field. These goods can be principally differentiated into four 
categories: economic capital, social capital (various kinds of 
valued relations with significant others), cultural capital 
(primarily legitimate knowledge of one kind or another) 
and symbolic capital (prestige and social honour).9 
The cultural field, including the specific literary field (what Bourdieu 
calls the field of restricted cultural production), is that 
space of positions and the space of position-takings in which 
[positions] are expressed ... [where] each position - e.g. the 
one which corresponds to a genre such as the novel or, 
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within this, to a sub-category such as the 'society novel' or 
the 'popular' novel — is subjectively defined by the system of 
distinctive properties by which it can be situated relative to 
other positions; ... [and where] every position, even the 
dominant one, depends for its very existence, and for the 
determinations it imposes on its occupants, on the other 
positions constituting the field; and ... [where] the structure 
of the field, i.e. of the space of positions, is nothing other 
than the structure of the distribution of the capital of spe-
cific properties which governs success in the field and the 
winning of the external or specific profits (such as literary 
prestige) which are at stake in the field. (Bourdieu, Field of 
Cultural Production, 30) 
According to this model of social practices, individuals or groups only 
operate within the possibilities of the field, which is itself defined by the 
particular resources at stake: access to cultural goods and profit defines 
the cultural field; access to intellectual goods and profit defines the edu-
cational field; and so on. Basic to this model is the notion that the (by 
definition 'at stake' or unequally distributed) resources that are avail-
able in and that determine the nature of each field also determine that 
all social practices are always forms of struggle. Finally, the model 
shows how individuals or groups operating within a particular field are 
constrained by the positions which are possible in the field and by their 
dispositions to position themselves in relation (domination, subordina-
tion, equivalence or opposition) to other individuals taking positions 
in the field." Such position-taking is, in Bourdieu's sense, a form of po-
litical positioning. While Bourdieu's 'positions' appear to be objective 
and the 'dispositions' subjective, both really are subjective. But to admit 
that individuals or groups construct the field, its positions and position-
ings by a kind of common agreement about the value of certain re-
sources and relations (including agreement about ways of taking an op-
positional stance) does not weaken the analytical purchase of the model 
if it is accepted as a model of the subjectively constructed nature of so-
cial relations. But to do so, unfortunately for Bourdieu, prevents him 
from producing a convincing theoretical bridge between subjectivism 
and objectivism which is the central purpose of his theory.ii 
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There is another problem with Bourdieu's model, however, 
which is to do with its status as a social model: are fields social realities 
or are they sociological constructs? Bourdieu suggests that they are 
merely the latter. 
Constructing an object such as the literary field requires and 
enables us to make a radical break with the substantialist 
mode of thought ... which tends to foreground the 
alQ,- t-the 
expense of the structural relations - invisible, or visible 
only through their effects - between social positions that are 
both occupied and manipulated by social agents which may 
be isolated individuals, groups or institutions. There are in 
fact very few other areas in which the glorification of 'great 
individuals,' unique creators irreducible to any condition or 
conditioning, is more common or uncontroversial. (29) 
In other words, fields are useful heuristic devices for avoiding 'the sub-
stantialist mode of thought' and for articulating the systematic nature of 
social reality. This is not a serious problem for an analysis of the mate-
rial and social conditions for the production of literature, in so far as 
such an analysis need not contend that the practices which underpin 
production are essentially systematic but only that they can be systemat-
ically explained.12 In Part Two I shall try to show how the practices of 
writing and reading can be explained as system-like mediations between 
individuals and groups. The fact that an individual can be seen in a re-
lation of subordination, say, to a teacher in the pre-tertiary education 
system, and as the result of certain textual practices, say, the practice of 
reading Shakespeare for success in university entrance examination, 
does not require that she or her teacher recognise such domination and 
subordination, nor that their relationship is 'really' one of domination 
and subordination, nor even that they 'play by the rules' of such a rela-
tion of domination and subordination, merely that the relationship can 
be usefully understood in terms of a typological system of domination 
and subordination. That such relations are typological and not real is 
essential to explaining why it is that an individual in a position of 
power in the cultural field, a teacher, say, or a publisher or librarian, 
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may operate in ways which are not in fact or which he or she believes 
are not intended to dominate. 
In defining the field of cultural production above, Bourdieu em-
ploys the notion of capital. The concept is central to a theory of fields of 
contest in which unequally distributed resources are at stake and offers 
considerable promise as a means to explain the convertibility of forms 
of power within and across various fields." He uses the term in a sense 
which is congruent with his use of the market metnphor to--describe  
fields as systems of competition over unequally distributed resources. 
Even linguistic exchange, he argues, is subject to competition in a lin-
guistic market. While there is a socially constructed disposition or a lin-
guistic capacity to speak, according to Bourdieu, every speech act de-
pends upon stak[ing] into account — in varying ways and to differing ex-
tents — the market conditions within which [linguistic] products will be 
received and valued by others' (Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic 
Power, 19) and 'the cultural capacity to use [linguistic] competence ade-
quately in a determinate situation ... [as well as upon] the structures of 
the linguistic market, which impose themselves as a system of specific 
sanctions and censorships' (37). How an individual operates in the lin-
guistic market, then, depends on how much and what kind of linguistic 
and cultural capacity or capital he or she possesses. This is so, presum-
ably, because such capacity is deployed in the relationship of the indi-
vidual with others in 
an economic exchange ... [in] a particular symbolic relation 
of power between a producer, endowed with a certain 
linguistic capital, and a consumer (or market) ... which is 
capable of procuring a certain material or symbolic profit. In 
other words, utterances are not only ... signs to be 
understood and deciphered; they are also signs of wealth, 
intended to be evaluated and appreciated, and signs of 
authority, intended to be believed and obeyed. (66) 
To conceive of linguistic relations in the economic terms of pro-
duction and consumption provides considerable analytical purchase for 
the explanation of the mode of operation of written texts in a system of 
domination and subordination. But it depends on a dubious and unex- 
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plained slippage of capacity (37) into capital (66). Capital seems, for 
Bourdieu, to mean simply resources. For example, in order 
to produce a written discourse worthy of being published ... 
[one requires] the capital of instruments of expression 
(presupposing appropriation of the resources deposited in 
objectified form in libraries — books, and in particular in the 
'classics', grammars and dictionaries) ... [and such] in-
sty iments ... -as-rhetorical-devices,- genres,_ le-
gitimate styles and manners and, more generally, all the for-
mulations destined to be 'authoritative' and to be cited as of 
'good usage' ... [which] confer ... on those who engage in it a 
power over language and thereby over the ordinary users of 
language as well as over their capital. (57-58) 
What makes such resources of competence into capital remains un- 
clear. Bourdieu seems to equate the capacity for profit with capitalis- 
ing.14 There are difficulties with this view for a theory of contested rela- 
tions. For one thing, capital is not simply the capacity for profit but the 
capacity to control and increase for oneself valuable convertible re- 
sources (such as the labour, knowledge or skills of others as well as ma- 
terial resources). For another, to suppose that one individual's profit is 
another's loss depends precisely on some kind of agreement on the 
value of the thing at stake. By deploying certain linguistic forms such 
that I garner, say, some kind of prestige in some public meeting does 
not necessitate the loss of actual prestige or even the potential prestige 
available for others who regard speaking at public meetings as a sign of 
social naivety. Bourdieu's model of fields does not show how resources 
are capital. That is, it sidesteps the question regarding why they are 
valuable, and constructs an illogical notion of non-exchangeable capital. 
Capital, for Bourdieu, seems to operate as a loose metaphorical 
term for assets in the limited sense where assets are merely items of ex- 
changeable value, in the last instance in terms of money value. This 
view underlies his claim that various kinds of capital can be converted 
or, so to speak, 'cashed in.' 15 The archetype of capital conversion is, for 
Bourdieu, the cashing in of educational qualifications for jobs. 16 Now, 
the cashing in of economic capital is a real trade: the economic capital 
goes into, say, education (and does not then exist as an available eco- 
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nomic resource because paid out for and then commodified as educa-
tion). But the cashing in of cultural capital is a different sort of trade 
which does not involve real cashing in: the cultural capital does not go 
into employment (and still exists as an available cultural resource 
which can be used 'off the job'). The social actor who 'trades' his or her 
cultural capital for employment cannot be constrained so that it is used 
only 'on the job,' whereas the 'owner' of economic capital who trades it 
-for-education-no-longer-has-a"'-to-the-dollars- t7rP"-tn-the- r1 ni I Am- whichwere originally-
his or her economic capital, only to certain cultural resources made 
available by his or her education. 
If we suppose that there is such a thing as cultural capital, that is, 
that cultural resources can be reinvested to make more resources, it can 
be seen as capital only in so far as the use of the resource is actually used 
to generate greater resources and access to yet other resources. For ex-
ample, cultural capital (educational knowledge) might be invested to 
develop further capital (the instructed skill to distinguish various peri-
ods of furniture, for example) which is capital only if it leads to the ca-
pacity for and realisation of further resource accumulation. The capital 
metaphor, that is, necessarily leads to ,a final (if only ever potential) 
economic reduction: one cashes in the cultural capital for profit (the 
ability to spot a bargain Louis Quinze chair in a garage sale, getting a job 
at Christie's, or whatever). It could be argued that the trade on such ac-
cumulated cultural capital (like distinguishing various periods of furni-
ture) may not lead to an economic cashing in but, instead, to the 
'purchase' of prestige or 'symbolic capital.' But Bourdieu's 'symbolic 
capital' is also reducible, as John Thompson notes, to a final economic 
profit, to 'a logic that is economic in a broad ... sense, [that is] the aug-
mentation of some kind of "capital" (Thompson, 'Introduction' to 
Language and Symbolic Power, 15). Whatever the problems may be 
with Bourdieu's 'capital,' the maximisation of resources is, in fact, 
merely assumed in his theory and therefore cannot explain why agents 
seek to accumulate capital. But Bourdieu's 'symbolic capital' also intro-
duces a new problem. Symbolic capital is not really capital at all. It is, 
rather, a form of end-point profit. One might profit by it (by, say, getting 
a job because of one's prestige) but one cannot trade symbolic capital 
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(say, prestige) for cultural capital (say, education). The convertibility ap-
pears not, in the end, to be reversible, as John Frow notes. 17 
Such problems surface in Bourdieu's theory as a result of the un-
der-theorising of the relations between kinds of resource, and the major 
symptom of this problem is to be found in the concept of capital con-
version as the mere capacity to cash in one form of resource for an-
other. Cashing in presupposes the over-determination of all fields by 
the ec,,nr,mi, -field in whi ,h the maximisation of profit (to A^ with 
whatever resources are at stake, be they currency, prestige, ATP rank-
ings, or whatever) is dominant. If fields are autonomous then the fact 
that they are over-determined by the economic field in the last instance 
is a serious contradiction. Further, Bourdieu's theorising of various 
kinds of capital, as we have seen, produces a naive economism of social 
action. And the raw equation of economic capital with the bourgeoisie 
and cultural capital with the intelligentsia reifies what begins in 
Bourdieu's analysis as merely methodologically differentiated social 
categories.18 Finally, his use of the term 'capital' to explain the various 
kinds of trade possible in fields is, by and large, spurious. Not all prac-
tices are necessarily economic in the sense of being reducible to the 
maximisation of profit. And not all resources are reducible to trade or 
conversion. Resources like education ('cultural capital') cannot, strictly 
speaking, be traded. The assumption that they can is a weakness that is 
apparent in the theory of the cashing in of capital. The concept of cul-
tural and symbolic capital both suffer as a consequence of their 'one-way 
tradeability.' For example, one might profit by but cannot trade prestige 
('symbolic capital'). Bourdieu's theory, as a result, cannot specify how 
symbols generate profits in fields other than the field of cultural pro-
duction. 19 In using the term 'capital' in order to equate economic or 
even cultural capital with symbolic capital Bourdieu commits a funda-
mental category mistake because 'symbolic capital,' prestige, is an end-
point purchased and subsequently untradeable good. 
Given that Bourdieu's theory of fields suffers as a consequence of 
the reductive economism of his model of capital, we would do well to 
reject the concept of cultural capital. This is an advantageous move not 
just because of the theoretical weaknesses in the concept of cultural and 
symbolic capital but because the concept as Bourdieu deploys it has un- 
62 
fortunate consequences for a theory of cultural production. Bourdieu's 
view of capital leads him to argue that the final necessary function of 
specific cultural products is to create or mark arbitrary distinctions be-
tween social groups. 
Like every sort of taste, [aesthetic taste] unites and separates. 
Being the product of the conditioning associated with a par-
ticular class of conditions of existence, it unites all those who 
nrc. thP prrwilict _c■ f_ 
them from all others. And it distinguishes in an essential 
way, since taste is the basis of all that one has - people and 
things - and all that one is for others, whereby one classifies 
oneself and is classified by others.20 
Such a capacity for distinction requires the misrecognition of the power 
relations that are embedded in cultural activities as merely natura1.21 
But such misrecognition requires a contradictory stance by social agents: 
agents are able to bring their subjective knowledge to bear in order to 
perceive their objective domination (for example, the proletariat per-
ceives its domination by the bourgeoisie) as inevitable, that is, as 
'natural,' a fact of life'; but at the same time it cannot recognise the 
means by which such domination is legitimated, that is, constructed as 
a social relation of inequality. If cultural productions are designed to 
mark distinctions between social groups it would seem, so far as 
Bourdieu is concerned, that all agents can distinguish their subjective 
cultural difference up to a point but then fail to see the legitimating 
function of their cultural activities.22 
Cultural activities certainly do maintain distinctions between so-
cial groups and this function is often misrecognised in the cultural prac-
tices of agents, but to explain cultural activity as an always and only 
misrecognised way of distinguishing agents in social groups is an im-
poverished and unnecessarily reductive understanding of cultural 
production that ignores the complex institutionally and historically 
motivated background to cultural production in general and the 
conditions for the production of 'literature' in particular. Edward Li 
Puma illustrates the poverty of Bourdieu's theory of distinction in the 
cultural field by reference to the production of luxury cars: 
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the quest for distinction which stimulates the production of 
luxury cars cannot explain why 'high-end' German car-mak-
ers .. bank-roled the development of a computerised, anti-
lock braking system .. To understand what motivated•
German car-makers requires knowledge about cultural ideas 
of technology and performance, the historical place of the au-
tomobile in the production of the modern capitalist con- 
crini igneQq, 	 -theqe_i den c_a rei nt-PrrPlated to_ capi tal, _pl 
cultural notions of distinction (that auto-makers could make 
a non-visible feature 'distinctive' through mass media adver-
tising). (Li Puma, 'Culture and the Concept of Culture in a 
Theory of Practice,' 30-31) 
To explain why certain products may distinguish certain classes requires 
more than an analysis of the mechanics of distinction. The fact that the 
use of certain kinds of books does distinguish certain social groups or is 
typical of certain groups is to do with more than the process of making 
distinctions: to do with cultural ideas about books, reading and talking 
about them, and to do with the historically and institutionally 
grounded status of education and language use and how these relate to 
perceptions of subjectively constructed and relational categories mea-
sured in terms of status, income, class, and so on. 
Bourdieu's theory of capital is, at best, over-extended and, at 
worst, weakly theorised. Curiously, this does not weaken the general 
analytical purchase provided by the theory of social fields. In fact, by 
disposing of the problematic concepts of cultural and symbolic capital a 
theory of social fields is beter able to account for the historicaly and in-
stitutionaly grounded nature of social practices and especialy the cul-
tural practices in which I am particularly interested. 
It must be stressed that a theory of fields provides us merely with an 
analytical tool for explaining social action. It may wel be that social 
agents engaged in various kinds of cultural production perceive a 
'cultural field' and their position in it as social realities, but I do not 
wish to argue that fields are therefore necessarily social realities, merely 
that a theory of fields may help to explain in a systematic way the rela-
tions between social agents. The concept of positions and positioning 
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within fields allows us to examine the more or less strategic actions of 
social agents as possibilities within the field. For example, the network 
of publishers, editors and writers in the literary sub-field operates ac-
cording to the possible positions and relations between agents in those 
positions and according to the strategic positionings which they take in 
relation to one another over time. So editors of short stories, for exam-
ple (the focus of the case studies in Part Two), operate according to the 
-possN 1 iliac _pct.-40 i ChPd--by--the- rPln tion between- vari ol s_ eurrent_puh,_ 
lishers and their policies (to concentrate, say, on the school market, on 
women writers, on academic 'critical editions,' on 'new' writing, and so 
on); by the relation between current and past productions (in a relation 
of development, revision, opposition) and anthologising practices 
(dividing the anthology selection into 'nationalist,' modern,' 
'contemporary' writing, revising or ignoring such divisions, selecting 
stories by 'name' or 'unknown' writers, selecting previously published 
or unpublished stories); by ideological position which various individ-
uals (Leonie Kramer, say, or Frank Moorhouse), texts (Kramer's My 
Country, say, or Anna Gibbs and Alison Tilson's Frictions: An 
Anthology of Fiction by Women), or publishers (Oxford University 
Press, say, or Sybilla) are thought by agents in the field to represent, and 
so on. 
Before examining the practices of social agents in the construc-
tion of 'Australian short stories' of one shape or another it is necessary 
to elaborate on Bourdieu's concept of fields in order to show how the 
positions and positionings in the literary field are contingent possibili-
ties, to show them, that is, as historical developments, and to explain 
how they endure over time, that is, as institutionally maintained possi-
bilities. I shall attempt to show how a theory of fields is able: 1. to ac-
count for the relative autonomy of the literary field, by virtue of recog-
nising the internal construction of the field which is not reducible to an 
economic maximisation of profit; 2. to account for the historically spe-
cific conditions which constrain what counts in various fields, for ex-
ample, how the texts, agents and practices that count as the 'literary' 
ones which constitute the literary field are produced in the struggles 
and alliances of agents in the field over time; and 3. to account for the 
present and more or less durable, that is, institutionalised, nature of 
65 
fields like the literary field, as a set of institutionalised instances con-
straining the practices of the agents who operate within them. 
In salvaging the concept of field I want to show how collaborative 
or competing agents operate according to the possibilities - the rules, 
conflicts and hierarchies - of a system of relationships. What 
Bourdieu's concept of field cannot do is articulate relationships of 
power in terms of capital, attractive though that concept might at first 
sight-have-seemed, precisely-because he skirtQ--thP-prnhlPm- 
Capital is, strictly, specific to the economic field as a way of organising 
the things or relations which are at stake or which count in the eco-
nomic field. To determine why it constrains the relations of power and 
the relative value of various resources and practices depends upon see-
ing how it has developed historically and upon describing those institu-
tions which maintain it. In the literary field, capital (that is, economic 
capital) only counts to the extent that the pressure to maximise re-
sources typical of the economic field intrudes - in the form of financial 
decisions by arts organisations, publishers and the like - into the prac-
tices of the literary field. This pressure may influence the way a writer 
writes, for example, or the sort of projects which he or she attempts, as 
well as the decisions of editors to underwrite a particular project given 
competing products in the market. Such pressures on material produc-
tion may be accurately explained in economic terms, but other literary 
practices to do with, say, the production of the reader and the reader's 
text may not be so easily explicable in terms of a theory of resource max-
imisation in a competitive market. 
Where economic strategies do determine the actions of agents in 
the literary field this is not necessarily a case of a perrnoanent, that is, 
structural over-determination, merely of the fact that the economic 
field may, as the result of its relation to the literary field at a particular 
time, be in a particular relation of domination (for example, in a period 
and place where the material production and distribution of texts re-
quires economic capital). Further, practices or resources which are val-
ued in the literary field may, at a particular time, similarly intrude into 
the economic field. By disposing of an over-determining concept of 
'capital' and the economic reduction that it produces, it is possible to 
consider any field as more or less autonomous, the present and chang- 
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mg instance of the possible positions and positionings, the expectations, 
attitudes and practices constructed from the previous 'moves' in the 
field by social agents. At the same time it becomes necessary to consider 
any field in terms of the historically situated institutions which are em-
bedded in the sedimented practices that constitute the field. One of the 
most important institutions in the literary field is, of course, the institu-
tion of the author. 
THE HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORISING 
The way the literary field operates appears to be so natural as not to re-
quire comment. But the central place that has been accorded to the au-
thor, the 'natural' right of the author-as-originator to control his or her 
text, the function of reviewers, readers and critics merely as 
'interpreters' of the supposedly pre-existing text have been problema-
tised by recent literary theory and textual studies of the kind inaugu-
rated by Michel Foucault in 'What Is An Author?' 23 Such a 'natural' 
conceptualisation of literary practices has been the subject of consider-
able attention, particularly by 'new historicist' literary critics whose pro-
ject has been to uncover the processes by which the author and the text 
have been constructed.24 
Authors, texts and the entire aesthetic apparatus which presently 
if problematically dominates the literary field are, as Martha 
Woodmansee shows in her remarkable study of The Author, Art, and 
the Market, the present manifestations of previous political struggles. 25 
The authority of the author, she argues, is a product of the particular 
conditions in which writers sought to protect their labour and works in 
eighteenth-century Europe (particularly in Germany). The articulation 
by eighteenth-century writers of a view of literary production as disin-
terested, where literature was seen as intrinsically valuable (and there-
fore not subject to market forces when it came to questions about 
value), was a political strategy intended to arm the status of high-cul-
tural works against their usually low popularity. Such a strategy sought 
to free particular writers (those who saw their work as being the work of 
'high culture') from subordination to publishers and the forces of mar-
ket determination and to bolster their claim to patronage (including 
state sponsorship). In order to develop the leverage for such a strategy, 
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writers who made the claim to high-cultural distinction emphasised 
originality as the hallmark of literary value, where literary value was 
supposed to be an intrinsic quality. By asserting that originality is the 
central feature of 'literariness,' of course, writers of 'high culture' at-
tempted to take control over who was to decide what counted in the lit-
erary field. What counted, according to an ideology of disinterestedness 
and originality, was work which ignored the tried-and-true formulae 
-that-supposedly-guaranteed-high-sales-and-widespread-appreciabion-by -a 
tasteless and uninformed audience. But such attempts by the 'high-cul-
tural' author to reorientate what counted in the field were aimed at pro-
tecting his labour and sales against the possibilities of imitation and 
piracy. When originality is the central determinant of literary value no-
body can compete by imitating successful works. Clearly, the 'high-cul-
tural' author's claim to disinterestedness was highly interested; and his 
claim to power as the originator of the original work was basically a 
means to protect his labour from pirate publishers and other writers 
with an eye to the market. 
Woodmansee's method in showing this is to uncover the specifi-
cally situated nature of practices in the literary field, to explain the polit-
ical point of practices which now appear to be just the way things are, so 
natural, endemic, automatic because they work so effectively to protect 
the interests of particular agents that nobody even has to think about 
them. When academic practitioners like literary critics make disinter-
ested, original literature their positive object of study, Woodmansee ar-
gues, they obscure or obliterate the political, specifically situated and 
temporal nature of such practices. The difficulty in uncovering such a 
process is that the mechanisms of analysis (using analytical tools and 
categories from, say, the philosophy of aesthetics or from literary criti-
cism) are self-serving and constitute parts of the structure of the prob-
lematic object ('art,' say, or 'literature') that is to be analysed, as can be 
seen, Woodmansee argues, in the tendency to discuss aesthetics 
anachronistically. She takes Morris Weitz to task, for example, for oblit-
erating the difference between pre-eighteenth-century questions about 
the nature of poetry, music, sculpture, and so on, and the post-eigh-
teenth-century question, 'What is art?' She points out that, even while 
Weitz is in the process of including in his anthology of Problems in 
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Aesthetics Paul Kristeller's 'The Modern System of the Arts' (an essay 
which stresses the difference between pre-eighteenth-century concepts 
of artistic practices and a post-eighteenth-century general theory of aes-
thetics), he conflates the discrete categories and distinct concepts of pre-
eighteenth-century painters, sculptors, poets, and so on, and those who 
wrote about their work, with the generalised aesthetic theories of 'Art' 
which only emerged in the eighteenth century.26 By so doing, Weitz ob-
scures-the- distinction KrictP11 Pr- lahnurPd_An AirienvPr_and -Mnkeq _the_ 
concept of art and the problems of aesthetics once again seemingly time-
less and universal. 
Woodmansee's analysis of Weitz's conflation illustrates how the 
practices in which academics engage underpin any view of art or litera-
ture so that the very practices which are to be interrogated are fre-
quently 'built in' to the interrogation. In Woodmansee's case, in order 
to undertake an analysis of the history of aesthetics, she must first u n-
cover the present-day practices, like those of Morris Weitz, which privi-
lege a certain way of looking at art and literature. Weitz, for example, 
privileges philosophical accounts of aesthetic problems in his anthology 
at the expense of the reviews, writers' prefaces, textbooks, handbooks, 
consumer manuals which are 'written not to explain but to intervene 
and to influence practice [such] that they fall outside the purview of the 
historians of aesthetics' (Woodmansee, The Author Art, and the 
Market, 4). Woodmansee's project, then, requires the casting of a wider 
net in order to catch and examine those practices (like valorising the 
disinterested author and originary genius) which still underpin the 
claims to power of those agents who occupy the 'high cultural' position 
in the literary field. 
The stakes in the field of literary production in Australia (my fo-
cus in the case studies in Part Two) have been determined by the previ-
ous social and economic conditions in which agents in the field in 
other parts of the world competed and by the ongoing outcomes of that 
competition. Woodmansee charts certain key moments of change in 
the literary field in Germany and England in order to show where the 
source of disinterest and originality lies and what interests they served. 
The disinterested aesthetics of writers such as Karl Phillip Moritz, she 
argues, resulted from an emphasis on such concepts as God's self-suffi- 
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cient perfection and the self-sufficiency of the individual in relation to 
Him. That is, Moritz's aesthetic perspective on the self-sufficient and 
disinterested work is transferred from his religious view (18-19). Once 
God can be thought of in terms of self-sufficiency it is possible to see art 
as equally self-sufficient: it exists independently of the interests of any 
human agent, producer or consumer. But the novelty in extricating 
human agents and things (like texts) from a system of mutual depen-
dency-and-giving -them-autonomy--was- not-simply—the-consequence-of 
changing religious beliefs. More likely, changing religious beliefs reflect 
deeper social shifts in the relations between human agents and things 
which concerned the determination of questions to do with individual 
rights and possessions. The new eighteenth-century perception of the 
individual as self-sufficient, self-determining, independent marks a 
general shift in the social relations of the time. The 'individual' shifts at 
the end of the eighteenth century from being indivisible from his social 
group to being precisely divided. Such a shift has consequences for the 
way power is explained. The new (autonomous) individual, as John 
Locke articulates, owns himself rather than owing society, and possesses 
in himself sovereign rights which were previously located in a hierar-
chical social system of obligation.27 The aesthetic of disinterestedness is, 
then, one aspect of a system of shifting social relations in which the in-
dividual and the texts which he or she produces come to be seen as au-
tonomous. Only with such autonomy can the producer of the au-
tonomous text or work of art be thought of as disinterested, which cul-
minates in the view of 'art for art's sake' in the late-nineteenth century, 
because the producer is not thought to depend upon the interests of 
others. 
The writer and text, in the eighteenth century, possess a new rela-
tion in terms of disinterest, but disinterest is not simply a manifestation 
of benign social changes. Disinterest is deployed in the highly particular 
struggle between 'good writers [who produce] for more noble purposes' 
and 'mediocre pen-pushers and avaricious publishers [who[ peddle 
their poor merchandise.'28 Disinterest enables 'noble writers' to lay 
claim to the rewards of prestige and subsequent patronage in the literary 
field, even while they concede the loss of financial rewards to the 
'merchandising pen-pushers.' As a political move it allows the 'noble 
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writer' to defend the value of his or her work against a hostile reception 
by the market by claiming that its value is intrinsic, to be found some-
where in the perfect harmonious construction of the work (32). Such a 
claim is, of course, highly useful the more difficult the work is, or the 
more unfavourable its reception. But the interesting side-effect is that 
the origin of the text seems only to be the autonomous writer, and the 
relation between the writer and the text becomes the only one worth 
_ hnthpri ng ahni t. 
In order for writers to claim, as indeed Wordsworth claimed, that 
they were the autonomous causes of otherwise autonomous texts, do-
ing 'what was never done before,' they needed to emphasise their indi-
vidual, exclusive, intellectual creation of the text, emphasising that: 
'every Author, as far as he is great and at the same time original, has 
had the task of creating the taste by which he is to be enjoyed ... [by do-
ing] what was never done before.'29 Wordsworth's claim to originality 
establishes the appropriate grounds for originality in novelty; and 
asserts that the claim to being the origin of the text need only go as far 
back as the individual writer.30 Why he only traces originality back to 
that point is, of course, highly self-interested. And the possessive terms 
by which the individual emerges, where, according to Locke, 'every 
Man has a Property in his own Person' (quoted in de Grazia, 
Shakespeare Verbatim, 8), have remained central in the field of cultural 
production, as can be seen in the development of the 'ownership of the 
text' by the copyright-protected individual, unique, autonomous, origi-
nating author. 
Our conception of legal copyright is, in fact, merely the present 
trace of the process of individuation in which writers struggled to estab-
lish their access to and continued hold on power (that is, to the right to 
the name of 'the author' and to property rights in 'the work'). 
Copyright, in other words, is the latest institutionalised instance of 
those contested power relations in which certain social agents are able 
to claim legal protection for their writing as the unique, original prod-
ucts of the intellection of unique individuals.31 That the rules (like the 
rule granting copyright) governing the stakes (like the stake in intellec-
tual property) are the result of contingent events and struggles between 
various stakeholders in the field of literary production demonstrates 
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that the operative possibilities (the available positions, positionings and 
resources) in the field are historically constituted: what counts and why 
it counts in the field of literary production depends on the previous 
moves in the field. 
The processes by which copyright and the author emerged are 
radically contingent. The capacity for copyrighting depended, for exam-
ple, on the possibility of producing stable reproducible texts, which was 
in -tiirn-d Ppend ent And ft _wa _ nn 1 y whert_print-
ing made possible the stable relation between particular writers, printers 
and texts that some writers were able to see and conduct themselves as 
the responsible proprietors of their written work. 32 As well, the growth 
of the institution of copyright and its effect on the contemporary notion 
of 'the author' also depended on the extremely particular legal struggles 
of book producers in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. 
In his analysis of the invention of copyright Mark Rose uncovers 
the processes by which copyright has become an institution of property, 
and his account traces the rise of a concept of abstract property — intellec-
tual property — which only appears to be a development from the way 
books were regulated during the Renaissance. In fact, Rose argues, our 
notion of copyright depends on a radical shift from the previous way of 
thinking about books and is founded on the same Lockean theory of 
self-sufficient and self-defining self-ownership which underpins the 
rise of the individual.33 That is, the rise of copyright and the autonomy 
of the disinterested author who goes with it both result from radical 
shifts in the conception of the individual which arise out of the pres-
sure of new social relations stimulated by the rise of the new bour-
geoisie and the decline of feudal relations of power. 34 
The case law codification of copyright which constructed the ab-
stract form of intellectual property that we take for granted today neatly 
reflects the politically grounded and contingent nature of the institu-
tions of copyright which underlie the literary field. The 1710 Statute of 
Anne, the direct English ancestor of contemporary versions of copy-
right, was established as a result of the lobbying of parliament, princi-
pally by booksellers but also by writers. 35 But to claim some kind of or-
ganic development of copyright from the Statute of Anne would be to 
misread the process by which the stakes in the literary field have come 
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to be. The Statute of Anne itself is the result of particular publishing 
conditions in Britain (a market struggle between the established 
London Stationers Company and provincial, mostly Scottish, book pub-
lishers who 'pirated' the London editions) and a factional alliance be-
tween representatives of producers like the London Stationers 
Company and writers, who sought to protect their texts from 'piracy,' 
and the government bureaucracy with its interest in censorship (Rose, 
Authors- -and Owners, 11-16). 
Because the Licensing Act had lapsed in 1695 (as the result of ob-
jections to censorship as an infringement of the rights of individuals) 
booksellers and writers were, in effect, able to ally themselves with 
those calling for the reintroduction of censorship in order to create 
tighter press regulation. That copyright is not an organic development 
but emerged from particular conditions is evident, further, in the fact 
that the act does not protect the intellectual property of the writer; it 
merely gives legal recognition to the writer and allows for the legal 
ownership of the material text (49), and in the fact that it is only the 
later case law (that is, legally contested) interpretations of the Statute of 
Anne which radically modified the intention of the act in order to 
satisfy the particular interests of some writers, adapting the law to cover 
a new concern with intellectual property. That is, copyright, like 'the 
author' which it protects, emerged out of particular contests as a con-
tested practice in the literary field. Our notions of the copyright protec-
tion of intellectual property and of the genius author are, then, both 
particular, possibly temporary positions which have come to dominate 
the field as the result of particular struggles between agents with com-
peting interests. Like 'originality,' copyright emerged as a means by 
which to protect the interests of some agents in the literary field. 
The Statute of Anne itself registers this fact, on the one hand pro-
tecting the author's or proprietor's right to the work (principally in 
favour of the interests of the London booksellers) but on the other lim-
iting this protection to twenty-eight years for new works or twenty-one 
for those already in print after which time the property was to fall into 
the common domain (allowing provincial booksellers the right to 
reprint). The reason, as Margreta de Grazia argues, that the London 
booksellers deployed Locke's concept of property in order to pursue 
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their case was that if the right to copy literary works was a matter of 
property under common law this would supersede the civil law Statute 
of Anne and its limit on the period of protection.36 The London book-
sellers failed in their attempt to maintain perpetual copyright, but in ar-
guing for it they produced the notion of copyright as a protection of in-
tellectual property. Case law interpretation of the Statute consistently 
ruled in favour of perpetual property rights until the 1774 ruling 
against the London booksellers found in favour of a printer who had 
published a copy of a title whose statutory limitation had lapsed. Even 
so, the arguments used by the London booksellers in favour of a 
(perpetual) common law property right which resulted from the unique 
and individual nature of the author and his or her production of the 
literary work created a persisting conception of the literary work as a 
new creation (de Grazia, Shakespeare Verbatim, 186-87). 
That such arguments did not, in fact, succeed in protecting liter-
ary property in perpetuity in no way cancelled their power in construct-
ing the way our present notion of limited copyright conceives of the 
writer's abstract property in his work. To take one example of the legal 
construction of a copyright in abstract goods or intellectual property, in 
the suit of Alexander Pope against Edmund Curl', the judge's decision 
establishes the notion of abstract copyright beyond the material text. The 
decision, in Pope's favour, to recognise his literary property as a thing 
distinct from material ink and paper established copyright as a 
protection of abstract property and, in so doing, constructed and gave 
privileged protection to the writer as an autonomous creator. Once the 
writer owns his work in an abstract sense (that is, once he is legally 
recognised in this way) he becomes independent of (that is, legally enti-
tled to claim independence from) the social and material conditions in 
which writing was previously thought to take place (Rose, Authors and 
Owners, 59-66). The author now stands alone. That this becomes 
possible, that the property in a text is abstracted, reflects and at the same 
time influences actual practices so that writing can be considered to 
involve solitary writers producing texts in isolation. Legal entities like 
intellectual property, in other words, create social practices, just as they 
are themselves the product of social practices. 
74 
The social practices which informed the legal development of in-
tellectual property in the case of Pope against Curl may not be known. 
But at least one of the social practices which informed the legal argu-
ment on originality is quite clear. The originality of a work was used 
early on in legal dispute as a means to secure the writer protection of 
his property. Following Edward Young's Conjectures on Original 
Composition, the work should be seen, according to those arguing for 
the protection of authors' rights, as the property of the writer because it 
is an embodiment of him (114).37 That is, the work is an expression of 
the writer's unique person not just a product of his labour. Young's 
Conjectures on originality as an organic and personal representation of 
the writer, as both Mark Rose and Martha Woodmansee note, provided 
the central argument for the protection of authors' rights in Britain and 
Germany.38 
By virtue of this originality embodied in the work, the author 
was able to claim or have conferred on him or her the right to control 
of the text, principally for the financial protection of a property. We can 
see how copyright law attempts to enforce this right to protection from 
reproduction, appropriation or other use by considering the legal con-
straints on the use of any book, proclaimed on the page following the ti-
tle page, but the title page itself is a significant instituted practice by 
which one individual claims (or a list of corporate individuals claim) 
the title to 'author.' 39 On the title page the title of the work appears first, 
thereby titling the work; the naming of an individual follows and it is 
this naming which entitles the named individual to be known as 'the 
author' of the work. Naming operates here in the manner of under-
writing in the broad sense that the naming of the individual is a kind of 
documentary signature denoting ownership and carrying legal weight, 
but also in the sense that the individual indicates his or her position as 
the guarantor of the work. This legal, and principally insurance, sense 
of the author as the underwriting individual who controls the work 
marks the double role of 'the author.' To guarantee involves the secur-
ing of the possession of the written work to an individual writer but, 
more importantly, depends upon that individual making him or her-
self responsible for the genuineness of the work. The author as guaran-
tor, finally, establishes the relation of the originating writer (who ii- 
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tially holds all the shares in the work) to the subsequent readers (who 
take up those shares). In doing this, the practices which entitle the au-
thor, that is, that individual who is named as the underwriting author-
ity for the work, protect the financial interest of that individual in the 
genuine work and his or her right to sell that work to others. 
The establishment of intellectual property has, however, another 
consequence besides allowing for the legal protection of the works of 
writers. The claim that the text is a unique product of the author's mind 
makes the text into a representation of the writer's consciousness and 
therefore copyrightable but, further, it creates the conditions in which 
such textual representations can be considered to be only the expression 
of 'the textual author.' Beyond this, it makes it possible to see this ex-
pression as a 'canonical' representation of the author based on a reading 
of the works earmarked as being 'in the canon.'" When the view that 
texts represent personalities is established, the conditions then exist for 
texts and canons to be interrogated in order to discover the textually de-
veloping psychology of the author, the sort of interrogation that is typi-
cal of the man-and-his-work literary criticism which was the target of 
Foucault's initial attack in 'What Is An Author?' Foucault's project in 
that essay, as I tried to show in Chapter One, was to uncover the very 
means by which 'the author' is a policing authority in and of his text. 
Armed with that Foucauldian perspective, the project of Rose and 
Woodmansee in their situating of writers in the literary field seeks to 
make transparent those historically constituted practices which define 
the stakes and make the field work in the way it does today. 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHAKESPEARE 
In arguing that the positions and strategies which are possible in the lit-
erary field are historical constructs I have tried to show that what a 
writer or reader or teacher of 'literature' does today is constrained by 
what has previously been done. But the picture is more complicated 
than this. The processes which construct the possibilities in the literary 
field are not simply chronological. Authors are also retrospectively con-
structed in order that they might be fitted into the possibilities of the 
contemporary field. The dominant artefact in the literary field, 
'Shakespeare,' illustrates this process exceptionally well. 'Shakespeare' is 
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still alive and kicking as a 'literary author' because his constructed 
'individual identity' and 'works' have endured as a result of being taken 
up and used by key players who have made and continue to make 
'Shakespeare' in order to maintain their control of some of the most 
valued stakes in the field. Not surprisingly, given the number of 
Shakespearean scholars in the academic field, the retrospective con-
struction of Shakespeare which I shall describe below has become so 
much an object of literary study that it now constitutes a historiographi-
cal sub-discipline of its own in the field. 
It used to be easy to say that Shakespeare was, arguably, the pre-
eminent author in the literary field. And the argument was over nom-
inees to the position (was Shakespeare pre-eminent or Dante?) rather 
than over the process by which nominations were established, judged 
or appealed. And nobody was arguing over the idea that a pre-eminent 
author served real interests, including the interests of the author (or, 
more to the point, his publisher) and the interests of the literary critics 
doing the nominating. Like the Academy Awards, the canonising of 
'great authors' can be seen as a marketing tool. But, luckier than the 
Academy Award judges who can only consider the annual crop of 
movies, agents in the literary field have the opportunity to reconsider 
and indeed resurrect older texts that may have been missed the first 
time around. A good example of this involves the reconstruction of 
'Australian women's writing,' the subject of Chapter Five. 
In the process by which Shakespeare has been revisited he has 
not simply been re-evaluated but reconstructed in the terms of the day. 
This gradual process has constructed, for example, a psychologically ex-
pressive Shakespeare who expresses his individual identity in his 
works, or more recently a subversive Shakespeare - perhaps 
'Shakespeare Caliban' - who expresses and supposedly represents the 
experiences of repressed minorities. By examining the way Shakespeare 
is constructed my aim here is to try to uncover some of the historical 
processes which have created the particular power of the author as a 
personality and which continue to determine how people read, think 
and talk about books in general and 'literature' in particular. 
Like the history of copyright, the history of Shakespeare as an in-
stitution concerns the conditions which made and continue to make 
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'Shakespeare' the author (or dramatist! poet), 'Shakespearean texts' and 
the group and chronology of texts which make up 'the Works of 
Shakespeare' or, even better, 'the Shakespeare canon.' What we do with 
the construction called Shakespeare is as much a set of historically con-
tingent and more or less durably instituted practices as those more ob-
viously constructed legal and political practices which underwrite the 
copyright protection assigned to 'the author.' That is, even while and 
partly because they appear to be natural social facts which are 'just 
there,' the author,' the works,' and 'the canon' are, like copyright, 
equally notional, historically particular ways of controlling the stakes in 
the literary field and equally in need of the sorts of specific maintenance 
procedures which institutions provide. In order to illustrate this I'd like 
to survey some 'New Historicist' studies of Shakespeare which describe 
the historical emergence of Shakespeare as the paradigmatic canonical 
author and which provide a detailed account of some of the mainte-
nance procedures by which the canonical Shakespeare has endured. 41 
I am not concerned here with 'Shakespeare' as a psychological in-
dividual, that identity which literary critics sometimes extrapolate from 
texts (where the texts are thought to be expressive residues or traces of 
that individual) because the texts themselves are always the product of 
publishing and editing practices which have constructed and continue 
to construct what 'Shakespeare' refers to in the first place. That is, I am 
really concerned with 'Shakespeare' as a textual phenomenon, with the 
ways in which 'Shakespearean texts' are maintained and the reasons 
why some texts are presumed in some instances to be the expressive 
trace of the psychological individuality of Shakespeare as an originating 
and supposedly original author. 
The 'Shakespearean text' refers, on the face of it, to those editions 
which bear the name of a publisher: the Cambridge, Oxford, Penguin, 
Signet, Arden Shakespeare, and so on. These texts can be traced back to 
the earliest extant Folio or quarto texts which, we might presume, were 
printed from those manuscript copies closest to Shakespeare's original. 
On the face of it, in other words, a direct line of descent appears to link 
the contemporary standard paperback copy back to the earliest printed 
copies and then back some more to the manuscript and, through this, to 
the mind of Shakespeare. After all, writers write manuscripts which are 
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published by means of printing copies based on those manuscripts. But 
when we conceive of the 'Shakespearean text' in this way we are merely 
using our own particular, contemporary conditions of textual 
production as a universal paradigm for the relation between all writers 
and texts. Yet the multiple versions of Shakespearean texts, from the 
standard paperbacks available in bookshops through to the quarto and 
Folio versions in public and private libraries, indicate both the 
volatility of the text and the institutional activity needed to shore up 
the text of, say, The Cambridge, Oxford, Penguin, Signet, Arden 
Shakespeare Macbeth, as a fixed entity. One such activity can be traced 
in the way the name of the author and the name of the publisher are 
used. More than any other name in the cultural field Shakespeare is 
tagged with a publisher in a relationship of reciprocal authorising. T he 
Penguin Shakespeare Macbeth, for example, lends the publishing 
weight of Penguin to the particular textual mutation called Macbeth. At 
the same time, Penguin receives the institutional prestige of association 
with the Great Author (and the RSC). The claim in titling The Penguin 
Shakespeare Macbeth calls on the singular authorising status of 
Shakespeare (and not, for example, Thomas Middleton who in all 
probability collaborated on the project) and the singular textual possibil-
ity of the text called Macbeth.42 
But more is going on here. The Penguin Shakespeare Macbeth be-
trays the multiplicity of textual variants, acknowledging the fact that 
there are alternative standard (Cambridge, Oxford, Signet, Arden) 
Macbeths while laying claim to the last word as the final, most 
authoritative version of such multiple possibilities. Such standard-and-
varying texts as The Penguin Shakespeare Macbeth rely on an appeal to 
an imaginary textual original, as though the text is based on the least 
corrupted quarto or Folio versions or mixtures of them and, behind 
these, on the presumed original manuscript. Indeed the very notion of 
the 'corrupt' text internalises in the actual miscellany of received Folio 
and quarto copies the virtual and as yet undiscovered existence of the 
presumed original manuscript of the 'pure' text which would serve as a 
standard in the process of verifying the authority of any particular text. 
And, given that the 'pure' text is supposed to be potentially but not yet 
actually available, the 'least corrupted' version, the one closest to the 
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mythical 'pure' text, becomes the best possible text in the circumstances. 
But seventeenth-century printing practices were such that there is no 
way of determining which early mutations might have been closest to 
any original manuscript. Because compositors read proof in a highly 
variable way as they worked, revising some sheets after unrevised ones 
had already been printed, there is no consistent, standard quarto or 
Folio text of any play, that is, no way of measuring the 'corruption' of 
any version. And comparing the extant copies of 'the same' quarto or 
Folio edition cannot establish a standard because, firstly, the surviving 
copies do not represent a spread of all the copies originally printed from 
which a pure version could be mixed and matched and, secondly, it is 
unlikely that there was any single original manuscript to begin with. 43 
The conditions in which the printed plays of Shakespeare 
emerged and the gap between the first printing of various plays and the 
later 'Works of Shakespeare' are instructive in showing how problem-
atic, and how well naturalised, is our notion of the text. When 
Shakespeare or others engaged to have the plays published, his 
manuscript held no special authority, indeed, we cannot be sure that 
'his manuscript' even existed. The source or sources for the printed ver-
sion may have been derived from one or several manuscripts written 
by Shakespeare or copied from the originals or original bits of 
Shakespeare or Shakespeare and his collaborators, or from copies pro-
vided by the owners of the performance rights to a particular copy, that 
is, the owners of the prompt copy, a copy which was subject to the mod-
ifications and reworking which might result from producing the play, 
or from a transcript from a performance, or from copies registered as 
entitled publishing property with the London Stationers, or from a mix-
ture of these. Further, the particular copy chosen for printing may have 
related to one particularly successful but atypical theatrical production. 
If the first publication of a play was subject to such variation, the 
process of collecting the plays of Shakespeare, the 1623 First Folio, led to 
an even more complex text. Margreta de Grazia describes the radical in-
consistency of the actual artefacts that are described, as though a coher-
ent object, as 'The First Folio.' Irregularities in the typeface, in spelling 
and punctuation, in act and scene division, in line arrangement, in pag-
ination, in ornamentation, in spacing to define titles of plays, stage di- 
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rections and act and scene divisions, in the listing of dramatis personae, 
in speech prefixes and in the degree of proof correction mean, she ar-
gues, that no typical First Folio actually exists (de Grazia, Shakespeare 
Verbatim, 15-18). That the paradigmatic First Folio does, however, exist 
in fact is a result of the editorial need to produce one. Charlton 
Hinman's The Norton Facsimile: First Folio of Shakespeare represents 
the theoretical entity of the 'original First Folio.' Yet, as de Grazia notes, 
the original First Folio never existed: Hinman's version is the result of 
a way of thinking which is only possible because of later modes of 
uniform work practices and mechanical reproduction (18) and because 
we conceive of the text as the uniform expressive representation of the 
writer. 
The First Folio was not, however, the simple collection of the ex-
tant copies of the plays of Shakespeare: 
[h]alf of the plays ... collected [by Heminge and Condell, the 
supervisors of the publication,] had been printed and of those 
several had been reprinted. The other half, it must be as-
sumed, existed in the form of authorial manuscripts ..., 
scribal transcripts, or prompt-book copies used for perfor-
mance, or combinations of the three .... While the unprinted 
plays were presumably the property of the acting company, 
the printed plays were variously assigned by the Stationers' 
Register and by the individual quarto imprints: the rights to 
one play had never been established, those to two others had 
reverted to the Stationers' Company, six belonged to the syn-
dicate of four named on the imprint and colophon, and the 
remainder were distributed among six independent publish-
ers .... Like the plays that had never been printed, the quarto 
plays also bore various relations to what the author had 
penned, having undergone different amounts of theatrical 
cutting, interpolation, abridgment, censorship, revision, as 
well as scribal, compositorial, and proof-readers' modification 
- some accidental and others purposeful ... [and] collabora-
tion .... With such diverse and complex backgrounds, the 
plays collected by Heminge and Condell needed a strong 
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principle of unification to authorise their enclosure in one 
massive book. (30-31) 
The apparatus that does this involves the very physical format of the 
volume. The respectable, monumental, expensive and durable folio 
format was intended for preservation, and thus signified that the con-
tents merited preservation. But folio publication was usually reserved 
for classics or serious works, not plays (32). In order to suggest the 
proper credentials of the plays of Shakespeare for such treatment, the 
First Folio apparatus produces an engraving, epistle, address, com-
mendatory poems and the strategic dedication of the publication to 
Pembroke and Montgomery, 'Both Knights of the most Noble order of 
the Garter, and our singular good Lords' (quoted in de Grazia, 
Shakespeare Verbatim, 37-38). In doing this, the apparatus stakes a 
claim to the importance of this particular publication and its author by 
virtue of associating this volume with previous folio volumes and 
with other agents or institutions with social and specifically literary 
standing. But the unification of the plays depends on the centralising of 
the author. The commendatory poems in particular lay claim to the 
relation between the bibliographical volume and the biological 
individual called Shakespeare. 'All four commemorative verses allude 
to that dead body or corpse, ... confined and stationed till doomsday but 
superseded by the perpetuating issue of the Folio tome' (41). The 
apparatus retrospectively constructs Shakespeare as the single, 
originating individual in order to title the volume and entitle it as a 
coherent collection of otherwise miscellaneous items under the 
homogenising name, 'Shakespeare.'" 
The generation of 'Shakespeare's plays' after the publication of 
the First Folio is highly dependent on such collectivising practices of 
the First Folio. What we now call 3 Henry VI, for example, follows from 
the First Folio rather than the quarto title page, 'The true Tragedie of 
Richard Duke of Yorke, and the death of good King Henrie the Sixt, 
with the whole contention betweene the two Houses of Lancaster and 
Yorke.'45 Even more, in order to reaffirm the coherence of the plays as a 
whole the title page in the First Folio suppresses the usual quarto title 
page information indicating the previous printing, selling and perfor-
mance of the text. Most importantly, what the Folio elevates in its appa- 
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ratus, the centrality of Shakespeare to the play, is usually subordinated 
in the quartos to the acting company and information about perfor-
mance, marketing information that promoted the publication in the 
same way that reissues of books 'tie-in' to the exposure already gener-
ated by films 'based on' the book. The naming of the writer was, in the 
quartos, usually subordinated to all the other marketing information. 
The only quarto exception regarding the prominence of Shakespeare's 
name, as Peter Stallybrass notes, is the 1608 King Lear: 
M. William Shak-speare 
HIS 
True Chronicle Historie of the life and 
death of King LEAR and his three 
Daughters 
But the elevation of the name 'Shakespeare' in this instance, according 
to Stallybrass, is not intended to valorise Shakespeare as author but to 
distinguish this play from the Leir which had been published in 1605 
(Stallybrass, 'Shakespeare, the Individual, and the Text,' 597). Further, 
while Shakespeare's name was of use in making such a distinction this 
was not because his status as author was established but because he 
occupied a position of centrality with regard to all aspects of the 
theatrical production. Given that Shakespeare 'was in the unusual 
position of being an actor and shareholder in his own company, he had 
an unusually full role in the collaborative process: he would have eco-
nomic interests in the choosing of a topic, in the theatrical revisions, 
and so on' (597). 'Shakespeare,' in other words, was one marketable 
name among other recognisable kinds of brand name, in Shakespeare's 
case deployed in order to strengthen the associations between the par-
ticular publication and previous theatrical productions associated with 
the company with which he was involved. 46 
If the First Folio constructs the individuated Mr William 
Shakes peares. Comedies, Histories, & Tragedies, subsequent editions 
construct a further elaborated identity as well as the notion of the 
Works of Shakespeare. And it is the idea of the Works of Shakespeare 
that makes possible the canonical treatment of the plays. The transfor-
mation of the coherent First, Second, Third and Fourth Folios into the 
increasingly unified Shakespeare editions with named editors (Rowe 
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(1709, twice, and 1714), Pope (1725 and 1728), Theobald (1733, 1740, 1752, 
1757 and 1762), Hanmer (1745, 1747, twice, 1748, 1751 and 1760) 
Warburton (1747), Johnson (1765, twice, and 1768), Steevens (Twenty 
Quartos, 1766) and Capell (1767)) was a process by which a new institu- 
tion, the works, was created.47 The durability of the works is the product 
of authorising. But the power of Shakespeare as an authorising figure 
depends on the particular conditions in which the editions listed above 
were produced. All of the editions were initiated by the Tonson pub- 
lishing house who used an already tested marketing strategy. 
By ... associating a particular reprint with a well-known con-
temporary writer, Tonson ... milked the [writer's] reputation 
as ... Ethel editor ... But in Shakespeare's case, because of the 
longevity of the Tonsons' influence this strategy produced a 
string of editions inextricably associated with the dramatis 
personae of eighteenth-century English literature .... [Flor 
over a century the finest practitioners of the English 
language, from Dryden to Pope to Johnson, contributed to the 
public remodelling and transmission of Shakespeare's plays 
... By the end of the eighteenth century Shakespeare had 
been, by such means, insinuated into the network of English 
literature. (Taylor, Reinventing Shakespeare, 71) 
Even more, the Tonson publications of Shakespeare were associated 
with the cultural elite, no more clearly than in Pope's edition in which 
'The Names of the Subscribers' are printed just before the plays, accord-
ing to rank, from the king down (de Grazia, Shakespeare Verbatim, 
197). Tonson publications aimed to profit by association with 
prestigious literary collections, emphasised by the honorific Works in 
the title of collections besides their Shakespeares, from Virgil and Ovid 
to Abraham Cowley, Milton, Matthew Prior, Sir John Denham, Sir 
John Suckling, Congreve, Beaumont and Fletcher, Waller, Otway and 
Spenser (Taylor, Reinventing Shakespeare, 69). The pre-eminent 
marketability of Shakespeare is, however, clearly evident in the 
decision to use the image of Shakespeare from the pedigreed Tonson 
Works of Shakespeare as the Tonson house-mark (de Grazia, 
Shakespeare Verbatim, 81). 
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The practice of editorial succession was, however, more than a 
marketing strategy. When the authorial work was edited it was appro-
priated by the new, secondary work, becoming the property of the editor 
and publisher because it had been 'infus[ed] ... with [the editor's] emen-
dations, illustrations, and evaluations' (195). Such a process of 
'overwriting' acted as a kind of de facto copyright that could be enjoined 
even when the statutory limitation on the primary text had elapsed, a 
fact that was especially useful for the sort of publisher like Tonson who 
virtually owned the rights to Shakespeare by virtue of taking his pub-
lishing rivals to court over copyright disputes (195) and by paying out 
the contracted editors for their often anonymous labour (Taylor, 
Reinventing Shakespeare, 71 and 139, de Grazia, Shakespeare Verbatim, 
201). 
Editorial succession did more than protect Shakespeare as 
Tonson property, it constructed the text that bore the Shakespearean ti-
tle. Each new Tonson edition appeared in a format with a text, biogra-
phy and authorial portrait inherited from its predecessor (de Grazia, 
Shakespeare Verbatim, 193) but, more importantly, each new editor 
received the interleaved copy of his immediate predecessor, made his 
changes on the predecessor's copy-text and added his own new notes on 
the interleaved pages (201). This practice ensured the continuity of the 
text from one edition to the next based on the further revision of the 
latest, that is, the most mediated version (52). Even where the new edi-
tor produced some innovation in the text, an innovation made neces-
sary by the function of the new edition in superseding the previous one 
(Taylor, Reinventing Shakespeare, 72-73), the new edition remained 
fundamentally conservative. The editorial decision to retain or reject 
the previous editorial emendation of, say, an archaic word or phrase or 
a supposed error by a compositor, or an altered or reassigned stretch of 
dialogue, or the provision of uniform speech prefixes served to 
construct the text by a process of accretion. Each editorial decision to 
retain or reject previous emendations is tied to the latest version and at 
best the one before that. In such a process the authenticity of the text, its 
relation to the earliest known sources, is not an issue. 
Margreta de Grazia's project is to demonstrate precisely how radi-
cal is the shift in editorial practice that began with Edmond Malone's 
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The Plays and Poems of William Shakespeare. Malone's insistence on 
collating the authentic (earliest known) copies of Shakespeare's plays 
introduced a new method for constructing Shakespeare. By insisting on 
authenticity Malone privileged documentary sources and discredited 
the practice of editorial succession which had ensured such profits for 
the Tonson publishing house. But the privileging of documentation 
also reconstructed Shakespeare in a new way. Malone's documented bi-
ography of Shakespeare, his chronology of the plays and his edition of 
the sonnets created a new version of Shakespeare in which the author 
becomes the psychological individual discernible in the traces of his 
texts (de Grazia, Shakespeare Verbatim, 134, Stallybrass, 'Shakespeare, 
the Individual, and the Text,' 596). Malone's method was to sift archival 
materials in order to establish the Shakespearean biographical record 
and source materials for the plays and then cross reference these with 
the plays. The method supposes that a consistent individual read and 
was influenced by particular texts in a coherent way. It postulates, that 
is, that Shakespeare's personal experience was recorded and could be de-
tected in the plays (de Grazia, Shakespeare Verbatim, 144). And, once 
ordered as a temporal sequence, 'Mlle chronology provided more than a 
way of identifying isolated memories, feelings, and thoughts; it 
provided a temporal structure by which to organise not only the plays 
but the lifetime in which they had been written' (145). 
Malone's method in authenticating the sonnets most clearly il-
lustrates the self-contained assumptions with which he began his pro-
ject: Malone conceived of the author as an individual whose consistent 
and psychologically understandable being was discernible in his textual 
traces. Accordingly, any cross-referenced similarities between the son-
nets and the plays became proof of the authenticity of the sonnets, thus 
drawing the sonnets into the canon. The method presupposes that 
Shakespeare - the historically documented entity who is recorded on 
parish rolls and as the principal figure associated with some performed 
and published plays - also occupies the first-person pronoun position 
in the anonymous narrative of the sonnets. The sonnets thus become, 
for Malone as well as for following critics, a biographical record of 
Shakespeare in which he reflects on his own psychological condition 
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(152-59). The text becomes, after Malone, the trace of the author, and of 
the author alone. 
Shakespeare or any other author considered as the individual, originat-
ing psychologically motivated personality behind the text who is ex-
pressed through the text is a particular, historically contingent product 
of the forces operating in the field of cultural production. The degree to 
which the canonical Shakespeare developed as such a historically con-
tingent product is clearly evident in, for example, the combination of 
factors which enabled the Tonson publishing firm to construct the col-
lection of texts they called 'The Works of Shakespeare' as property. The 
possibility of establishing the authority of those Works depended on 
such contingent factors as: agreement between publishers on the con-
ventions which controlled the registration of rights to the copying of a 
text; the persistence of case law agreement with the Tonson claim to 
perpetual copyright even after the Statute of Anne proclaimed the limi-
tation of copyright protection; the rise of the belief in the autonomous 
individual; the parallel rise of individuated reading practices and a 
growing book market; the rise of 'the man of letters' as an editorial au-
thority in the eighteenth century; the position of editors as contracted 
labourers subject to Tonson control; and the capacity of the Tonsons to 
collect, retain and institutionalise the previously diffused publishing 
rights to Shakespeare's plays and poems for three quarters of a century. 
The machinery which maintains the centralising, originating au-
thor, then, protects the text as a property in the interests of publishers. 
But also, and perhaps inadvertently, it encourages the protection of liv-
ing authors who saw in 'the more profound conceptions of literary 
property rights ...[- that is, in] concepts which regard an author's work 
as the expression of a free moral personality' - an opportunity to protect 
their supposed individual labour. 48 Such an individual originating 
author whom we may consider as a natural fact in the production of a 
text is, after all, the product of the confluence of contingent practices 
which served then and still serve now to protect the interests of some 
agents more than others in the field of cultural production. This au-
thor, as I have tried to show in the case of Shakespeare, is a construction 
which depends on the suppression of the practices which get him or her 
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up and running in the first place. Shakespeare the natural genius, the 
expressive individual or the subversive - rather than his theatrical and 
textual collaborators, publishers and editors - appears to be the underly-
ing wellspring of production, and such a wellspring that the critic need 
only understand h i in to understand the plays. 
It used to be thought that the reason some writers, like 
Shakespeare, get to be authors or great and enduringly great authors 
was because they just are better than others. But, as I have tried to show, 
the conditions which privilege and reward agents who can claim to be, 
or have been posthumously claimed to be, such individual, originating 
authors depend on the historically particular interests and contests of 
agents in the field of cultural production. 49 Some of these agents are 
and have been writers, but the definition and possession of the stakes in 
the field is not exclusively their province. What counts and who gets to 
play in the field of cultural production depends on such historically 
constructed ways of thinking about or handling texts as copyright, the 
individuated ownership of intellectual property, the text as the trace or 
residue of a psychological individual available for interrogation, cen-
sorship, praise or censure. What counts and who gets to play depends 
on the way writers deploy their resources according to such ways of 
thinking about or handling texts and on how such notions operate over 
time in the hands or minds of such users of texts as lawyers, critics, edi-
tors, pedagogues, publishers, and so on. It is because such notions gov-
ern the cultural field that it was possible to imagine, as Leavis did, that 
authors have always and only been unproblematic objects which can 
simply be measured and compared to decide which ones are the best. At 
the same time, it is because the cultural field operates in the way that it 
does, and especially because Shakespeare occupies such a significant po-
sition in its historical development, that the attempt to validate a 
judgement of Shakespeare - or any other writer - as the best is impossi-
ble. The contemporary cultural field, as a result, is an interesting one: 
judgements about authors by agents in the field is at best problematic 
and at worst impossible yet at the same time agents operate in the field 
as though this were not the case. This is because the historically particu-
lar shape of the field of cultural production and the roles that are possi-
ble in it are enduring ones which is a consequence of the institution- 
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alised nature of the ways of thinking, feeling and acting which 'just are 
the way things are done' in the field. And how institutions operate to 
maintain 'the way things are done' in the field of cultural production is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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3 
Institutions of the culture industry in the 
field of cultural production 
We need to see authors and readers as only two elements 
in a much larger network which includes critics and re-
viewers; journalists, editors and publishers; academics 
and teachers; literary magazines and newspaper review 
pages; advertising and marketing practices; printing tech-
nologies; and curricula in universities and schools. 
David Carter and Gillian Whitlockl 
Writing and reading books are institutional practices. And the 
agents who have since the eighteenth century been credited in west-
ern culture with the central place in this cultural production have, 
as I tried to show in the last chapter, continued to occupy this posi-
tion by virtue of institutions which foreground writing as a product 
of the originary genius of the individual, autonomous and copy-
right-owning author. Authors, that is, are products of historically 
particular social practices which apply in the field of cultural produc-
tion; and they occupy a social position which has been reasonably 
durable because the chronically recurring commercial and pedagogi-
cal practices embedded in institutional behaviour continue to have a 
hand in the consecration of the individuals who achieve the name 
'author' and in the initial production and subsequent valorising of 
particular 'literary' texts. It is these chronically recurring commercial 
and pedagogical practices which will be the subject of my attention 
in this chapter. 
By 'institution' I mean those 'hard' social practices that are 
strongly sanctioned and codified in the legal, bureaucratic and finan-
cial constructs of the organised state. But I also mean those appar-
ently trivial 'soft' social practices which direct our everyday be- 
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haviour that are weakly sanctioned because deeply sedimented in 
the typical and habitual ways in which social agents think, feel and 
act.2 In using the term 'institutional practices' I mean practices 
which exercise the 'capacities that individuals possess as a result of 
their position in a social organisation.' 3 For example: 
if two men fight solely for the possession of a piece of 
food, the fighting involves only the exercise of individual 
powers. If, however, two men fight to win a laurel 
wreath, they are engaging in a contest and not only are 
individual powers being exercised, the men are participat- 
ing in social or institutional behaviour. Fighting may be 
simply an individual activity or it may be an institutional 
activity, depending upon how the participants understand 
their behaviour. (Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, 79-80) 
Institutional practices such as fighting for a laurel wreath, then, de-
pend upon the perceptions of the participants which may result 
from a more or less institutionally soft, deeply sedimented under-
standing of the practice, but also upon the more or less institution-
ally hard, explicitly organised structures which determine, say, the 
rules, arenas, system of scoring, appointing of judges, and so on, par-
ticular to wrestling, which maintain the practice by means of poten-
tially strong sanctions, such as the sanction against running away 
from one's wrestling opponent. Similarly, the institutions which 
regulate the practices underpinning cultural production can be de-
scribed as being both soft and hard, constructing and maintaining 
the perception and prestige of the 'supply-side' agents involved in 
the field (writers, publishers, reviewers, school and academic course 
writers and teachers, and so on), the actual cultural artefacts (the 
books themselves) and the readers who read (and reconstruct) them. 
The fact that the cultural productions of social agents result 
from more or less soft and more or less hard institutional practices 
explains why it is that the historically contingent possibilities that 
have emerged in the field of cultural production, such as the possi-
bility of laying claim to the status of the autonomous, originary and 
copyright-owning author, tend to endure long after the battles have 
been lost and won. Agents operate according to both the weakly and 
strongly sanctioned institutions that organise the positions and pos-
sible moves in the field and according to the weak and strong sanc- 
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tions which control the way various cultural artefacts like, say, 
canonical texts, airport fiction or newspapers may be used. 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS 
The institutional regulation of behaviour has been of considerable 
interest to philosophers of language and art, whose theories provide 
some analytical leverage in helping us to prize open the mecha-
nisms by which institutions regulate our social and cultural prac-
tices. John Austin's original theory of speech acts, for example, has 
been deployed in a variety of more and less satisfactory ways in a 
range of literary and cultural theories but is most useful for my pur-
poses in showing how institutions operate in both strongly and 
weakly sanctioned ways at the same time. 4 Austin's method is to 
analyse the conditions in which language can be said to 'do things.' 
His argument is that some utterances are descriptive while others, 
like interrogative, declarative and imperative utterances, are per-
formative. A performative utterance is one in which the uttering of 
'the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to 
describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing 
or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it.' 5 That is, 'the issuing of the 
utterance is the performing of an action' (Austin, How To Do Things 
With Words, 6). Pierre Bourdieu takes up Austin's theory in order 
to situate the performative utterance in its social context, that is, to 
show how Austin's performative utterance is dependent on the 
context in which it occurs. 
The limiting case of the performative utterance is the le-
gal act which, when it is pronounced, as it should be, by 
someone who has the right to do so, [that is,] by an agent 
acting on behalf of a whole group, can replace action with 
speech ...: the judge need say no more than 'I find you 
guilty' because there is a set of agents and institutions 
which guarantee that the sentence will be executed. 
(Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 75) 
Bourdieu's limiting case seeks to explain the 'appropriate circum-
stances' which, for Austin, are necessary to the 'felicity' or efficacy of 
the utterance (Austin, How To Do Things With Words, 8-9). But 
Bourdieu misses the point here and betrays a single-mindedly hard 
definition of institutions whose origins and maintenance, having 
been shifted to the status of preconditions, he cannot now explain. 
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Austin's theory attempts to show how conventional practices are 
instituted in and by their use. The issuing of a promise, for example, 
is at the same time an utterance and a promise which both practises 
and maintains the institution of promising or, to use Bourdieu's 
terms, the 'right to promise.' For Austin, the performative utterance 
is effective when it is pronounced by someone who is believed by 
the receiver. When, for example, I say 'I promise' the act of 
promising is effective, executed in so far as my listener believes in 
my promise, which is partly the result of my saying 'I promise' and 
partly of characteristics to do with my listener's perception of me (his 
or her knowledge of my history in relation to promises, my current 
status, the nature of the relationship) and to do with the possibility 
of my fulfilment of the promise which depends on the situation in 
which the promise is made. To promise, in other words, is 
institutionalised and institutionalising, created out of and creating 
social practices which enable ongoing behaviour, not simply the 
result (although often the result) of previously given socially coded 
or legislated practices. 
Austin's theory shows the construction of the institution in 
its everyday use. Bourdieu reverses the method. For him, the per-
formative utterance does not construct but merely follows from the 
appropriate circumstances (for example, the institution of finding 
guilt follows from already being a judge, rather than the other way 
around).6 Bourdieu conceives of institutions as constituting the ba-
sis for legitimate social practice `by instituting [the agent] as a 
medium between the group and the social world' (Bourdieu, 
Language and Symbolic Power, 75) but fails, curiously, to see 
institutions as being produced in the agent when the agent is 
speaking for him or herself. Rather than the power of the institution 
being constructed in its use by various agents, for Bourdieu the use 
reflects only the power of the group delegated in an authorised 
representative, and how this authority is legitimised remains 
unspecified and problematically unspecifiable. 
Austin's theory of speech acts, on the other hand, demon-
strates how both soft and hard institutions are maintained by lin-
guistic practices in everyday circumstances. His emphasis on the ev-
eryday and trivial basis of institutional action explains how institu-
tions are produced and reproduced by means of participation in the 
action, whether this is the result of deeply sedimented, habitual and 
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wealdy sanctioned behaviour or behaviour which is highly codified, 
explicitly regulated and strongly sanctioned.7 Jeffrey Wieand calls 
these institutions 'action institutions,' institutions which are them-
selves maintained by the actions which they regulate. 'Action insti-
tutions' shape both harder organisations and social structures and 
softer, habitually understood conventions by which we negotiate so-
cial relations. 
The idea that the institutions which regulate the ways that 
agents act are themselves produced and reproduced out of the ac-
tions of agents is a useful one that helps to explain how institutions 
and agents operate in durable and regulated ways in the field of cul-
tural production. I shall make use of it in Part Two to attempt to 
show how short story anthologies operate institutionally to regulate 
how agents conceive of categories like 'Australian fiction,' women's 
writing,' and so on. Anthology 'selections' present and represent 
what is considered to count - 'Australian fiction,' women's writing,' 
or whatever - in the cultural field and which writers and particular 
works are considered to count as worthwhile 'specimens.' Short 
story anthologies provide useful case studies because they reveal 
how practices like selecting, describing and historicising 'Australian 
fiction,' women's writing,' or whatever construct these objects and 
regulate the possibilities open to subsequent editors as well as to the 
various kinds of readers who use anthologies. 
George Dickie's institutional theory_ of art refin-eg tikkotidki. that in-
stitutions regulate and are regulated by agents in order to explain 
what characterises artistic practices and artefacts. For Dickie, the in-
stitutional theory of art stresses 
the conventional matrix in which works of art are em-
bedded and which provides the defining characteristics of 
art ... [, that is,] the non-exhibited characteristics that works 
of art have in virtue of being embedded in an institu-
tional matrix which may be called 'the artworld' ... The in-
stitutional theory ... concentrates attention on the 
practices and conventions used in presenting certain 
aspects of works of art to their audiences and argues that 
the presentational conventions locate and isolate the 
aesthetic objects (features) of works of art.8 (Dickie, Art 
and the Aesthetic, 12, emphasis added) 
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The institutional theory of art, clearly, seeks to oppose an idealist or 
essentialist aesthetic but must also contend with the anti-essentialist 
view that there exists no single necessary and sufficient feature to 
define every form of art. Dickie, following Maurice Mandelbaum's 
critique of Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblance, locates the 
necessary and sufficient condition for art in the `relational attributes' 
of artistic or cultural production, that is, in the fact that all artworks 
are related because they share presentational conventions. 9 Such 
conventions, according to the institutional theory of art, are evident 
in all artistic or cultural productions in that they all present artefacts 
as artistic or cultural products. Most importantly, the conventional 
actions involved in presenting thereby define the artefact as an artis-
tic or cultural product. Dickie's theory is limited, however, in that he 
assumes that the artefact precedes the conventions of presentation 
which define the artefact as an artistic or cultural product. This as-
sumption may result from his paradigmatic use of Marcel 
Duchamp's Dadaist ready-mades to explain the institutional basis of 
art, Duchamp's already-existing and merely functional urinal be-
coming the artistic `Fountain' by virtue of the conventions of pre-
senting it for exhibition. But the artefact is, more accurately, con-
structed as art in the moment or at each moment of the receiver's 
apprehension of it as art. In other words, the artefact is constructed 
as an artistic or cultural product because of the way its audience re-
lates to it, as I shall attempt to show, later, in terms of the reader's 
construction of the literary text. 
Despite the limitations of Dickie's theory, however, his ac-
count of cultural production helps to explain the institutional basis 
of cultural products in general and the literary text in particular." 
Literary texts are artefacts which result from the mediation of the 
generally hard organisational structures and practices of publishing 
and distribution and the hard and soft pedagogic organisational 
structures and practices which determine which texts are read and 
how texts are read by social agents in terms of the literary author, 
text and canon. 
In the rest of this chapter I shall consider such institutions in 
terms of the supply-side of production — the actual production of tex-
tual artefacts, that is, the production of books by agents like writers, 
publishers, and so on, and the reproduction that comes with the 
consecration of such artefacts and their writers as canonical texts and 
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authors; and in terms of the demand-side of production — the fur-
ther reproduction of textual artefacts as a result of the construction . 
of the reader and 'literary' ways of reading. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the method used here to describe cultural production in 
terms of an initial supply- and subsequent demand-side is a matter 
of analytical convenience which enables me to consider the various 
ways in which texts are produced, yet such a split distorts what is re-
ally a continuous form of production. Books are not really au-
tonomous products delivered to virgin readers who subsequently 
use them, but always products that follow from the ways in which 
previous books have been used already, products which in turn de-
termine subsequent books and ways of reading them. 
SUPPLY-SIDE INSTITUTIONS OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION: THE 
PRODUCTION OF TEXTS 
I don't want to be judged on a book-by-book basis. If we are 
not making enough money, or no one likes us, then I am 
doing a bad job. If at the end of a year enough books have 
made themselves felt and heard, and we have come out 
ahead financially, everything is fine. How I get there is my 
business. 11 
On the face of it, books in general and literary fiction in particular 
come into being as a result of the practices of such agents in the field 
of cultural production as literary agents, publishers, reviewers, and 
so on, who mediate between the initial producers of manuscripts 
(writers) and the final consumers (readers). Such a view sees the 
mediating practitioners and practices of the book industry as a kind 
of gatekeeping or 
sluicegate ... for ideas, deciding which [books] will be of-
fered and what will be excluded ... sifting the chaff from 
the wheat and making authoritative decisions about 
which deserve sponsorship for distribution and which are 
to be kept out of circulation.12 (Coser, Kadushin and 
Powell, Books, 4) 
Literary agents, publishers, publicists, reviewers, and so on, certainly 
make decisions which make and break the careers of various writers 
and provide or deny them access to a variety of consumers. But the 
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idea that the production of texts is a simple kind of gatekeeping ob-
scures the key institutional practices which govern the field of cul-
tural production. 
One of these key practices involves deciding what counts in 
the field, that is, why some manuscripts get through the gate, which 
is not simply a question of 'sifting the chaff from the wheat' but of 
deciding what constitutes wheat and chaff in the first place. Every 
choice by the gatekeeper is a more or less habitually instituted step in 
constructing and reconstructing the general typical profile for a pub-
lishable manuscript (the wheat) and a rejected one (the chaff) and 
the appropriateness of particular manuscripts in relation to this con-
structed profile. The practice in constructing 'an appropriate 
manuscript' depends on: the prior history of the publishing house 
regarding published and rejected manuscripts; the mechanisms by 
which manuscripts arrive on the editor's desk (directly onto the 
'slush pile' or by way of a literary agent's recommendation which is, 
in turn, qualified by the reliability of the agent's assessments or her 
prior affiliation with the publishing house, and on the agent's per-
ceived status in regard to representing profitable or prestigious writ-
ers)13; the relation between the writer and publisher (whether the 
manuscript is suited to the typical style of the house or imprint, 
whether the writer has produced reliable sales on previous titles, is 
new to the house or has changed from one house to another); the 
selling power of the writer's name, and so on. But the idea that some 
agents in the field of cultural production are gatekeepers rests on the 
presupposition that ideas already exist as a reservoir of unproblem-
atic givens and the gatekeeper's role is merely passive, requiring 
only that he or she fish out the good ones. As I have tried to show in 
relation to the construction of the copyrightable and the 
Shakespearean author, those cultural products (books and authors) 
which gain a foothold in the field of cultural production are not pre-
existing objects in the field to be netted by some benign authority 
called a publisher. Rather, they emerge from and are constructed out 
of the various victories, defeats, truces and alliances which result 
from the contests between competing agents. 
Another key practice governing the field of cultural produc-
tion which is obscured in the account of Coser, Kadushin and Powell 
concerns the nature of distribution and circulation implicit in the 
making public which characterises publishing. Coser, Kadushin and 
101 
Powell's homogenising of the publishing industry as a monolithic 
gatekeeping institution submerges the contests over how and how 
far particular texts are distributed and circulated. It takes for granted, 
against their own evidence, that all published texts are equal simply 
by virtue of being in the public domain, without analysing the vehi-
cles used by textual producers to deliver texts to specific consumers. 
Where, for example, the published text relies upon a large advertis-
ing budget, author tours, television interviews and bookshop sign-
ings rather than, say, reviewing, the extent of its circulation, typi-
cally, is wider and the duration of sales shorter than for a text which 
relies on reviews or recommendations.14 More importantly, the de-
cision to promote a book by way of reviews defines the text as 
'literary' and not 'popular,' popular' books, typically, depending on 
pre-publicity which reaches booksellers before reviews appear. So far 
as Coser, Kadushin and Powell are concerned, however, the causal 
relation is one in which, 'Ulf the book is a literary work, then the 
public relations department attempts to get literary opinion leaders 
and makers to endorse the book. Getting reviewed in the right places 
is part of this process' (213, emphasis added) and such reviewing is 
central only to the marketing of the unproblematically defined 
'quality work' of 'serious' intellectual or literary merit' (the terms 
appear on pages 10, 221, 308, 331). But the relation between text and 
review is more complex than this suggests. 
The decision by, say, a publishing editor to pitch a book as a 
literary one determines her choice to review (including the attempt 
to place the book with newspapers, pre-publication trade magazines 
or literary magazines which are perceived to have high status in the 
literary field) but is in turn determined by the book being taken up 
and reviewed as a literary one. 15 And how reviewers review is, of 
course, determined by institutional practices. The reviews editor, for 
example, indicates by his matching of titles to reviewers and by the 
amount of line space he makes available to the reviewer how he ex-
pects each book to be treated. The review, further, is predetermined 
by its intended audience. A review in the New York Review of 
Books, for example, will reach a small, self-consciously highbrow 
audience and any reviewer will be selected for and will critique par-
ticular books on the basis of being familiar to such an audience and 
of having a familiarity with the 'literature' that it consumes. But in 
so far as editors and publishers of review magazines perceive the 
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role of reviewing as directing the market, reviewers also assume a 
cultural authority in order to construct the terms of debate about lit-
erature. Publications of the Australian Bookseller and Publisher, for 
example, sought in the 1930s to direct the book-selling and -buying 
market by developing the 'Bookchat' and later 'All About Books' in-
serts. Such inserts defined the terms of, for example, the debate on 
'Australian literature' in the early 1930s, and thereby helped to con-
struct the initial market for Australian literature and the later aca-
demic discipline that studied it. 16 
Independent bookshops, which tend to offer strong support 
for locally produced books, rely on the kind of review publicity 
which defines what gets to be called 'literary,' largely because they 
tend not to possess the kind of advertising budget typical of the large 
book chains. As a result, reviews of Australian books, which have a 
significant influence on independent bookshop sales, also have 
some influence over the construction of the category, 'Australian 
literature.' 17 In other words, the practice of reviewing helps to con-
struct kinds of books, the degree of distribution likely for books, and 
the category of 'literature' itself. There is, of course, more to the con-
struction of 'literature' than this. And how the initial determination 
by reviewers of the book as a literary one is pursued by other agents 
and organisations like literary critics, teachers and curriculum writ-
ers in the field of cultural production shall be considered a little 
later. 
For the moment, and having confined my analysis to the 
supply-side production of books, there is still a clear case that there 
are agents other than individual writers who are more or less in-
volved in what might be called the primary production of texts as 
material objects, actively engaged in the selection of suitable topics, 
genres and the commissioning of writers, as well as the funding, re-
search and editing of projects. Such agents include commissioning 
and selecting editors, their departmental or imprint heads, 
manuscript editors, ghostwriters, designers, publicists, the commer-
cial buyers and sellers of the manuscript rights to publication of the 
book itself as well as the subsidiary rights to it, the managers and 
buyers of the large book chains, and so on. This network of agents, as 
popular commentators bemoan, indicates 'that the writer is no 
longer the most important part of a book,' as though this once was 
the case.18 
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To suppose that textual production involves simply the 
choosing of autonomous manuscripts which are then type-set and 
distributed as books in a kind of chronological production line as 
Coser, Kadushin and Powell suppose in the gatekeeping quotation 
above ignores the evidence which they have compiled. For example, 
they describe the existence of loose structures or social networks in 
trade fiction publishing which relate writers, literary agents, editors, 
reviewers, and so on, in a system of production and explain how 
these structures or networks construct the demand for and supply of 
trade fiction manuscripts and, as a corollary, why few unsolicited 
(that is, relatively autonomous) manuscripts are selected for 
publication.19 They note, further, that in contrast to trade fiction 
publishing networks, academic and college publishing networks are 
relatively more organised because they are usually grafted onto 
already existing and highly bureaucratised academic and college 
research and teaching programs. And, they note, the small and 
regulated nature of the academic and college production network 
and market (which amounts to more or less the same thing, 
academic and college text producers being the principal buyers) 
stimulates a high number of commissions because academic series 
editors are usually academics who tend to have a thorough 
knowledge of research relevant to the series and who are well placed 
to put academic and college texts on academic and college reading 
lists (Coser, Kadushirt and Powell, Books, 9, 81-87). Even in trade 
fiction the tendency for agents other than the writer to initiate 
manuscripts is not atypical. For example, writers in genres such as 
detective, mystery, thriller and romance fiction typically are required 
to satisfy the predetermined generic formulae of the publishing 
house or imprint, formulae which are determined by rather than 
novel to the reading market. 20 In other words, the (individual or 
collaborating) writer in the organisation of textual production is, as 
Russell Berman notes, simply one among many commodity 
producers and, because the capitalist structure of the publishing 
industry positions the writer as a dependent employee, writers 'will 
choose to write in certain ways' which are consistent with the 
marketing strategy of the publisher. 21 
Coser, Kadushin and Powell assume, against their own evi-
dence, that publishers are relatively passive agents whose job is to 
winnow out the best of the autonomous manuscripts which, they 
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seem to believe, somehow simply arrive on the editorial desk. But 
according to their own survey of editors the quality of the 
manuscript is only one of a number of inter-related factors which in-
form the decision to sign. Editors cite a variety of factors determin-
ing their decision-making such as: the professional prestige of the 
writer; the reputation of the writer among readers; the writer's pre-
vious publishing record; the timeliness of the book; the potential 
prestige of the book; how well the manuscript reads; the lack of 
competition on the subject dealt with in the book; in-house and out-
side recommendations of the book; the production cost; potential 
sale of rights; potential first-year profitability; potential long-term 
profitability; and ease of promotion. And trade editors tend to rate 
the market value or prestige of the writer, rather than the quality of 
the manuscript, most highly. That is, editors base their editorial deci-
sions on maintaining writers in or attracting writers to the house or 
imprint on the basis of the prestige which they carry in the field of 
cultural production rather than on a gatekeeping response to 
manuscripts (145-46).22 Even further, editors tend to base their edito-
rial decisions on the prestige of the literary agent who represents the 
writer, on the basis that prestigious writers are usually represented 
by prestigious literary agents. Presumably, the maintaining or attract-
ing of prestigious writers by a publishing house may at some times 
precede rather than follow the reading of a manuscript, as the prac-
tice of making contractual advance payments suggests. 
Other material and social factors besides the relation between 
writer and editor further constrain what I have called the primary 
production, or the initiation or selection and material construction, 
of books. The development of the technology necessary to mass pro-
duce and distribute paperbacks, for example, has especially deter-
mined the characteristics of mystery, romance and detective paper-
back genres. That individual texts of such genres are highly deter-
mined by market-driven formulae for good industrial reasons has 
been well documented by Janice Radway in her study of the reading 
practices of middle-class women. 23 Mystery, romance and detective 
paperbacks, she argues, are relatively uniform kinds of commodities 
because they emerged in a manufacturing and distribution system 
that relied on mass consumption. The capacity in the nineteenth-
century American market to produce cheap books was itself conse-
quent on the practices made possible by technological change. 
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Machine-made paper, mechanical typesetting, high-speed rotary-
press printing and synthetic glues allowed for cheaper production 
costs per unit (Radway, Reading the Romance, 22 and 27). But it was 
the high capital investment cost required for such technological 
change which determined the need for large print runs. That is, a 
high turnover of large quantities of a low unit cost commodity 
(paperbacks) was required to cover investment costs. Incidentally, it 
is this capital-driven mass production rather than the existence of a 
population with uniform tastes and available to be mass consumers 
which determines the idea of mass commodities, including, in this 
case, 'popular' fiction. But in order for the new, large American pub-
lishers to cover their investment costs they needed to sell their 
mass-produced popular fiction through a large distribution network 
(22, 27-28). 
When Mercury Publications in 1937 and Pocket Books in 1939 
harnessed their new mass commodity paperbacks to existing maga-
zine distribution networks (that is, to corner stores rather than 
bookstores) they did three things. Piggy-backing paperbacks on a 
magazine distribution system, firstly, established a point-of-sale 
structure which allowed for market research. But, secondly and 
more importantly, publishers restricted production to certain kinds 
of books because they needed to guarantee predictable sales of 
proven kinds of books. This was because the distribution network 
depended on the incentive to new book-sellers provided by the 
publishers who carried the risk on unsold books (the beginning of 
the returns policy). And, thirdly, a restricted range of genres 
dependent on tested formulae allowed for generic advertising of the 
list of formulaic books and even of the imprint (for the purpose of 
encouraging brand recognition). The new distribution network, 
then, made possible wide-ranging market research and advertising 
but also depended on wide-ranging research and advertising in 
order to turn a profit based on reliable sales of the proven kinds of 
book which would infrequently be returned by the new kind of 
book-sellers (28-31). 
Not all publishers, however, are constrained by the need to 
minimise returns on all books. In fact, many publishers expect to 
make losses on what they call 'conscience books,' say, by new writers 
(Coser, Kadushin and Powell, 16). And various kinds of publishing 
provide more or less room to move in relation to budget costs and 
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patterns of consumption. But the primary production of all books is 
determined by the same kinds of material and social conditions, in-
cluding: the various social structures which govern the relations be-
tween writers, publishers, editors, reviewers, literary agents, book-
sellers, and so on; the capital-driven economic organisation which 
governs the expectation by various kinds of publisher to achieve 
various rates of and time frames for a profit return; and the status-
driven social organisation which governs the non-economic deci-
sions by publishers to invest in various kinds of more and less prof-
itable cultural products. Book publishing marries material and eco-
nomic constraints with the constraints produced by the social and 
status networks of particular agents in the field of cultural produc-
tion. It marries, in other words, 'making enough money and being 
liked,' or, 'being felt and heard and coming out ahead financially.' 
SUPPLY-SIDE INSTITUTIONS OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION: THE 
CONSECRATION OF TEXTS 
Where an author gets placed in the generic class-system - 
as 'novelist' versus 'literary journalist' or 'essayist' - is 
crucial to the development of his reputation. Some genres 
get exiled from or discriminated against in the high 
canon. So even distinguished achievement in a genre of 
mediocre or vague literary status (the essay, the fable, the 
utopia) may doom a writer to exclusion from the high 
canon.24 
In the analysis so far I have supposed that books are the result of an 
initiating system of primary production, supplied by agents operat-
ing within the material and social conditions which govern the field 
of cultural production. Beginning this account with such a supposi-
tion may have tended to reify a model of textual production in 
which manuscripts come first, selected by agents in the publishing 
network for printing, marketing and distribution, to be received fi-
nally by critics and readers who act as more or less passive textual 
consumers. That reading or the reception of a text is far from a pas-
sive consumption of an already existing product will be considered 
later in this chapter. But even the supply-side consecration of texts 
cannot simply be considered as a matter of a critical reception which 
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retrospectively assigns a high value to certain published texts, a final 
gatekeeping activity in which the gradual coalescing of critical opin-
ion regarding particular writers, texts, genres and canons necessarily 
follows publication. 
The consecration of texts is also a supply-side institutional ac-
tivity in which pedagogical practices and course writing decisions, by 
determining what sort of already-existing texts deserve consecration, 
determine what sorts of texts primary producers consider to be 
worth producing next. 25 John Rodden's account of the 'class-system' 
in which a writer or text is positioned by its critical reception, while 
it foregrounds the institutional conditions which govern the status 
of the text, tends to background the productive role of critical opin-
ion in determining which kinds of texts or writers publishers com-
mission or select. Rodden's class-system is useful in foregrounding 
the systematic nature of critical and pedagogical consecration. But 
his apology for the 'distinguished achievement' of George Orwell 
(the writer he is at pains to rehabilitate) who worked, unfortunately 
it seems, 'in genres of mediocre or vague literary status' (Orwell's es-
says, fables and dystopias) resubmerges the institutional practices he 
is at pains to uncover. What constitutes 'distinguished achievement' 
and how and by whom are various kinds of 'literary status' (as well 
as 'non-literary status') assigned? Rodden is able to answer neither 
question because, firstly, he assumes 'that intrinsic, sometimes inde-
finable, aesthetic attributes of works contribute to authors' reputa-
tions' (Rodden, Politics of Literary Reputation, ix) and because, 
secondly, he undertheorises canon formation as a kind of simple 
politics of representation of or discrimination against social groups 
in which texts and writers are thought somehow to represent social 
groups. 
The decisions made in the pedagogical practice of literary or 
textual analysis to take up certain texts in certain ways is a way of 
constructing those texts. For example, the decision to offer non-
Shakespearean late seventeenth-century plays in an undergraduate 
course but still to consider those plays in terms of a close Leavisite, 
Marxist or feminist reading constructs those plays as objects worthy 
of academic attention and thereby assigns to them a position that is 
similar to (if 'not quite up to the standard' of) Shakespeare's plays. 
They become 'plays worthy of study,' suitable candidates for an ex-
traction of ideologies or meanings, formal patterns and linguistic 
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characteristics which are the practices typical of literary textual analy-
sis. The idea of a standard of taught plays is not to suggest that 
Shakespeare's plays really possess any necessary intrinsic characteris-
tics to be extracted, any intrinsic merit as the best models or standard 
measure of seventeenth-century literature, merely that 
Shakespeare's plays occupy a relational position in literary textual 
analysis as the standard measure by virtue of the uses made of them, 
being deployed by Shakespearean-trained academics who use them 
as the major quarry for extracting materials to be examined by stu-
dents in undergraduate courses. 26 In other words: 
Shakespeare's authority is simply the artefact of various 
institutional practices .... Shakespeare is not the embodi-
ment of any kind of universal or essential cultural value 
but is rather the instrument of parochial, or more typi-
cally, hegemonic class- and gender-bound interests .... 
[And] Shakespeare's authority is best understood in insti-
tutional terms ... [because] manifold institutional practices 
together with massive investment in concrete institu-
tional infrastructure have jointly contributed to the cul-
tural position of Shakespeare and the reception of his 
works.27 
The mechanisms of selection (choosing one writer, text, genre over 
another) and the choice of a method of textual analysis that con-
struct the writer, text or genre in one way or another function in the 
same way and assign to the writer, text or genre a value. For exam-
ple, suppose I select David Malouf's short fiction for an undergradu-
ate course, concentrating on An Imaginary Life and I examine the 
text as, say, the trace of Malours experience, where my choice of text 
and method of analysis responds to and reconfirms the choice by 
other teachers and course writers to set and study the same text and 
writer, using the same analytical method. The selecting of this text 
and writer and method of analysis, like the selection of 
Shakespeare's plays and the analysis of 'Shakespeare's personality,' 
functions to construct and consecrate An Imaginary Life and Malouf, 
not just as valuable objects in the literary field but as literary objects 
in the first place. An Imaginary Life as a result becomes the trace of 
Malouf's experience and becomes valuable because studied (and 
istudyable) as the trace of Maloufs experience. 28 Literature is, as a 
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result, 'what gets taught,' as Barthes says. 29 But, more than this, it is 
the product of the way this object 'gets taught.' 
The consecrating power of such pedagogical practices is in-
escapable. This is because texts (in the area of textual pedagogy but 
also, say, mathematical formulae, geological descriptions, physical 
theories, and so on in other pedagogical areas) function in an insti-
tutionalised pedagogical relation (over and above any other possible 
specific relations) in which the teacher subordinates the student in 
order to reassert and legitimise the power structure in that relation. 
Even further, as Bourdieu argues, 
[t]he mere fact of transmitting a message within a relation 
of pedagogic communication implies and imposes a social 
definition. (and the more institutionalised the relation, 
the more explicit and codified the definition) of what 
merits transmission, the code in which the message is to 
be transmitted, the persons entitled to transmit it or, bet-
ter, impose its reception, the persons worthy of receiving 
it and consequently obliged to receive it and, finally, the 
mode of imposition and inculcation of the message which 
confers on the information transmitted its legitimacy and 
thereby its full meaning. 30 
That is, the process by which certain texts are consecrated is embed-
ded in the power relations which structure the pedagogical practices 
of the institution.31 For Bourdieu, this embedding is by and large 
disguised by or misrecognised in the practices typical of schools in a 
kind of conspiracy theory of ruling-class domination. 32 But, on 
Bourdieu's own terms, any pedagogical action constructs institu-
tional relations of domination and subordination regardless of the 
class interests or relations of specific agents. Similarly, to return to 
the uses of texts, the selection of a set of texts (over all other texts) 
and a method of analysis constructs institutional relations of conse-
cration which value and authorise those texts (over all other texts) 
regardless of the class interests or relations of specific agents. 33 
Texts, then, are constructed by the institutional uses to which 
they are put. Situating the construction and consecration of texts in 
pedagogical practices makes it possible to reject the problematic as-
sumption that texts in general, and canonical texts in particular, are 
expressions of social identities which somehow represent (or fail to 
represent) various social groups. Rejecting this has important conse- 
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quences because it allows for the demolition of the major obstacle to 
any explanation of the institutional practices of cultural production 
which rests firmly on the belief that texts are autonomous objects, in 
the case of the canon debate, autonomous objects which represent 
dominant (or alternative) social interests. 
John Guillory has usefully repositioned the canon debate in 
exactly the terms I am using here. For Guillory, the canon is depen-
dent on conditions provided by the school, the syllabus and curric-
ula. In his view, 
it is only by understanding the social function and institu-
tional protocols of the school that we will understand 
how works are preserved, reproduced, and disseminated 
over successive generations and centuries. Similarly, 
where the debate [over canon formation] speaks about the 
canon as representing or failing to represent particular so-
cial groups, I will speak of the school's historical function 
of distributing, or regulating access to, the forms of cul-
tural capita1.34 
The moves, Guillory argues, which have characterised the canon 
debate and the demand to 'open the canon' are grounded in simplis-
tic assumptions about the inclusion of texts in and exclusion of texts 
from the canon, where inclusion is seen to be a form of representa-
tion and exclusion a form of non-representation. 35 This constructs 
canonical and non-canonical texts in the canon debate as though 
they are vehicles supposedly representing dominant and subordi-
nate social groups. Both canonical and non-canonical texts are 
thought to be expressions of political (dominant or resistant or al-
ternative) stances (Guillory, Cultural Capital, 10). But the argument 
to 'open the canon' to new texts by individuals defined in terms of 
social groups, like women, say, or migrants, which have been 
hitherto 'unrepresented' or 'under-represented' does not in fact open 
the canon. Rather, it establishes a new relation between texts, social 
identities and social groups and a new set of canonical texts which 
become canonical by virtue of being taught. 
This new relation between texts, social identities and social 
groups continues to construct the idea of texts as expressions of so-
cial identities. And in this new relation the representativeness (or 
unrepresentativeness) of texts in the canon appears to be the condi-
tion of canonicity or non-canonicity. This appears to be plausible 
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only because representativeness, where texts are thought to repre-
sent social identities, operates as the ruling contemporary condition 
for canon formation (17). Even more, the contemporary emphasis 
on social identity as the central determinant governing inclusion in 
or exclusion from the canon actually retrospectively constructs the 
process of canon formation as one which has always been deter-
mined by social identity. Such a process 'requires a revisionist his-
tory in which social identity is [that is, is made to be] the major nega-
Hve criterion of judgement' (353, note 50). 
Besides taking the canon debate apart by examining its sim-
plistic assumption that texts represent social groups and express 
writers' experiences as representative members of those groups, 
Guillory usefully repositions the analysis of canon formation in 
terms of the practices of using, that is, teaching and studying texts in 
institutional settings. Such a move shifts the focus from lists of texts 
to the processes by which those lists are determined and the uses to 
which they are put, for example, in the construction of syllabi and 
anthologies. The syllabus and the anthology are institutional prod-
ucts whose function is to confer status on certain texts over other 
texts. The idea that a text is 'on the syllabus' or 'in the anthology,' 
Guillory argues, imagines a canonical totality from which possible 
selections are made. So any revision of the selection is not an objec-
tion to the canon but a reinforcing of it. Such a relation to the canon 
will be illustrated in Part Two, where I shall try to show how short 
story anthology editors lay claim to a privileged access to a suppos-
edly autonomous, already-existing canon and to a special capacity to 
discern in one form or another the proper representative selection 
of short fiction to be drawn from it. 
Whatever choices are made in selecting texts for a syllabus or 
anthology, whether the choices are conservative or radical, the 
canon is not overthrown because every construction of a syllabus or 
anthology institutes the canon (31). This is because the list of texts 
which make up a syllabus or an anthology contents page imagines a 
whole from which the texts are supposed to be a selection and be-
cause syllabi and anthologies construct the coherence and unity of 
their lists of texts by making reference to one tradition or another, 
say, English Literature, Romantic poetry, the Nationalist short story, 
Australian women's writing, or whatever. That is, 
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[t]he canon achieves its imaginary totality, ... not by em- 
bodying itself in a really existing list, but by retroactively 
constructing its individual texts as a tradition, to which 
works may be added or subtracted without altering the 
impression of totality or cultural homogeneity. 36 (33) 
Consequently, any alternative syllabus or anthology merely con-
structs a new tradition with its own imaginary totality and its own 
retrospectively constructed, newly-minted traditions. And such in-
stitutional new minting remakes the texts as texts for study where 
the context in which the text was first produced and consumed is 
suppressed by the new pedagogical context and by the syllabus or an-
thology apparatus which collects together certain texts and examines 
or 'introduces' them in the light of the retrospectively constructed 
tradition (Romantic poetry, the Nationalist short story, Australian 
women's writing, and so on) which is the justification for the syl-
labus or anthology in the first place. It is because syllabuses and an-
thologies are constructed for certain uses, typically for study, and be-
cause this suppresses the various conditions in which texts were or 
might otherwise be used that literary critics, editors and so on are 
able to present texts as the best selection from the canon and to con-
secrate them as the best examples of a homogeneous cultural tradi-
tion - 'our best.' By constructing an institution like a syllabus or an-
thology, in other words, literary critics, editors, and so on, are merely 
going about their own business, which is to preserve the homoge-
neous cultural tradition which they create and to maintain their 
control over it. 
Texts, then, are canonical by virtue of being constructed as ex-
amples of cultural traditions and selections from the imaginary to-
talities of 'Western Culture,' or 'English Literature,' or 'The 
Nationalist short story,' or whatever. But these cultural traditions 
and imaginary totalities are merely the work of pedagogical practices 
which serve the interests of pedagogical practitioners like literary 
critics. Guillory's project to expose the reifying notion of the canoni-
cal text as a representation of social interests and specifically peda-
gogical practices is essential to any analysis of the material and social 
conditions that determine 'the rules of the game,' individual agents' 
'feel for the game,' as Bourdieu puts it, and the field of cultural pro-
duction itself. By demonstrating the pedagogical basis of the process 
of canonising texts Guillory is able to put to rest the notion of the 
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canon as an autonomous object. Canons, like texts, are constructed 
in their use: they are the result, that is, of social practices and mate-
rial constraints. This fact is inescapable: even my analysis of this 
construction of texts and canons here constructs texts in its own way. 
In order to deal with the text as an object for analysis the dis-
cussion so far has persisted in viewing the text as a kind of 'supply-
side' commodity, assuming for the moment that texts are simply 
commodities that exist uniformly, independent of readers. It re-
mains now to consider those 'demand-side' institutional practices 
which construct 'the reader' and consequently construct various pos-
sible 'readerly texts.' 
DEMAND-SIDE INSTITUTIONS OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION: 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF 'THE READER' 
Re-siting reading and the text read in a history of cultural 
production means giving oneself a chance of understand-
ing the reader's relation to his or her object and also of 
understanding how the relation to the object is part and 
parcel of that object. 37 
Commercial texts ... are ... sanctioned, reiterated, selected, 
commoditised [T]here  is a selective tradition ... at work 
... [that] valorises particular practices, encourages par-
ticular practices and discourages others .... [W]hat happens 
in our culture is that institutionally certain competencies 
are cultivated and selected with this technology, then 
favoured, then sanctioned, then encouraged — all the way 
from that first bedtime story to the portrayal of the kids 
reading on TV. All the way down there are messages say-
ing 'these are the norms of the literary event', 'this is what 
you do with books.' 38 
The relation between texts and readers is one of dual influence. This 
two-way street can be explained in terms of the conventions that are 
characteristic of various genres which, for example, determine what 
is an appropriate narrative point of view, plot or set of images for a 
narrative, or what possibilities are available to characters in, say, re-
alist or psychological or meta-fictive novels, or what makes a satis- 
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factory beginning and ending for, say, a mystery or Western or 
thriller. These sorts of conventions are at the same time repeated in 
texts ('really there') and discoverable because readers bring to the text 
reading strategies which lead them to expect such structures ('really 
in the reader's reading practices.') Indeed, the reading strategies that 
we possess determine what we mean by 'appropriate,' possible' or 
'satisfactory' when we are discovering conventional structures in 
texts. But conventional structures can be said to be i n texts because 
writers are trained by their reading and therefore depend on but also 
thereby reconstruct generic, familiar characteristics which in turn 
construct readers' expectations. In other words, 
[h]aving accepted, chosen, discovered or invented appro-
priate forms, speakers and writers are then guided by the 
structure of those forms .... [So] speakers' and writers' in-
dividual creative processes are influenced and socialised 
by their awareness of genres both as available strategies 
and as reader expectations. 39 
That is, 'genres are social processes that correspond to (and also con-
struct) particular types of auditors/ readers' (Coe, 'An Arousing and 
Fulfilment of Desires": The Rhetoric of Genre,' 184, emphasis 
added). But even in such a view of the two-way process by which 
texts and readers construct one another, in a move typical of genre 
theory, the text occupies a privileged status, firstly, as a result of the 
emphasis on the primacy of texts in constructing readers and, 
secondly, as a result of the suppression of the institutional pedagogi-
cal processes that codify and discipline reading practices in favour of 
a focus on those characteristics of texts that are thought to constitute 
reading practices. But while readers learn to read (and to hold expec-
tations and to construct interpretations) largely as a result of being 
exposed to various kinds of text, they also learn under the influence 
of as well as in reaction against more and less explicit teaching. And 
more and less explicit teaching constitutes texts by determining what 
makes for proper (that is, possible) readings. 
In order to see how texts are constituted we need to see how 
the reader's reading practice is also constituted. The reader's consti-
tution of the text in terms of what might loosely be called 'reader-re-
sponse theory,' and the constitution of the reader in terms of the his-
torical and pedagogical basis of the practice of 'active reading,' will be 
considered in the final part of this chapter. 
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The problem posed by reader-response theorists is to do with the lo-
cation of meaning in texts. For example, 
if meaning is embedded in the text, the reader's responsi-
bilities are limited to the job of getting it out; but if mean-
ing develops ... in a dynamic relationship with the 
reader's expectations, projections, conclusions, 
judgements, and assumptions, these activities (the things 
the reader does) are not merely instrumental, or 
mechanical, but essentia1. 40 
Stanley Fish focuses his analysis of textual production on the reader 
because, he argues, 
the making and revising of assumptions, the rendering 
and regretting of judgements, the coming to and abandon-
ing of conclusions, the giving and withdrawing of ap-
proval, the specifying of causes, the asking of questions, 
the supplying of answers, the solving of puzzles ... are in-
terpretive - rather than being preliminary to questions of 
value, they are at every moment settling and resettling 
questions of value ... [that is,] not waiting for meaning but 
constituting meaning (Fish, Is There a Text? 159, 
emphasis added). 
Such a view is not without its difficulties when it comes to textual 
analysis, as Fish is quick to admit. 
The main difficulty is that, in ascribing practices to readers, 
any theory necessarily constructs a model of what readers do in a 
way which reifies actual reading practice.41 For example, in his own 
reader-response critique of the way a reader reads Milton's poems, 
Fish appropriates the notion of 'line endings' and treats it as a fact 
which is simply evident in the text rather than as a convention 
which is a product of interpretive strategies. That is, he admits, 
[w]hat my principles direct me to 'see' are readers per- 
forming acts; the points at which I find (or to be more pre- 
cise, declare) those acts to have been performed become 
(by a sleight of hand) demarcations in the text; those de- 
marcations are then available for the designation 'formal 
features,' and as formal features they can be 
(illegitimately) assigned the responsibility for producing 
the interpretation which in fact produced them ... [, so] the 
116 
facts [the critic] points to are there [in the text], but only as 
a consequence of the interpretive .(man-made) model that 
has called them into being. (163 and 167) 
Fish's view is useful, so long as we are able to think of the text as be-
ing the product of the strategies of readers rather than as a pre-exist-
ing fact. His idea of interpretive strategies then becomes a powerful 
tool, enabling us to think of texts being constituted in different ways. 
For example, executing different interpretive strategies makes differ-
ent texts; two readers who execute the same sorts of interpretive 
strategies, and thereby perform similar interpretive acts, tend to 
agree, apparently objectively, about the meanings and stylistic char-
acteristics typical of the genre of which the text is thought to be an 
example; and, most importantly, readers who execute similar inter-
pretive strategies, performing similar kinds of interpretive acts 
across a number of texts, construct tho' se texts as similar kinds of 
texts. 
The idea of interpretive strategies explains the way texts are 
shaped by reading. Given that texts depend on the interpretive 
strategies readers bring to them, textual meaning becomes relative, 
potentially infinitely plural. This is a consequence which Fish at-
tempts to resist but which other textual theorists like Michel de 
Certeau embrace. In de Certeau's model, the reader produces a mu-
tating text by insinuating him or herself into the place of the author, 
or, put another way, by poaching or appropriating the author's prop-
erty in order to make it his or her own. 42 For de Certeau, the text is 
both a system through which the reader passes in a more or less con-
strained, more or less resistant way and a reservoir of forms out of 
which the reader establishes meaning (de Certeau, Practice of 
Everyday Life, 169). As a result, 
[t]he reader takes neither the position of the author nor 
the author's position. He invents in texts something dif-
ferent from what they 'intended.' He detaches [texts] from 
their (lost or accessory) origin. He combines their frag-
ments and creates something un-known in the space or-
ganised by their capacity for allowing an indefinite plural-
ity of meanings. (169) 
This potential for plural meaning is, de Certeau thinks, the site in 
which readers conform to or resist cultural authority. 
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The model offered by de Certeau operates on the basis of a 
simple binary scheme in which a socially dominant elite has a 
vested interest in maintaining conformist readings of texts, opposed 
by dominated groups who resist such an interest by practising a form 
of reading which 'insinuates' (172) oppositional readings into the 
text. There are the same kind of problems in this view as there are in 
the debate over canon formation which has generally deployed an 
over-simplified conception of texts as representations similar to de 
Certeau's model. Just how conformist reading subscribes to the 
hegemonic ideology of the elite, how elites actually maintain hege-
monic readings, why non-conformist appropriations of texts are 
necessarily oppositional, and why elite appropriations of texts are 
not, remain unclear in de Certeau's description. But we should also 
question the grounds of his model of reading as appropriation. For 
de Certeau, unlike Fish, texts exist prior to reading, and readers are 
constrained by the structures or reservoir of possibilities within 
which they read. By starting with the autonomy of the text as an 
artefact, a structure or reservoir within or from which various 
meanings might be extracted, his model cannot satisfy his claim that 
reading is infinitely plural because reading is always constrained by 
the structure or the reservoir within or from which meaning must 
be extracted.43 On the other hand, Fish's model has the advantage of 
explaining why meaning is potentially infinitely plural. 
Hoping to avoid such a conclusion, Fish suggests two concepts 
which he believes serve to regulate reading practice. One is the idea 
of the situatedness of interpretation. Following John Austin's 
speech-act theory, Fish argues that the meaning of a sentence, I will 
go, depends on the circumstances in which it is used (284). 44 And 
some situations are 'more available' than others (308), more often 
and more widely used, or, `so widely lived in that for a great many 
people [but not, apparently, for Stanley Fish] the meanings they en-
able seem "naturally" available' (309) or 'objectively true.' Such a 
view supposes that because situations determine possible meanings 
(because / will go is a warning, promise, threat, prediction, or what-
ever, depending on the situation in which it is uttered) meaning is 
never objective yet is not infinitely plural either because always de-
termined by the situation in which it is uttered. But the situatedness 
of any utterance or longer stretch of text does not alter the radically 
contingent possibilities of interpreting the utterance or text because 
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the situation, however reliable, is never absolutely fixed, always sub-
ject to possible change over time, and particularly to the re-situating 
of the utterance or text in a classroom where it becomes the subject 
of various kinds of pedagogical scrutiny that may bear no link to the 
conditions in which it was first produced. Meaning, that is, is not 
always determined by the situation in which it is uttered but by the 
situation in which it is interpreted, and Fish is back to square one in 
his attempt to avoid the conclusion that all we have left in textual 
interpretation are radically contingent meanings and texts. To be 
fair, Fish's concept of situation can be rehabilitated, but this project 
requires an analysis of the institutional conditions which govern the 
situatedness of interpretation, a project which remains under-de-
veloped in Fish's mode1.45 
The situatedness of interpretation relates to the other concept 
Fish believes serves to regulate the otherwise infinite number of 
possible interpretive strategies and the readings of texts which they 
produce. Fish calls this idea the 'interpretive community.' Basically, 
readers tend to execute conventional interpretive strategies which 
fall within the broadly agreed practices of a community of readers. 
This is most probably true, but in order to account for the way in 
which readings are constrained by an interpretive community Fish 
needs to specify the historical conditions of its formation and the in-
stitutional conditions of its maintenance, to explain, in other words, 
how 'broadly agreed practices' are determined and maintained. And 
these historical and institutional conditions may well uncover vari-
ous kinds of struggle for control over what counts as an appropriate 
interpretive strategy for a particular group of interpreters. By em-
phasising the interpretive community, implying as it does a com-
mon interest, Fish suppresses the possibility of seeing the hege-
monic practices and struggles against them which underlie the pos-
sibility of using the particular interpretive strategies that constrain 
readers. In order to expose such political practices, again, Fish needs 
to examine the historical conditions which have formed various in-
terpretive strategies and the institutional conditions which main-
tain various interpretive strategies for reading texts. 46 
Genre theorists have attempted to negotiate the inadequacy of 
the concept of interpretive community by locating the apparatus 
which constrains possible interpretations within the text or genre, 
where the text or genre is the 'trigger' for particular conventional 
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reading practices, rather than the other way around. For Anne 
Freadman, 
the publishing conventions that make ... books the way 
they are - with covers, titles, bibliographical and catalogu-
ing information, title pages, tables of contents, acknowl-
edgments, prefaces by series editors, footnotes, indexes, 
glossaries, etc. - are notational frames for the ceremonies 
of reading 
which constrain the physical practices and interpretive strategies 
that are available to readers (Freadman, 'Anyone for Tennis?' 60, 
emphasis added). 47 Similarly, Carolyn Miller locates the process by 
which readers come to shared interpretations in 'the process of 
typification ... [by which] we create recurrence, analogies, similarities 
... not [in] a material situation (a real, objective, factual event) but [in] 
our construal of a type' presumably derived not from real, objective, 
factual events but from the text (Miller, 'Genre as Social Action,' 29, 
emphasis added). Miller is well advised to avoid the conclusion that 
interpretation results from 'real, objective, factual events' because 
such events are themselves the product of interpretation, but to 
theorise interpretation as the construal of types evident in texts 
requires going beyond the immediate act of reading, to uncover the 
social practices that constrain what counts as an appropriate or 
inappropriate interpretive strategy at a particular time and place and 
to explain the emergence and durability of those social practices. 
Charles Baserman admits as much when, in the same collection of 
essays, he recognises that '[a] genre exists only in the recognitions 
and attributions of the users' (Baserman, 'Systems of Genres and the 
Enactment of Social Intentions,' 82). 
Despite the under-theorised nature of text-biased reader-re-
sponse and genre theories, however, the model they offer provides a 
much-needed corrective to the view that, 'we ... have free-standing 
readers in a relationship of perceptual adequacy or inadequacy to an 
equally free-standing text' and makes possible, but does not fully ex-
plain, the alternative view that, 'we have readers whose conscious-
nesses are constituted by a set of conventional notions which when 
put into operation constitute in turn a conventional, and conven-
tionally seen, object' (Fish, Is There a Text? 332). While Fish allows 
us to deal with the text as a contingent artefact he continues to resist 
the conclusion that the contingent artefactual nature of reading and 
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making texts leads in practice to the construction of multiple and fi-
nally indeterminate meanings. But in order to support this resis-
tance he, like Freadman, Miller and Baseman, might fruitfully ex-
amine those historical conditions which have formed readers and 
various ways of reading and the institutional conditions which 
maintain various interpretive strategies for reading texts. A promis-
ing way to begin an examination of such historical conditions is to 
problematise our notion of reading as dependent on the solitary, ac-
tive, literary reader. Even in doing this, however, Fish would not 
have the satisfaction of reaching a positive bedrock of finally con-
strained meaning, as I shall show below. 
Our understanding of reading is, according to Elizabeth Long, 
'governed by a ... powerful and ... partial picture of the solitary 
reader' but 
[t]he theoretical location of reading in the private sphere 
... neglects ... the social infrastructure that is necessary, at 
the most concrete level, for enabling and sustaining lit-
eracy and sustained reading itself .... By the 'social infras-
tructure' I mean two things. Foundationally, that reading 
must be taught, and that socialisation into reading always 
takes place within specific social relationships ... [and sec-
ondly that /]eading ... requires ... an infrastructure as social 
base." 
Long's project is to uncover the sociality of reading practices, not 
least in order to examine the ideology of the solitary reader which, as 
she notes, 'suppresses recognition of the infrastructure of literacy 
and the social or institutional determinants of what's available to 
read, what is "worth reading," and how to read it' (Long, 'Textual 
Interpretation as Collective Action,' 193). 
Long's view of the social infrastructure for reading provides a 
more useful analytical model than Fish's interpretive community 
that might explain the constraining forces on interpretation, empha-
sising the social role of institutions as contested sites in which au-
thority, that is, the power to legitimate some kinds of reading prac-
tice and not others, is at stake. But Long fails to consider how the 
ideology of the solitary reader emerged and why it possesses hege-
monic authority. In a corrective move, Martha Woo dmansee shows 
how the solitary reader, equipped with the skills to 'read actively,' 
121 
results from the use of the idea of aesthetic autonomy as a weapon 
(and subsequently a discipline) in the cultural politics of eighteenth-
century Germany and nineteenth-century England.49 
Woodmansee's method in uncovering the historical back-
ground to the politics of reading practices is to examine the founda-
tions on which Schiller builds his On the Aesthetic Education of 
Man. Schiller's project to take the high Romantic road in order to 
safeguard the prestige of poetry (as against the healthy sales of con-
temporary popular poets like Gottfried Burger) rests, Woodmansee 
argues, on such projects as the more pedagogically explicit The Art of 
Reading Books by Johann Adam Bergk. Bergk's pedagogical con-
struction of the active reader emphasised the development of close 
reading skills which allowed the reader to analyse the author's pur-
pose and the relationship between this purpose and those discover-
able features frequently found in certain texts which could be dis-
sected and then synthesised in the complete explicated text. His ap-
proach transformed reading into explication and readers into au-
thoritative critics (in a way that parallelled the later 'close reading' of 
New Criticism), and required rereading, intensive reading and, most 
importantly for Schiller and other 'high literary' writers, the avail-
ability of texts which could sustain and reward such close attention. 
The effect was to 'drive..., middle-class readers to classical [and ulti-
mately Romantic] authors by turning them into classical [and ulti-
mately Romantic] readers' (Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the 
Market, 101). 
Bergk's production of the active reader was not, of course, dis-
interested but a political move that was exploited by those writers 
who had a stake in maintaining their prestige in the literary field (as 
writers worthy of active reading) and in improving their chance of 
increased sales to the increasing market of active readers who re-
quired new kinds of 'difficult' texts (4-5 and 96-101). Long's solitary 
reader can be seen, then, as the product of pedagogically constructed 
and politically situated practices. By marshalling such readers, pre-
viously low-selling, difficult writers like Schiller were able to main-
tain their prestige in the literary field and cash in on the new market 
that was delivered to them. 
Woodmansee takes account of the cultural politics out of 
which the particular textual practices of active reading emerged, but 
she does not explain why the more or less marginal eighteenth- and 
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nineteenth-century practice of active reading has taken on such a 
widespread, central and hegemonic role in the twentieth century. To 
do this requires an understanding of the history of the institutional 
rise of 'School English' as a pedagogical practice. 
'English' is so widely experienced by school students and so 
naturalised a discipline that the category itself as well as 'English' 
texts and the social practices - reading, discussing and writing about 
texts in particular ways - that make up the category can easily be 
taken for granted. Ian Hunter's remarkable study of the emergence 
of literary education explains why 'English' and the disciplined 
kinds of reading and writing practices which it constructs have 
become central to the business of schooling. According to Hunter, 
'English' is the result of entirely 
contingent historical circumstances in which a minority 
aesthetico-ethical 'practice of the self' [the Romantic rela-
tion to things encouraged by Bergk's active readers and 
Schiller's aesthetics, among other influences] found itself 
redeployed as a discipline in an apparatus [popular educa-
tion] aimed at the moral supervision and cultural forma-
tion of populations.50 
Hunter's broad argument is that the corrective network of practices 
which made up the apparatus of popular education borrowed the 
'culture' of Romantic aesthetics in which the self is, quite usefully, 
considered as an autonomous, rational and sensory being. What 
made the originally marginal practices of the self-cultivating cul-
tural elite (like the active reader as authoritative critic) so useful to 
the project of popular education (or population management) was 
that the instituting of new pastoral techniques to create a morally-
managed environment in the school and school-yard required the 
exercise of some kind of practice which led from external discipline 
to the internalising of the social norms of the school. And the elite 
practice of aesthetics, including the practice of active reading, pro-
vided a ready-made model for this project (Hunter, Culture and 
Government, 70-83). 
The close fit between the practices of the self-cultivating aes-
thetic elite and the needs of popular education tends to obscure the 
contingent nature of the relation between the two. The early contact 
between popular education and aesthetic elite culture was the result 
of the administrative needs of the new, large-scale educational insti- 
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tution. The aesthetic practice of active reading constructed a disci-
plined, autonomous, investigating reader. Popular education re-
quired a set of practices which could be taught, and learned, super-
vised and investigated but, most importantly, internalised and 
normalised for whole populations (82-83). The contingent place of 
active reading in this expropriation of the marginal aesthetic practice 
of the cultural elite for the management of the population as a 
whole resulted, Hunter argues, from the peculiar needs of an ad-
ministratively (and presumably financially) under-resourced institu-
tion which relied on the 'exemplary force' of the inspectorate, where 
school inspectors like Matthew Arnold operated as the embodiment 
of the ideal citizen. Popular education, that is, drew on 
[t]he exemplary standing of the inspectorate [which] al-
lowed the new corrective technologies of the social sphere 
to penetrate and transform the voluntary school net-
works. The public control of education was thus achieved 
not through the exercise of class or state power, but 
through the form in which governmental technology 
personified itself in the ethical authority of the cultivated 
man. It was in this manner that the minority practice of 
ethical self-shaping was linked to the strategy for govern-
ing the population invested in the morally administered 
environment of the popular school. (106-07) 
Hunter's account usefully turns 'English' on its head in order 
to explain why practices like active reading hold such a central place 
in popular education. 'English' becomes 'the literary form of a spe-
cial pedagogy, rather than ... the pedagogical form of literary criti-
cism' (115). 
This literary form of a special pedagogy designed to normalise 
a population of citizens proved and continues to prove extremely 
useful. 'English' allows the teacher to elicit apparently subjective re-
sponses from the student and hold up such responses for examina-
tion and correction against the teacher's own normalised response 
and, in so doing, provides the social machinery that enables the con-
struction, supervision and internal self-maintenance of the self in 
terms of the norms of the popular school system. In contemporary 
'English,' 
the pupil, in making manifest forms of behaviour, 
thought, feeling and sentiment which are then subject to 
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correction via the normalising gaze of an ethical exemplar 
- the teacher - [,] is induced to embark on a program of 
infinite, non-coercive, self-correction, to become the ac-
tive agent of his/her own moral normalisation. 51 
And 'English' retains its position as such a useful pedagogical tech-
nology for social control because it is able to use reading and writing 
as 'expressions of the self ... [which are] amenable to correction and 
revision' (Bennett, Outside Literature, 178). 
Hunter's theory provides a useful account of the construction 
and use of 'English' which helps to explain the hegemonic function 
to which English has been and continues to be put without resorting 
to a simplistic conspiracy theory in which the ruling class dictates 
cultural values. The view that it is not a class conspiracy but the 
contingent institutional needs of the school apparatus which serve 
to construct a technology of subjugation confirms Gramsci's view 
that hegemony is the result of the fusion of an ensemble of institu-
tional practices. This enables Hunter to illustrate the Gramscian 
hypothesis that 'dominance is created through a complex cultural 
interplay ... in which the mentality of the oppressed permits them to 
accept the domination that shapes their perceptions.' 52 
The idea that 'English' as a pedagogical technology relies on 
active reading as a key method in the supervision and subsequent 
self-correction of large populations of individuals has profound im-
plications for the way in which 'the reader' and 'the text' can be con-
sidered. It becomes impossible to consider readers or texts as au-
tonomous things that are innocently independent of political inter-
ests. Literary criticism, the sort of active reading which requires in-
struction in the use of certain kinds of text which, in turn, stimu-
lates demand for certain kinds of text is the product of pedagogical 
practices and not the other way around: 'English' teaching produces 
suitable 'English' texts. This means that the 'literary properties' to be 
found in certain kinds of texts are merely the constructs of literary 
practices which result from a variety of contingent and political 
moments. 
The active reading of the pedagogically constructed reader, 
then, can usefully be seen as a set of socially constructed and provi-
sional practices which constrain what can be done with texts. This is 
as much as to say that the active reader is a particular and currently 
ascendant historical construction which derives from and in turn 
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maintains certain textual practices and suppresses others. This ex-
plains why, according to Fish's description of reading, people do op-
erate in agreement as a result of playing by shared - by and large 
pedagogically constructed - rules. But such a contingent set of so-
cially constructed practices in no way necessarily limits the poten-
tially infinite possibilities of making meaning. They merely deter-
mine what is an appropriate thing to say about or do with a text at a 
particular time and in a particular place for a particular social agent 
in or from a particular social group. Even so, it is such socially con-
structed practices that stimulate the demand for certain kinds of text, 
suited to these practices, which we call 'literary' texts. 
There is, of course, a whole range of alternative reading practices 
that I have not examined which construct readers and their texts in 
similar sorts of ways. My concern so far has been to uncover the 
contingent, institutionally and politically situated nature of cultural 
production, both of a supply-side and a demand-side kind. In doing 
this I have concentrated on the constructedness of the literary text 
because these texts rely obviously and heavily on the pedagogical 
practices that supply the literary text, genre or canon by putting them 
on offer and, equally, rely on the construction of readers trained in 
the specific practices of close, critical, that is 'active,' reading. This is 
not to say, however, that literary texts are highly mediated by the in-
stitutions of textual production while mass-market texts are some-
how not. I have not, until now, allowed the distinction between lit-
erary and mass-market texts, or between 'high' and 'low' cultural 
products, and some explanation of my methodology may now be in 
order. I began this chapter without problematising 'culture,' and for 
good reason. 'Culture' and 'literature,' as I have argued above, are 
always determined by those agents who compete for control over, 
and privileged access to, the resources and practices that define or, 
better, that construct 'cultural' and 'literary' objects. So 'high culture' 
or 'literature' and their opposites aren't anything, they do not exhibit 
any positive characteristics in an objective sense: they are merely 
what is `up for grabs' in a field of scarce resources and are power- and 
value-laden in this field in the same way as are, say, various sports 
in their field. 'Literature,' in other words, is the result of a histori-
cally specific set of social practices, the product of the ensemble of 
'institutionally and discursively regulated forms of use and de- 
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ployment to which selected texts are put' (Bennett, Outside 
Literature, 140-41) or, as John Frow puts it, of the historically specific 
literary formation which systematises and regulates the production, 
reception and circulation of texts which constitute the category 
'literature.'53 
To say that the 'literary' text is constructed by social practices 
whose origins are open to discovery and whose status is finally the 
result of contingent events is, of course, to attack the objectivist priv-
ileging of an unproblematic category called literature and, equally, to 
question the assumption that literary texts somehow exist indepen-
dently of commercial or industrial interests, the sort of assumption 
from which criticisms of the commercial nature of textual produc-
tion, best characterised by the position of Theodor Adorno, have 
been made. Adorno's attack on the commercialised low' cultural 
products of what he called 'the culture industry' is in reality a dis-
guised defence of the supposedly autonomous 'high culture' which 
he valued. But the distinction between low and high cultural prod-
ucts will not hold. All cultural products are constructed by the his-
torically determined, institutionally regulated and politically inter-
ested practices of agents in the cultural field. 
According to Adorno, however, the 'culture industry' is the 
cause of the 'aesthetic impoverishment' of twentieth-century cul-
ture.54 Previously autonomous cultural products have, in his view, 
been colonised or corrupted by the intrusion of a hegemonic capital-
ist (or even fascist) elite which controls mass production. Mass or-
ganisation and production result in the rationalisation of distribu-
tion and the consequent standardisation of the product. 55 There are 
problems with this view. Adorno's assumption that somehow 
autonomous cultural products are prey to basic industrial interests 
depends on the crude and problematic Marxist view of culture as the 
secondary pile of super-structural stuff built on an apparently pre-
cultural primary industrial base. 56 And he makes two further 
problematic assumptions: firstly, that large-scale cultural production 
is necessarily conventional and formulaic while small-scale 
production is somehow, by definition, not conventional; and, sec-
ondly, that cultural production outside the culture industry operates 
according to the non-commercial rules of disinterestedness. Most 
questionable of all, however, is Adorno's underlying dehistoricised 
assumption that cultural production somehow existed au- 
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tonomously prior to being colonised or corrupted by the culture in-
dustry. 
As I have tried to show, there is no cultural production which 
exists autonomously. All cultural practices and products depend on 
institutional, including industrial, practices. In fact, the 'field of cul-
tural production' might just as usefully be described as a 'culture in-
dustry.' But Adorno's use of the term, 'culture industry,' is the ex-
pression of a different, more anxious moment in the description of 
cultural production than my own. Adorno is placed in the middle, 
not the end, of the century at a time when social and political con-
flicts arising out of mass industrialisation and commodification 
tended to identify 'culture' with a threatened 'civilisation' opposed, 
variously, by the barbarisms of materialism, commercialism, democ-
racy or socialism.57 'Culture' as I have used it in this chapter is, on 
the other hand, simply that set of practices and products which are 
contested by those agents who consider themselves to be in the field 
of cultural production, including those agents who consider them-
selves or are considered by others to occupy positions of establish-
ment authority, oppositional resistance, or any other position in be-
tween. How one defines a cultural practice or product is, then, a mat-
ter of the description of the contested and historically grounded con-
ditions in which agents act, rather than of the positive description of 
the formal properties of cultural or literary artefacts. 
Such a view is, of course, tautological, but no more so than 
the view that the meaning of the term 'culture' can be gleaned from 
an analysis of pre-determined 'cultural artefacts.' The tautological 
grounds of positivist conceptions of culture like Adorno's are dis-
honestly disguised by the theoretical game he plays in which 
'culture' and 'industry' remain an opposed pair, 'culture' being all 
that which is (or was) non-industrial. In my tautological view, the 
'culture industry' which has been the subject of this chapter has at 
least the virtue of referring to a single kind of thing, like the 'health 
industry,' the 'sports industry' or the 'industry industry' and is open 
to an examination of the historically constituted rules of the game 
and the terrain of the field in exactly the same sorts of ways as such 
industries. 'Culture,' then, comprises all those practices and products 
which are the contingent consequences of the rules and stakes of the 
game of the 'culture industry' that operates in the field of cultural 
production. 
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Some of those cultural practices and products (like the strate-
gies typical of anthologisers and critics and the uses to which an-
thologies, study guides and other 'secondary' texts are put) which are 
themselves the consequences of previous moves in the game of cul-
tural production and which, in turn, determine the following 
moves in the game will be considered in Part Two. 
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PART 2 
A GUIDE TO AUSTRALIAN SHORT FICTION 
Introduction 
In Part One I attempted to uncover some of the practices that deter-
mine how agents operate in the cultural field, to show how 'the 
writer' and 'the text' are not simple, objective categories to be con-
sumed by 'the reader.' Rather, 'the author,' the text' and 'the reader' 
are the outcomes of contests between various players, embedded for 
longer or shorter periods in the practices current in the field. What 
we count as an 'author,' for example, is the product of a broad range 
of practices - like aesthetic assumptions, copyright agreements, ways 
of producing books, and ways of reading and talking about them - 
which dominate the cultural field at the moment. The 'author' ap-
pears to be a stable fact because these sorts of practices have been rea-
sonably durable and successful in maintaining it, for the moment. 
This means that the 'author,' like any other category in the field, is 
not in any way an objective fact, although it might appear to be. 
In Part Two I want to try to show how this view might use-
fully explain the workings of the sub-field of 'Australian short fic-
tion.' My method will be to show how short story anthologies, criti-
cal studies and other key practices construct this category. 
Anthologies are a major institution in the production and reproduc-
tion of the sub-field of 'Australian short fiction.' Their development 
can be traced from the instituting work of Francis Palgrave through 
to contemporary versions. The trace of typical claims that I shall at-
tempt to uncover indicates the reasonably durable nature of practices 
that maintain the anthology as a genre. It is this durability in the 
sub-field, the ongoing function of anthologies in determining the 
object that they appear to describe, that marks the institutional char-
acter of textual production. Anthologies help to determine what is to 
count as 'Australian short fiction,' who are to count as writers, edi-
tors and critics of 'Australian short fiction' and how 'Australian 
short fiction' is to be read, as I shall attempt to show. Anthologies are 
not, of course, the only institutions that determine the sub-field. 
Reference guides and critical studies function in the same way. The 
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personnel who produce, deliver and consume certain kinds of con-
tent, the activity that dominates the sub-field of 'Australian short fic-
tion,' are also maintained by means of other institutions, like 'small 
magazines,' Australia Council grants and 'Writers in Residence' 
programs, writers' festivals, and so on. 
There is, though, a problem in examining these institutions, 
and this is that my own text will appear to occupy a position some-
how above the cultural practices that I am trying to analyse, a kind of 
meta-discourse that stands above the texts which I scrutinise. But in 
examining the cultural field in general or, here, the sub-field of 
'Australian short fiction,' I occupy a position that is in some ways 
within the sub-field. For example, this text engages with anthologies 
in an attempt, by and large, to re-read them in order to show what 
they are 'really' doing. What I think they are really doing is con-
structing categories that they appear only to describe. But in trying to 
show this I =avoidably take a position that is within what might be 
called the academic field. This field takes an interesting dominant 
position over the 'objects' it chooses to examine, a kind of 'meta-
nominative' position, in which the observer, analyst or, best of all, 
scientist 'names' or makes sense of what is supposed to be simply the 
raw data of the non-academic world, stuff that is incoherent until 
made coherent by academic attention. 
This position is, of course, itself open to reflexive academic at-
tention. Some interesting ethnographic work has attempted to show 
how academic practice is "always caught up in ... invention, not ... 
representation." The difficulty faced by a theory of social fields, for 
example, is that the theory itself tends to objectify the 'field,' as 
though the field really exists. This is a problem which Bourdieu ig-
nores in his social theory of fields. Does his 'field of cultural produc-
tion,' for example, exist in the social consciousness of the agents who 
occupy that social space which characterises cultural producers and 
consumers or is it simply an analytical construct?2 The meta-nomi-
native tendency, the will to objectify, it seems, is pervasive. In the 
pages you are just reading, for example, I claim to explain that what 
anthology editors 'are really doing is constructing categories that 
they appear only to describe.' This suggests that there is some kind of 
bedrock 'reality,' an objective mechanism that constructs the object 
called 'Australian short fiction' that my analysis has 'uncovered.' 
Besides this archaeological trope, a favourite of mine, my 'case stud- 
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ies' also imply a kind of quasi-scientific objectivity. Analytical 'study' 
stands outside, usually above, the 'cases' which I shall scrutinise in 
Part Two. But if I am right, if texts are the products of always con-
testable and contingent social practices, then the same must be true 
of my own text too: it is as much a case to be studied and, if studied, 
can be shown to be equally the product of always contestable and 
contingent social practices. This is not cause for panic, merely for 
caution. Part Two is not an attempt to get any closer to the truth, 
only to suggest how we might reorientate ourselves to some texts. 
My discussion in Part Two is not an attempt to suggest a final read-
ing of 'Australian short fiction,' merely one reading which concen-
trates on the practices that are not the usual staple diet of textual 
analysis. 
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Short story anthologies and the 
construction of 'Australian short fiction' 
[R]eal criticism ... occurs not in reviews or in long critical 
articles but in the selection and compilation of antholo-
gies. The influence that these monuments exert has not 
been sufficiently recognised. One's first (and often one's 
firmest) sense of [the] tradition is shaped by the first an-
thology one totally devours. 
Gary Catalanol 
The sorts of behaviours, agents and texts that are called 'literary' and 
what is meant by 'literature' are the consequences of seemingly nat-
ural but historically specific conditions and ongoing institutional 
practices. This means that agents involved in cultural production 
are able to operate with some freedom in a field of competing inter-
ests, according to historically constituted and durable institutions - 
institutions like 'authorship,' publication, 'literary criticism' and 
'active reading' - that determine legitimate practices in the field. 
Against this background I now want to show how some specific 
practices operate in the construction of one sub-field, Australian 
short fiction. To do this I want to look at the practices of anthologis-
ing (including along the way those practices involved in producing a 
'literary history') and at the construction of a literary kind of writer, 
both materially, by means of funding decisions by arts organisations 
and publishers, and in terms of literary value, by means of academic 
literary criticism of the study guide variety. 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE SELECTIVE ANTHOLOGY 
Anthologies of any kind of writing serve as monuments, operating 
according to the complex functions that the term incorporates. 
Anthologies appear to be a record of some kind of positive knowl-
edge or corpus and accordingly present themselves as printed forms 
of factual evidence representing various literary genres, kinds of 
journalism, bodies of knowledge, or whatever. But as monuments 
they also seek to commemorate, that is, give value to, this factual 
evidence. Anthologies, in other words, play a kind of triple role. In 
one sense they describe a group of texts as though selecting them 
from a larger body of possibilities. In another they constitute that 
group of texts and what gets to be called that imaginary larger body 
(from which the particular anthology contents appear to be drawn). 
In yet another they consecrate that group of texts as the best exam-
ples drawn from that larger body of possibilities according to terms 
that the anthologiser dictates. 
In order to perform these roles, anthologisers produce the 
'anthology introduction' or apologia, a genre which positions the an-
thology both as one example in the tradition of anthologies and as 
the latest, necessary and often ground-breakingly oppositional addi-
tion to this tradition. 2 This triple act is, of course, one of the strate-
gies used in canon formation where some practices, like making crit-
ical discriminations and selecting texts to 'illustrate' the best' or 
'good writing,' or to produce a generic sample or to 'represent' social 
minorities, are highlighted while others, like commissioning an an-
thology and selecting texts on the basis of lapsed copyright, or in or-
der to promote a particular 'school' of writers or kind of criticism, or 
to supply a perceived market niche, are suppressed. 3 By analysing 
the genre of the anthology introduction I will attempt to show how 
its strategic function is precisely to highlight those practices which 
encourage the potential users of the anthology to accept the selection 
as the positive embodiment or monument or last word on, for ex-
ample, 'good writing,' lyric poetry' or 'writing by women' and to 
suppress any practices which might discourage potential users from 
taking the anthology as such. 
The strategic claim of the anthology introduction is typically 
that the anthology represents a certain body of texts by and/or for a 
certain social group, a claim that especially marks the canonising 
function of anthologies. There are several generic features in these 
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typical strategic claims, most clearly characterised by Francis 
Palgrave's early, influential and long-lived anthology of poetry, T h e 
Golden Treasury of the Best Songs and Lyrical Poems in the English 
Language, a revised volume of which is still in print and stocked in 
school bookrooms.4 Palgrave's Golden Treasury establishes the 
grounds on which anthologies operate as canonising institutions. 
The anthology, he claims, 'represents' the already existing and or-
ganic unity of 'good literature.' The two key moves here are to estab-
lish the natural condition of a positively objective 'national litera-
ture' as organic and representative. Almost all subsequent antholo-
gists repeat these moves. 
The apparatus of Palgrave's The Golden Treasury of the Best 
Songs and Lyrical Poems in the English Language, besides his 
Preface, involves a physical page by page journey towards the actual 
contents through a series of claims, beginning with the title cover 
claim to incorporate 'the Best' within the volume followed by the 
claim that the volume incorporates 'The World's Classics,' a claim 
preceding the title page and repeated in the ornate title page decora-
tion that follows, along with the appeal to the authority of the 
Oxford University Press and its list of imperial outposts; next the 
dedication to 'ALFRED TENNYSON POET LAUREATE' which in-
cludes, by extension, the claim to Tennyson's 'just judgement and 
high-hearted patriotism' for the volume itself as 'a true national 
Anthology.' 5 But it is in the Preface, the direct ancestor of the an-
thology introduction, that Palgrave stakes his greatest claim to 
'represent' an organically unified and national literature. 
Palgrave's Preface, like many of its generic offspring, begins 
with the claim to originality. `This little Collection differs ... from 
others,' in this case 'in the attempt made to include the best original 
Lyrical pieces and Songs in our language' (Palgrave, Golden 
Treasury, ix).6 This is a claim that endures in subsequent op-
positional anthologies and appears to function as a sales pitch — the 
remarks appear on the first page of text to be read by the browsing 
buyer — justifying the particular anthology in terms of potential 
competing and possibly long-in-print anthologies. 7 More specifically, 
Palgrave's declaration that his `little Collection' is a selection of `the 
Best' differentiates it from the earlier and encyclopaedic The Works 
of the English Poets, from Chaucer to Cowper of Alexander 
Chalmers. 
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Palgrave proceeds to the difficulty in defining terms (that is, in 
circumscribing the terrain of the field claimed by the anthology), 
'lyrical poetry' being prescribed according to 'a few simple principles. 
Lyrical has been here held essentially to imply that each Poem shall 
turn on some single thought, feeling, or situation ... [or else possess] 
rapidity of movement, brevity, and the colouring of human passion' 
(ix, emphasis added). Palgrave then deals with the problem of 
selection (incorporating the definitional problem of 'the Best'): to 
distinguish the best poem 'we should require finish in proportion to 
brevity, ... clearness, unity, or truth,' and 'Excellence should be 
looked for rather in the whole than in the Parts,' while 'a few good 
lines do not make a good poem' (x). Palgrave's Preface is useful in 
the way it foregrounds the prescriptive function of the anthology, 
particularly as more recent anthologies attempt to submerge this 
prescriptive role. But the obvious prescriptive claims here - 
Palgrave's Ishalls' and 'shoulds' - obscure another important feature 
of the anthology introduction, namely, the naturalising of the an-
thology contents as a unity, an organic whole, rather than a collec-
tion of parts. This is important in the genesis of the anthology as an 
institution which by establishing a content constitutes a subject, like 
lyrical poetry or Australian short fiction, even while it appears 
merely to describe it, by virtue of collecting together parts which 
themselves can be united. This is the purpose of the final strategic 
move in the anthology introduction, to explain the logic and thereby 
naturalise the organisation of material. 
In order to achieve 'a closer lyrical unity' Palgrave omits 
stanzas of poems, avoids extracts 'as essentially opposed to this 
unity' and arranges the poems to achieve 'the most poetically-effec-
tive order' so as to avoid a 'rapid alteration of the eye's focus ... 
[which] will always be wearisome and hurtful to the sense of Beauty. 
The poems have been ... distributed into Books ... [which] might be 
called the Books of Shakespeare, Milton, Gray, and Wordsworth' 
(xi). Under such a scheme, Palgrave's 'English Songs and Lyrical 
Poems' become a naturally organised fact, with an organic history 
traceable from the early works' of Shakespeare to the latest works of 
the dead poets of the nineteenth century. Palgrave's scheme, in 
other words, organises and makes natural a lyrical canon which 
'accurately reflects the natural growth and evolution of our Poetry' 
in 'a certain unity' (xi, emphasis added). 
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Palgrave's project, as this quotation and his title suggest, was 
to constitute our national lyrical literature, 'the Best Songs and 
Lyrical Poems in the English Language,' for that huge imperial mar-
ket 'wherever the Poets of England are honoured, wherever the 
dominant language of the world is spoken' (xiii). This dominating 
function of the anthology persists in its offspring, although not nec-
essarily in an imperialist form, in the way subsequent anthologies 
constitute their contents and project an identity for their readership 
at the same time. Palgrave's anthology constitutes 'the Poets of 
England' for an audience of readers 'wherever English is spoken,' an 
imperialist function that cuts both ways, constituting (while appear-
ing to represent) the community of the poets of England (a national 
lyrical literature) and constituting (while appearing to present this 
literature to) the community of English speaking readers of songs 
and lyrics.8 Such constituting of both a canonical subject (whether 
lyrical poetry or, for example, short fiction, or Australian short fic-
tion) and an object (consumers of lyrical poetry, short fiction, 
Australian short fiction as constituted by the anthology) is typical of 
all anthologies, as I shall attempt to show in an examination of 
some Australian anthologies. 
ANTHOLOGIES OF AUSTRALIAN SHORT STORIES 
My argument here is that anthologies like Palgrave's Golden 
Treasury, under the guise of describing a content or selecting a repre-
sentative sample, constitute that content, the audience for it and the 
mode of reading it as an organic unity. But a word of caution is in 
order, considering what I am about to do. Analysing the constitutive 
practices in any selection of Australian short story anthologies has, 
in itself, the effect of constituting 'characteristic features' of what is 
always a problematic list of problematically representative texts, 
thereby constructing a positive object for enquiry (the culpable an-
thologies in the formation of the canonical Australian short story) 
in exactly the same way as the very anthology practices which I wish 
to problematise. To minimise this objectifying effect I have ran-
domly selected for analysis the following rather disparate bunch of 
more and less critically sophisticated short story anthologies: Cecil 
Hadgraft and Richard Wilson's 1963 A Century of Australian Short 
Stories, Harry Heseltine's 1976 The' Penguin Book of Australian 
Short Stories, Kerryn Goldsworthy's 1983 Australian Short Stories, 
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Leonie Kramer's 1985 My Country: Australian Poetry and Short 
Stories and Laurie Hergenhan's 1986 The Australian Short Story. 
But some caution is required even here. My chronological organisa-
tion of these anthologies might imply some form of development in 
anthologising practice (a key claim in the genre of the anthology in-
troduction). What prevents this, in my opinion, is the lucky inclu-
sion of Kramer's peculiar anthology dating from 1985 which, against 
the grain, reconstitutes the dominance of the 'Bulletin style' of short 
story of the 1890s. 
The function of the Australian short story anthology as a tex-
tual practice which institutes categories, like 'Australian short fic-
tion,' is shared by its generic cousin, the descriptive 'literary history.' 
While the literary history is a genre with a similar function to the 
anthology introduction, it appears to precede anthologies. This is be-
cause it enables the anthology by producing a brief context for it, as 
though the anthology provides the detailed material (particular 
Australian short stories, for example) which illustrates the general 
characteristics that the literary history describes. Of course, those 
'descriptions' established by the literary history, like those of the an-
thology, appear to describe when in fact they actually circumscribe 
the proper terrain of the field claimed by the history. 9 The genre of 
the literary history seems to have burgeoned in the 1980s as a vehi-
cle for promoting the claim of various kinds of criticism to represent 
the establishment view of the field. 10 But one of the neatest exam-
ples of the genre is John Barnes's essay, 'Australian Fiction to 1920,' 
in Geoffrey Dutton's The Literature of Australia, an essay which 
clearly illustrates how the literary history helps to construct 
'Australian Fiction' in the literary field. 
Barnes's sophisticated account of the emergence of 'Australian 
Fiction to 1920' offers a rich picking of problematically positivistic 
and evaluative terms to articulate a version of the progress of classic 
'Australian Fiction to 1920,' terms which are repeated if disguised in 
the accounts of every subsequent short story anthology editor." For 
Barnes, 
it is useless to expect to find works of art among the 
Australian novels of the nineteenth century. In spite of 
the tradition which lingers, that there is a solid body of 
Australian fiction in this period, it is only with Furphy's 
Such Is Life in 1903 and Henry Handel Richardson's The 
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Australia, an essay which clearly illustrates how the literary history 
helps to construct 'Australian Fiction' in the literary field. 
Barnes's sophisticated account of the emergence of 'Australian 
Fiction to 1920' offers a rich picking of problematically positivistic and 
evaluative terms to articulate a version of the progress of classic 
'Australian Fiction to 1920,' terms which are repeated if disguised in the 
accounts of every subsequent short story anthology editor." For Barnes, 
it is useless to expect to find works of art among the 
Australian novels of the nineteenth century. In spite of the 
tradition which lingers, that there is a solid body of 
Australian fiction in this period, it is only with Furphy's 
Such Is Life in 1903 and Henry Handel Richardson's The 
Getting of Wisdom in 1910 that it is possible to think of 
Australian classics. Geoffrey Hamlyn, His Natural Life, and 
Robbery Under Arms diminish in stature as time passes; they 
... are not the classics of Australian fiction which they were 
once thought to be. They hold a considerable interest for us 
still, because they represent stages in the history of the 
progress towards an Australian prose tradition. 12 
The breathtaking assurance with which Barnes constitutes 'fiction' and 
describes the 'solid body of Australian fiction' and the 'progress towards 
an Australian prose tradition' of 'classics,' which are presumably 'works 
of art,' masks his less startling but more interesting account of the 
process by which such categories are established in the first place. 
For Barnes, texts might rise and fall in value over time, so that 
texts that were 'once thought to be classics' can 'diminish in stature.' 
The statuary trope governing Barnes's model is significant here: texts 
are, he suggests, positive entities, parts of the 'solid body of Australian 
fiction.' This allows him to articulate the model in terms of time so that 
texts 'diminish in stature as time passes.' But in order for the trope to 
make sense Barnes needs his texts to inhabit a place, they need to exist 
e-ver time, and this depends on the other governing 
metaphor in his account, where classic texts result from a process of 
artefactual survival in the museum of literature. But what is it that 
survives here, what can we 'expect to find,' individual 'works of art' or 
the 'solid body of Australian fiction?' Barnes seems to want to conflate 
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century Australian fiction texts which 'represent stages in the history 
of the progress towards an Australian prose tradition,' a tradition 
which is, now, a historical entity abstractly constructed by the literary 
historian. The literary critic is able to imagine his museum and then 
proceed to dust off his classic and subsidiary examples while pre-
tending that he only dusted off his examples and then discovered 
that they exist in a ready-made museum. 
The literary history which the literary history constructs is a 
precariously confused sketch of a simultaneously abstract and con-
crete object. Why, then, have such versions of 'Australian fiction' 
maintained for so long their dominant place in controlling the key 
terms, genres, texts and personnel that make up the category 
'Australian fiction'? The power of the literary history is deeply sed-
imented in the typical and habitual ways that writers, critics, readers, 
and so on, think about the literary field and perceive 'objects' in it. 
Agents in the literary field accept, reject or otherwise negotiate their 
position in or way through the field in terms that are determined by 
the practices, especially the textual practices, of previous agents in 
the field. It is because the literary history occupies a position of dom-
inance that the confused sketch which it constructs has tended to be 
adopted by agents in the literary field or at least has tended to remain 
unquestioned. This position of dominance has little to do with the 
actual text of the literary history and much to do with the extra-tex-
tual credentials of those agents who produce them. But the durabil-
ity and power of the literary history is also the result, in no small 
part, of the 'fleshing out' of the sketch, that is, the result of the un-
ambiguously positive construction of the sketched 'literary history' 
in anthologies. 
Australian short story anthologies typically wrestle with the 
sorts of chronological problems outlined in Barnes's sketch of 
'Australian Fiction to 1920? How far back does the critic draw the 
line in his or her selection of nineteenth-century texts? And, specifi-
cally in the short story anthology, how much weight does he or she 
give to the apparently distinctive nationalist concern - the so-called 
'Bulletin style' - of the short story as an originating characteristic of 
Australian fiction, and what consequences does this have for the 
construction of the anthology contents? The clearest symptom of 
these concerns in the Australian short story anthology appears in 
the concentrated attention paid to the question of 'selection,' an at- 
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tention that betrays the fluid status of the key terms, genres, texts 
and personnel of the sub-field. Selection is, as I have attempted to 
show in my analysis of Palgrave's ancestral anthology, a key move 
in the practice of constructing a literary category in the field. Cecil 
Hadgraft and Richard Wilson deal with the matter almost immedi-
ately in their 1963 anthology, A Century of Australian Short Stories. 
In order to do this, they expose without resolving the problem of 
'quality.' Short stories of any quality, dealing with Australia, began 
appropriately with a writer born in this country. This was John Lang 
(1816-1864). There were of course earlier incidental stories in news-
papers.' 13 Quality is submerged here by the broad-brush prescription 
of characteristics necessary to qualify an Australian short story (the 
Australian short story writer, it appears, needs only to be born in and 
'deal with' Australia). For Hadgraft and Wilson earlier stories by 
other writers become, by definition, incidental to the tradition which 
their anthology constructs. Sitting uncomfortably against their prob-
lematic and unresolved claim to represent quality short Australian 
fiction is the distinction between central and incidental stories, a dis-
tinction which turns on their version of the history of the genre 
which, they claim, began with John Lang. 
Hadgraft and Wilson reject a huge volume of short stories 
from 1800 to 1880, relying on the undefined concept of 'quality,' in 
order to construct, as the title of their anthology suggests, a tradition 
of Australian short stories, a tradition which privileges the 'Bulletin 
style': 
[the 'Bulletin style' of short story] was nearly always short, 
though some writers could be allowed latitude; it dealt 
with reality known at first hand, and this was often the 
outback; it was laconic; it depended much on understate-
ment; sentiment was kept on a tight rein; and in dialogue 
and general atmosphere it was essentially Australian. 
(Hadgraft and Wilson, eds A Century of Australian Short 
Stories, xi) 
Leaving aside the tautological characterisation of essentially 
Australian short stories as essentially Australian, the emphasis on 
economy here (stories are short, laconic, understated, tightly reined) 
merits some attention. Hadgraft and Wilson provide a generalised 
description of what they mean by quality (stories that are short, la-
conic, understated and tightly reined) and select their anthology con- 
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tents accordingly. But the 'Bulletin style' on which they base this de-
scription and selection is itself a construction of the anthology, as 
their thumbnail sketch betrays. The kind of 'Bulletin style' short sto-
ries Hadgraft and Wilson select are nearly always short, laconic, un-
derstated and keep sentiment on a tight rein although some writers 
can be allowed latitude. 
Hadgraft and Wilson conveniently ignore the implications of 
the fact that various kinds of stories appeared in the Bulletin in the 
1880s, including 'trite and stilted fiction,' parodies and illustrations 
guying the clichés of popular fiction' and the 'characteristically 
Australian' stories which flowed from 1888 on (xi). In their brief in-
troductory sketch and the anthology contents that follow Hadgraft 
and Wilson conveniently suppress those other possible long, over-
stated, sentimental selections which would contradict their 'Bulletin 
style.' In the process they become themselves the arbiters deciding 
which writers and stories constitute the style and 'the quality 
Australian short story' that is ostensibly derived from it. 14 
But in constructing one kind of Australian short story the al-
ternative styles they reject are inescapably embedded in the tradition 
constituted by the anthology. Indeed, a rejection of previous and al-
ternative styles is the fundamental move for the editors, enabling 
them to arbitrate and classify the genre of the Australian short story, 
by stating what their selection is not. 15 The stories not included are 
'outmoded,' long-winded,"orotund,"the sentiment is lush' and 
'the moralistic note rings loud and clear. The content is almost in-
variably conventional — in plot, dialogue, feeling, and attitude. Just 
as stock are the characters' (x). In other words, by definition, the sto-
ries not selected are opposed to the 'Bulletin style' in terms of con-
y e ntional features. What is interesting about the strategy used here 
is the way the features which are supposed to be characteristic of the 
'Bulletin style' become implicitly original, by contrast with the 'stock' 
or 'conventional' characteristics of its stylistic opposite. By defining 
the field in terms of its other, by reference to what it is no t, Hadgraft 
and Wilson's rejection of conventional short stories (stories that are 
long-winded, orotund, lush) does double duty: the style promoted in 
their anthology becomes the style for quality Australian short stories 
(short, laconic, understated) as determined in their selection of ac-
tual content; and, by emphasising the conventionality of the sorts of 
stories which their anthology does not include, the conventionality 
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of their own content (conventionally short, laconic, understated sto-
ries) can be evaded. 
Hadgraft and Wilson's anthology is a political and contestable 
construct, depending on their own description - that is reconstruc-
tion if not initial construction - of the 'Bulletin short story ... [which] 
was in effect the real Australian short story of the period from about 
1890 until World War I' (xii). Hadgraft and Wilson claim for them-
selves the capacity to define this object despite the fact that 'many 
stories that appeared in the Bulletin were not what we call typical 
Bulletin stories' (xii). What counts, in other words, as 'the real 
Australian short story' depends on 'what w e call typical.' The an-
thology editors, in so calling, claim power over the object which 
their anthology legitimates. But embedded in this process of con-
structing 'the real Australian short story' are all those other stories, 
possible pretenders to the title, which need only the apparatus of an 
anthology in order to overthrow the 'Bulletin short story' version 
with a new version of 'the real Australian short story.' 
Having constituted the sub-field, or genre, 'the real Australian 
short story,' and their position in the field as the arbiters of this ob-
ject, Hadgraft and Wilson proceed to the next move typical of an-
thology introductions, a move that follows Palgrave's 'natural 
growth and evolution.' This is to construct a model of the develop-
ment of the genre. Hadgraft and Wilson's genre, as we have seen, is 
unified by the 'Bulletin style' between about 1890 and World War I. 
In their history, 
World War I may be put as the terminus to this first im-
portant period in the development of the Australian 
short story. After that it was to change, to become more 
sophisticated and to shift away from the outback .... There 
seems something of a hiatus between the ending of the 
Bulletin period and the thirties. The link is Vance Palmer. 
emphasis added) 
In constructing a history some kind of link between elements is es-
sential in order to naturalise otherwise disparate material and syn-
thesise it into an organic whole, called Australian short fiction. But 
the somewhat tentative qualification here - 'may be,' seems,' 
'somewhat' - suggests Hadgraft and Wilson recognise the con-
testable nature of this next move but also obscures the reified status 
of their emphatically positive construction, now with a 'first impor- 
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tant period' which serves as the absolutely factual beginning to a 
positivist 'Australian short story.' 
Harry Heseltine's The Penguin Book of Australian Short 
Stories is the most ambitious and explicit attempt in my random list 
of anthologies to lay claim to the right to constitute and consecrate 
the specific list of the Australian short story as well as to identify or 
at least assert custodial rights over the whole imaginary genre of the 
Australian short story. Heseltine's introduction usefully fore-
grounds the process by which anthologies naturalise and synthesise 
disparate material in order to 'accommodate' it in a 'tradition' or 
'continuum' or 'coherent' whole. 16 Heseltine's project is, he admits, 
to present a 'practical exemplary history of short prose fiction in this 
country' (Heseltine, Penguin Book of Australian Short Stories, 9). 
The positivist implications of such a project are, as Heseltine 
acknowledges, obvious. 'To claim for a set of twenty-five stories 
chronologically arranged the force of an exemplary history is clearly 
to assume that there is a history to be exemplified' (9). While he fails 
to come to terms with the function of his exemplars as definitive 
models, Heseltine does foreground the role of the editor in 
constructing various conditional 'versions' (11) of the genre. But in 
making explicit the conditional aspect of selection Heseltine neatly 
obscures the positivist assumption that the selection which 
represents his version of the genre is drawn from some larger imag-
inary, canonical body of possible short story choices rather than con-
stituted by his selection itself. 
Not surprisingly, Heseltine's positivist genre closely follows 
that of Hadgraft and Wilson, the traditional characteristics of the 
sub-field 'Australian short fiction' being well established by 1976." 
The short story - an organic genre, with a 'source,' a 'development' 
and even a 'flowering' to prove it - 'has ... a discernible 
development beginning in the 1890s ... enjoying a second major 
flowering during the 1940s' (9), with Henry Lawson as 'the source of 
most that is imaginatively important in it' (11). Clearly, such a 
model informs Heseltine's editorial practice - it is this model that is 
constituted in the contents of his anthology 18  and, presumably, 
necessitates the pre-emptive disclaimer that follows: 
I wish to make it absolutely clear that any interpretation I 
offer of the rise of the Australian short story grew out of, 
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did not dictate, the lengthy process of selection. (12, em-
phasis added) 
This disclaimer is unusual as a defensive strategy in anthology in-
troductions in that it foregrounds the fundamental problem con-
cerning the anthology as an 'interpretation,' a problem which is 
usually suppressed. Heseltine, by disclaiming responsibility for the 
'constructedness' of his body of Australian short fiction, effectively 
foregrounds the key role of the anthology introduction and contents, 
dictated by the interpretation that he offers, in constituting his object 
in the literary field. To put this in terms of the agent, Heseltine fore-
grounds the status of the anthology as an artefact of his own subjec-
tive consciousness partially disguised as a positive object. 
The artefactuality of Heseltine's anthology and the constitut-
ing force of his introduction ('force' being a term Heseltirte uses) are 
further emphasised by his explicit problematising of the coherent 
tradition of the Australian short story genre and his attempt to re-
solve this problem. Constructing an Australian short story tradition, 
Heseltine admits, has its difficulties: 
Hal Porter and Patrick White constitute obstacles to the 
perception or proof of an Australian short story tradition 
.... Indeed, perhaps the greatest challenge to historical 
criticism of the Australian short story is to generate a 
reading of its development which will accommodate 
Henry Lawson at one end of the continuum and Hal 
Porter and Patrick White at the other without misrepre-
senting [them and those who fall between them]. (12, em-
phasis added) 
Beyond the usual reifying construction of a positive 'tradition,' 
'development' and 'representation' of Australian short fiction (in 
this case by referring to the possibility of misrepresentation), 
Heseltine seems here to construct a more sophisticated practice for 
constituting the category he appears to represent by acknowledging 
that his introductory account 'generates a reading' of the genre, an 
acknowledgment that clearly contradicts his opening claim merely 
to 'present a practical exemplary history' back on page 9. Now on 
page 12 the tradition seems to have become problematic and 
dependent on a 'perspective' or Iplerspectives [that] are available on 
the Australian short story' (12). But Heseltine submerges the radi-
cally subjective basis of these possible perspectives as soon as they 
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surface: the Iplerspectives [that] are available on the Australian short 
story' it turns out 'afford its major representatives some kind of 
cultural coherence without either imposing on them new and 
perverse interpretations or absolutely disintegrating the old patterns 
of understanding' (12). Clearly Heseltine's project is not to disinte-
grate the tradition and construct a new one but to conserve a particu-
lar account of the Australian short story tradition which is not 'new 
and perverse.' Even when the tradition is the product of a 'generated 
reading' the anthology user is not following any kind of radical sub-
jectivity, a 'generated reading' based on Heseltine's perspective, but 
one based on 'perspectives [that] are ... discernible in the twenty-five 
stories ... in this anthology' (12, emphasis added). Heseltine's 
'perspectives' are regulated not by his subjective position in the field 
or by his subjective consciousness but by firm and positive entities 
which are 'really out there' after all. 
Heseltine justifies these 'perspectives' as positive entities by 
sleight of hand, exactly on the basis of those already subjectively se-
lective particular instances that he fails to acknowledge. The same 
kind of double vision - at once acknowledging and suppressing the 
radical subjectivity of his anthology - appears in the ambivalent 
conception of particular stories as obstacles to the 'perception or 
proof of an Australian short story tradition.' The tradition, here, 
seems to be the product both of perception and proof, compressing 
together the radical plurality in the multiple possibilities of subjec-
tive perception with the evidential positivism of proof. While 
Heseltine seems to be having a bet each way here, his analysis (or, in 
my terms, construction) of the organkally whole and coherent tradi-
tion of the Australian short story which follows suggests a funda-
mentally positivist conception. 
How does Heseltine resolve the problem, when 'Hal Porter 
and Patrick White constitute obstacles to the perception or proof of 
an Australian short story tradition'? In a move reminiscent of the 
New Critics, a move practised by editors of pedagogical anthologies - 
like Cleanth Brooks and Robert Warren in Understanding Fiction as 
I shall attempt to show in Chapter Six, he discovers apparently con-
tradictory elements in various short stories which are, it turns out, 
coherent, that is, can be synthesised into coherent elements in an or-
ganic tradition. Heseltine's tradition, briefly, involves stories by 
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writers who 'fill the gaps' between Henry Lawson, Katherine 
Susannah Prichard and Hal Porter, on the basis that: 
a subordination [of the imagination to the pressure of the 
actual] ... has been endemic in our shorter fiction .... [T]he 
experienced quality of reality has, in effect, rendered the 
imagination superfluous (31). 
It seems odd, at first glance, that Porter's flamboyantly 
imaginative fiction style should be synthesised into such a 
characterisation of Australian short fiction. But it turns out, as 
Heseltine explains, that Henry Lawson, Katherine Susannah 
Prichard and Hal Porter share the same fundamental characteristic: a 
reliance on 'authenticating experience' (13). Lawson's austere 
understatement 
might [and for Heseltine actually does] serve as a 
paradigm for Australian realism which forgoes the effects 
of the imagination because language adequately applied to 
the quality of experience is already more than enough 
(19); 
while 
[iln the interlocking of ... her greed for authenticating in-
formation and her trust in language to turn that informa-
tion into art ... Katherine Susannah Prichard defined her 
central place in the Australian tradition of short prose 
narrative (22); 
and with a 
writer [like Hal Ported who subordinates his imagination 
to his own reality (of words), who is greedy for abundance 
and information, who reveals himself as good without 
ever having been innocent, such a writer we can now see 
as peculiarly representative of our whole national experi-
ence (27; see also 13). 19 
The point in examining Hese'tine's construction here of 'the 
Australian short story tradition' is not to accuse him in particular of 
some kind of hoax, or to discern in the practice of critics like him 
some kind of conspiracy. Rather, it is to show how any apparently 
descriptive account of an object, like 'the Australian short story tra-
dition,' is one practice (usually one of several) that actually brings 
about that object. And, in so far as that account claims for itself and 
consequently has conferred on it the status of authenticity as a reli- 
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able explanation for that object, a conferring that follows from the 
use to which the account is put over time, that object will maintain 
its social power, or value, as though it is absolute and positive. The 
interesting thing about Heseltine's construction of his 'Australian 
short story tradition' is that he deploys as though a positive element 
the very concept of authenticity which it is his project to construct: 
his account appears to be authenticated because he seizes for himself 
the right to make judgements on authenticity. And what measures 
authenticity is information, which sounds like a hard category of 
positivist evidence, not imagination, which sounds like the wishy-
washy sort of subjectivity literary critics of the New Critical variety 
used to try to avoid. 
Heseltine synthesises his three major Australian short fiction 
writers by a rhetorical appeal to their shared horror of imagination 
and devotion to 'reality,' information' and 'experience' - a cluster of 
terms which can be thought of as synonymous and which Heseltine 
compresses into synonyms in his conclusion on page 31 (quoted 
above). The weight of Heseltine's rhetorical strategy rests most 
heavily on his compression of Porter's dubiously non-imaginative 
'reality (of words)' into 'information,' words becoming somehow 
things that exist outside imagination, and on his rhetorical 
compression of the flimsy conception of writerly greed - Prichard's 
unsubstantiated 'greed for authenticating information' and Porter's 
'greed for abundance and information' put them in the same boat as 
Lawson. 
By privileging 'authentic experience' over 'imagination' 
Heseltine is able to make Porter, whose style presents a potential ob-
stacle in his developmental model of the Australian short story, as 
he acknowledges, into a major element and, by the way, positions 
Heseltine as the critic who holds the power to construct and conse-
crate the list of writers and stories which constitute the Australian 
short story as an apparently positive and now organic object. 
Heseltine's readiness to find a 'deep' structural characteristic - a kind 
of family resemblance - with which to construct his object finds a 
different expression in his important 1962 essay, 'The Literary 
Heritage,' a major articulation of his strategic claim in the literary 
field to the position of the 'canon maker.' The Literary Heritage' ap-
peared in Mean jin at a time when the debate about 'Australian liter-
ature' - its content, value and personnel - and the role of university 
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departments of English in determining what kind of Australian 
Literature should be studied, if any should be studied at all, was at its 
height.20 
Heseltine's claim in the essay to the authority to speak on be-
half of some kind of 'Australian literary heritage' is a form of posi-
tioning in the literary field. The essay, in other words, is a staking of 
his claim to the power to authorise 'our most accomplished literary 
works' (Heseltine, 'Literary Heritage,' 154), that is, to decide on 'our 
monuments' or what counts in the field. But it is also a staking of a 
claim to the central place of the literary field over all other fields in 
'the continuing definition of ourselves to ourselves through the 
forms of literature' (154), a claim that emphasises the nationalising 
function of 'literature.' To ask whether or not Heseltine's second 
claim, a kind of 'ambit claim,' was ever taken seriously by agents 
operating outside the literary field is less important than to ask what 
function such a claim serves inside the literary field. To claim the 
centrality of one's object - Australian literature - as the 
overdetermining thing which defines 'ourselves' in all other fields 
has the effect of implying at least the centrality of that object in the 
literary field and, by extension, of implying the centrality of 
Heseltine in that field. Having done this, Heseltine sets out 'to con-
struct a version of our literary heritage which will do justice to 
whatever discoverable complexity and force are latent in it, and at 
the same time will not disavow its Australianness' (156). 
The typical ambivalence in Heseltine's methodology should, 
by now, be apparent. Just as he does in his introduction to The 
Penguin Book of Australian Short Stories, Heseltine at once exposes 
the subjective basis of his practice to 'construct a version' and con-
ceals it again in the reifying objectivity announced by the concept of 
'discoverable' evidence which is now 'latent' in this object. 
Heseltine's 'literature' is characterised by 'complexity and force,' 
characteristics which are valued for good professional reasons. 
Heseltine constructs a 'literary heritage' which depends on the sorts 
of skilled close reading which literary critics know how to do and are 
paid to teach. But in order to strengthen his double claim both sub-
jectively to 'construct a version' and objectively to 'discover evi-
dence of the latent complexity and force' of 'Australian literature' 
Heseltine makes an additional move. Complexity, he suggests, 
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might disavow or repudiate the 'Australianness' of his object, imply-
ing that 'Australianness' is, by definition, 'simple.' 
Reference to the problematic complexity of what should be a 
'simple Australian heritage' might seem counter-productive. But 
Heseltine turns the problem on its head in order to repudiate sim-
pleness. What is 'Australian,' it turns out, is really complex. 
The canon of our writing presents a facade of mateship, 
egalitarian democracy, landscape, nationalism, realistic 
toughness. But always behind the facade looms the fun- 
damental concern of the Australian literary imagination. 
That concern, marked out by our national origins and 
given direction by geographic necessity, is to acknowledge 
the terror at the basis of being, to explore its uses, and to 
build defences against its dangers. It is that concern which 
gives Australia's literary heritage its special force and dis- 
tinction, which guarantees its continuing modernity. (166) 
Heseltine shifts the usual defining characteristics of 'Australian fic-
tion,' including the 'realistic toughness' which he was later to make 
central in his Penguin anthology of 1976, to the periphery in order to 
baptise a more complex 'concern of the Australian literary imagina-
tion,' a fascination with 'terror.' The importance of this 'modernist' 
concern is that it fitted 'Australian literature' into the then current 
model of European fiction which, at the time of Heseltine's essay, 
privileged texts which expressed some kind of nihilism or existen-
tialism at the expense of 'Romantic optimism' (158). 
Heseltine's 'complex Australian literary heritage,' then, ac-
complishes several things: it constructs a positive object suited to the 
needs of academic teacher-critics; it constructs this object in a cate-
gory with European and modernist credentials; and it positions 
Heseltine as the baptiser of the 'real Australian literature.' What is 
common to Heseltine's objectifying and canonising projects, a fun-
damental characteristic of the 'teacher-critic' in the literary field, is 
his willingness to deploy different frameworks, or 'perspectives' 
which become 'proofs,' with which to construct his object. The 1962 
essay emphasises the fundamental imaginative fascination with ter-
ror and a rejection of 'reality,' the anthology disposes of 
'imagination' and emphasises the fundamental position of the 
'reality' of 'authentic experience.' Whichever framework he chooses, 
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however, the critic who decides what counts maintains his central 
position and consecrating power in the literary field. 
Leonie Kramer has been one of the most influential teacher-
critics in the literary field. Her influence is the result of the wide in-
stitutional power which she possesses as an academic and popular 
critical commentator, an editor and a jury member for various liter-
ary awards. The institutional leverage of her Oxford History of 
Australian Literature — a project which bears the double authority of 
Kramer and Oxford — on perceptions of 'Australian literature' de-
serves a study in itself. I shall, however, restrict my analysis here to 
Kramer's massive two-volume 'coffee table' anthology, My Country. 
Australian Poetry and Short Stories: Two Hundred Years. In her 
brief introduction to the two volumes Kramer deploys every charac-
teristic move of the anthology introduction after Palgrave in order 
to sketch her object. 'Literature' is, first of all, a 'represented' object, 
characterised by fiction and poetry. The sorts of text which are not 
'represented' are 'records, journals, diaries and descriptions,' which 
appear to be the only genres writers could manage during the 
'struggle to survive' in the colonial years, and which are simply as-
sumed to be subordinate to the poetry and fiction that begin the con-
tents of the anthology. 21 And the absence of early poetry or short fic-
tion from the anthology, of course, proves her case, but more than 
this it constructs Kramer's 'Australian literature' by means of a sim-
ple suppression: 'Australian literature' is not evident in records, 
journals, diaries and descriptions. What, then, fills this category? 
'The works have been selected to show how writers ... have re-
sponded to a variety of experiences and how well they have ex-
pressed their observations and impressions for a very diverse audi-
ence' (Kramer, My Country. Vol. I, x). Oddly enough, 'literature,' for 
Kramer, gets back to a kind of recording ('expressing observations 
and impressions') with the addition of some subjectivity and 
diversity which has become, somehow, fictional or poetic, 
presumably because a fictional or poetic kind of responsiveness to 'a 
variety of experiences' results from the luxury afforded to writers 
who are no longer struggling to survive. 
Kramer's introduction, for all its brevity, is loaded with this 
kind of dense and ambiguous thinking. The selection, on the one 
hand appearing to result from the emphasis on 'response to a vari-
ety of experiences,' in fact determines on the other what counts as a 
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'response' in the first place and what kinds of experience are judged 
to have been worth responding to. The selected 'works' constitute an 
organic whole, being on the one hand 'arranged chronologically, but' 
on the other 'no strict progression is implied' (x). Kramer remains 
ambivalent about the function of her text: 'Where is a predominance 
of stories dealing with the bush and country life, as though to insist 
that this is where "the real Australian" is to be found' (xifi). Again, 
she suppresses the fact that the 'predominance of bush stories' is the 
product of her selection - the predominance is a simply positive fact 
- yet infers the subjectivity of this fact, 'as though to insist.' Even 
here, however, her positivist view helps to obscure the subjective 
editorial function, suggesting that we ought to ask what is it that 
insists 'that this is where "the real Australian" is to be found'? The 
answer, of course, is that it is the apparently objective anthology 
contents that insist. But this avoids the other possible and more 
revealing question, w h o is it who insists? To ask this and answer - 
that it is Leonie Kramer who insists - is to expose the subjective 
status of the anthology selection which she takes such pains to 
conceal. 
Submerged in her introduction are the three key claims that 
characterise the anthology introduction and, while Kramer confuses 
or shifts into the background the usual concern with representation, 
the organic unity of her object and the whole problem of 'literature' 
as 'the best,' she does foreground the claim that Australian short 
story anthologies define the national identity. Her nation is, appar-
ently like her whole project, an emphatically positive one: '[winters 
... are like explorers, in that they bring to light observations ... and 
produce individual maps of the terrain they traverse' (Kramer, My 
Country. Vol. II, xi). Besides suggesting that 'Australian literature' is 
a colonial branch of European literature, Kramer's colonising trope 
itself helps to construct her nationalism. My Country constructs her 
object while appearing to explore it: the anthology becomes the map 
of those texts which have appeared on an apparently otherwise 
blank pre-colonial surface. My Country, as the appropriation in the 
title implies, is an emphatically European one, in which Kramer's 
'map' is at once her constitution of 'writing in English' as 'one of the 
cultural gains of colonialism' (My Country, Vol. I, xi), her claim to 
the right of possession of this object, and her consecration of it by her 
selection. 
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What I have called the 'sleight of hand' construction of the 
positivist object - 'The Australian short story' - in Australian short 
story anthologies suggests some kind of conscious conspiracy in the 
work of various teacher-critic-editors like Hadgraft and Wilson, 
Heseltine or Kramer, emphasising the power of the agent in the pro-
cess of canon formation. How much the process is a consciously 
strategic one is, however, impossible to establish and, as I have at-
tempted to show in Part One, irrelevant. Regardless of their inten-
tions, the practices of agents in the literary or any other field have 
unintentional and constrained consequences. 22 For example, the 
practices of a series of editors and publishers in constituting 'The 
Works of Shakespeare,' whatever the intended consequences, have 
resulted in the construction of an institution in which Shakespeare 
has become an extremely valuable cultural and professional aca-
demic asset and a major feature in the reproduction of the matrix of 
practices which sustain the power of 'authors,' as distinct from writ-
ers of texts, and individual 'works,' as distinct from texts, as I at-
tempted to show in Chapter Two. Similarly, the fact that specific ac-
tors in the field have had more or less freedom as agents to direct 
how the field operates does not diminish the institutional nature of 
the ongoing practices that also operate in the field. And it is exactly 
the institutional interdependence of anthologies that I wish to con-
sider next in order to show how specific editors and publishers con-
struct a 'natural chronology' for the genre, 'Australian short fiction.' 
Roughly speaking, the organic and positive object called 
'Australian short fiction' develops' or else 'flowers' in three stages, 
in the 1890s, the 1940s and the 1970s. This chronology and the or-
ganic metaphor that controls it gain currency through repeated use 
in short story anthologies. Let me show how this works in two re-
cent cases, Kerryn Goldsworthy's 1983 Australian Short Stories and 
Laurie Hergenhan's 1986 The Australian Short Story: A Collection, 
1890s - 1990s. Both anthologies promote the developmental model 
of 'Australian short fiction.' For Goldsworthy 
[t]he stories ... have been chosen partly to reflect the three 
roughly identifiable short-story 'booms' in Australia ... the 
1890's [sic] ... the 1940's [sic] short story ... that dominate[d] 
Australian fiction ... [and] the 1970's [sic] new generation. 
(Goldsworthy, Australian Short Stories., x-xi) 
For Hergenhan the 
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supposed progenitor [of the Australian short story is] 
Henry Lawson [and] there is a long line of distinguished 
short story writers extending from the 1890s to the 
present. (Hergenhan, The Australian Short Story: 1890s - 
1990s, xi) 
The Bulletin origin, as I argued above, is itself a contested notion, as 
Hergenhan's evasive 'supposed progenitor' implies, but both an-
thologies, strangely, depend on and in turn maintain it. This is 
strange because both, in the spirit of the times, are self-conscious at-
tempts at canon formation or canon revision. 
Goldsworthy and Hergenhan each spend considerable time 
discussing selection and organisation, both typical concerns in an-
thology introductions. Goldsworthy selects material with 'the desire 
for some kind of chronological coherence in showing the develop-
ment of the Australian short story; ... presenting as wide a spectrum 
... as possible' (Goldsworthy, Australian Short Stories, xviii) in order 
'to establish and maintain certain kinds of continuity and ... to 
illustrate some general ideas and observations about the Australian 
short story' and organises the selection chronologically, according to 
the writer's birth date (x). Hergenhan selects "representative' stories 
... to concentrate on authors who have made an important 
contribution to the form of the short story as practised in Australia' 
and 'Rio make th[e] development apparent to readers I have 
arranged the stories chronologically according to first publication' 
(Hergenhan, The Australian Short Story: 1890s - 1990s, xii). 
Clearly, both editors use the same strategies: both select texts 
on the basis of a model - Goldsworthy produces a 'coherence,' 
'certain kinds of continuity and ... some general ideas,' Hergenhan 
produces apparently problematic 'representative' stories but also un-
problematic 'important contributions to the form of the short story;' 
• both organise their selections chronologically in order to reify a de-
velopmental model; and both suppress the grounds by which they 
determined this development - it remains unclear how either edi-
tor attaches value to 'coherence' or 'width' or on what grounds a 
'contribution' is 'important' in their constructions of Australian 
short fiction. And while Hergenhan's 'important contributions to' 
the Australian short story is less evasive than Goldsworthy's vague 
'wide spectrum' and 'general ideas,' neither editor acknowledges the 
fundamentally subjective basis of the attitudes or strategic decisions 
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which determine their respective contents. Both assume that the 
'spectrum' or 'important contributions' simply appeared somehow 
on the editorial desk. 
Goldsworthy's introduction differs from Hergenhan's, how-
ever, in the attention she pays to the explicit revision of the sup-
posed content of the Australian short story and the function of the 
anthology in the attention she pays to uncovering the obscured but 
positively objective fact that Australian fiction has, it turns out, al-
ways dealt with female experience: 
a survey of Australian short fiction reveals that its writ-
ers, both male and female, have always been equally con-
cerned with female experience of Australian life, or, in-
deed, female experience in general. One of the purposes of 
this anthology is to demonstrate that concern: to attempt 
to redress the balance of a popular imagination which sees 
male figures and male experience as predominant in 
Australian life. (Goldsworthy, Australian Short Stories, 
xvi, emphasis added) 
While Goldsworthy's 'survey' which 'reveals' evidence functions in 
the same positivist vein as Kramer's mapping exercise, the ambigu-
ity in at once 'demonstrating' the features of a positive object and 
'attempting to redress' the imbalance in the imagination that deter-
mines the subjective perception of that object recalls the kind of am-
bivalence that is a characteristic of Heseltine's methodology. 
Goldsworthy's claim is that her anthology observes some significant 
new evidence in the field of Australian short fiction. As a result, 
some dark horses have been included at the expense of 
favourites ... because such a race is always more 
interesting than one in which the outcome is predictable, 
and ... because of some recent and significant changes in 
the condition of the track. (xviii) 
The function of the racing metaphor is interesting here: 
Goldsworthy's revisionist project clearly involves a recognition of 
the political basis of selection (she refers to 'inclusion' and 
'representation') and of the fact that the short story anthology has, 
until recently, been a certain kind of race characterised by the sort of 
content I have reviewed above. And her view of anthologies as 
vehicles for inclusion and exclusion, allowing 'most of the well-
known Australian writers of short fiction [to be] represented here' 
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(x), suggests that her desired 'outcome' is, presumably, the greater in-
clusion of fiction by and/ or about women. But her metaphor con-
ceals, as usual, as much as it reveals. The anthology, it seems, de-
scribes some 'recent and significant changes in the condition of the 
track,' but the tracks on which short stories run are always and only 
the ones provided by publications like Goldsworthy's own anthol-
ogy. By ignoring this Goldsworthy submerges her own responsibility 
for constructing the track and makes the track appear to be a natural 
and positive feature of the literary field when, in fact, the anthology, 
the choices and the contests embedded in it constitute 'the track,' the 
race' and 'the horses' running in it. 
For all her foregrounded claim to canon revision, 
Goldsworthy's selection is as conservative as Hergenhan's. In terms 
of content, there is considerable overlap in the personnel selected in 
the two anthologies. Goldsworthy (with twenty-six writers) and 
Hergenhan (with thirty-three) select nineteen in common: Barbara 
Baynton, Henry Lawson, Henry Handel Richardson, Katherine 
Susannah Prichard, Christina Stead, Alan Marshall, John Morrison, 
Gavin Casey, Hal Porter, Dal Stivens, Patrick White, Peter Cowan, 
Thelma Forshaw, Elizabeth Jolley, Morris Lurie, Frank Moorhouse, 
Murray Bail, Michael Wilding and Peter Carey. Goldsworthy's an-
thology, while ostensibly revisionary, selects only three pre-Bulletin 
writers, and ends with the five 'Balmain School' writers whose rep-
utations were already established by Brian Kiernan's 1977 The Most 
Beautiful Lies. A Collection of Stories by Five Major Contemporary 
Fiction Writers: Bail, Carey, Lurie, Moorhouse and Wilding, an an-
thology I shall examine in detail later. Hergenhan follows her lead 
but manages, admittedly with a larger volume, to select more dark 
horses: Olga Masters, Beverley Farmer, Fay Zwicky, Barry Hill, 
Gerald Murnane, Archie Weller, Thea Astley, Helen Garner, Lily 
Brett and Susan Hampton. 
Both anthologies organise their selections according to the 
three periods or 'flowerings' which they nominate in their introduc-
tions as the turning points in the development of the Australian 
short story, the 1890s, the 1940s and the 1970s, although Goldsworthy 
adds three pre-Bulletin stories and Hergenhan adds a 1980s phase. 
Both, in other words, adopt the regular model of the Australian 
short story which privileges the 'Bulletin style' origins of the genre, 
as established by earlier anthologies like those of Hadgraft and 
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Wilson, and Heseltine. In terms of content, however, both antholo-
gies give considerable space to short stories written by 'the 1940s' 
writers: of Goldsworthy's twenty-six writers, fourteen were pub-
lished in the 1940s; of Hergenhan's thirty-three, twelve were pub-
lished in the 1940s. Devoting more than half of her anthology to sto-
ries by writers from the 1940s, Goldsworthy institutes quite literally 
her contention that 'the 1940s short story dominated Australian fic-
tion,' while Hergenhan's provision of only one third of the anthol-
ogy for 1940s stories allows him to give greater emphasis to contem-
porary material, in keeping with his project to institute 'a long line 
of distinguished short story writers extending from the 1890s to the 
present.' But there is more to the constitution of the 1940s 
'flowering' than this. 
The selection of particular 1940s writers in the two antholo-
gies seems to be strongly determined by Beatrice Davis's 1967 Short 
Stories of Australia: The Moderns, an anthology that consecrates the 
1940s style, or what could be called the 'Coast to Coast style.' 23 In The 
Moderns, Davis stakes her, at first glance, oppositional claim to de-
fine what counts as contemporary Australian short fiction in the lit-
erary field, a claim that is all the more interesting for the fact that, at 
second glance, the contents and terms of the struggle between the 
'old' fiction and its 'new' successor turn out to be institutionally lo-
cated in and controlled by the two volumes of Short Stories of 
Australia, the old establishment in volume one, The Lawson 
Tradition, and the new opposition in volume two, The Moderns. 
The Moderns attempts to show in what new or different 
directions the short story in Australia has developed since 
1940 .... [T]here will be found a distinct change in approach 
from that of most of the writers in the first volume [that 
is, Douglas Stewart's Short Stories of Australia:] The 
Lawson Tradition. (Davis, ed. Short Stories of Australia, 
vii) 
Davis's description of her selected material constructs, in her terms, 
a 'new' style which is characteristically personal and concerned with 
relationships rather than with epic accounts, thereby strategically 
marking off the boundary between Stewart's 'old' establishment tra-
dition and her 'new' modern style. The anthologies of Goldsworthy 
and Hergenhan work with this boundary: ten of Goldsworthy's four-
teen 1940s writers were selected by Davis; while ten of Hergenhan's 
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twelve appeared in The Moderns. Christina Stead is the one selec-
tion to appear in both anthologies not determined by Davis's 
mode1.24 The stories that comprise the evidence of 'the Coast to 
Coast style' to be found' in Davis's anthology clearly constitute the 
'new and different directions' and 'distinct change of approach' 
which she seeks to privilege in the sub-field of Australian short fic-
tion. But it is in the way this evidence is taken up by anthologies 
which follow, like Goldsworthy's and Hergenhan's, that the contents 
of the field - its texts and personnel - are maintained. 
The selection of largely the same personnel, or canonical writ-
ers, from anthology to anthology in the sub-field of Australian short 
fiction indicates that the conservatism of Goldsworthy and 
Hergenhan is not unusual. A sample of sixty short story anthologies 
published between 1950 and 1995 which select material by Australian 
writers (broadly speaking, material written by or about Australians 
or written in Australia) indicates that between one third and one 
half of the writers selected in each anthology appear with some fre-
quency (see Table 1 below). 25 While the figures reproduced below 
indicate this pattern, it should be remembered that material by in-
frequently selected writers makes up roughly half or more of the 
contents of most short story anthologies. Only writers who have 
made five or more appearances in the sixty anthologies have been 
listed, for the purpose of indicating which writers are most often an-
thologised, particularly in order to highlight the frequency of selec-
tion of some writers - Henry Lawson, Hal Porter, Frank Moorhouse, 
Vance Palmer, Peter Carey. The figures for each writer indicate the 
number of times a story is selected, usually once in individual an-
thologies but sometimes up to five times. Frequency of selection has 
been cross-matched against the number of pages devoted to each 
writer in Stephen Torre's The Australian Short Story - 1940-1980: A 
Bibliography.26 There is a high correlation between my sample an-
thology selection and Torre's bibliographic register of publication ac-
tivity by and about short story writers. Torre's Bibliography lists first 
publications, short story collections, anthologies and review or criti-
cal articles. Frequently anthologised writers usually receive one and 
up to seven pages of bibliographic reference in Tone's Bibliography. 
A low correlation occurs for some writers, of course, because Torre's 
Bibliography indicates little publication activity for nineteenth-
century writers (usually with no pages listed) and post-1980s writers 
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Table 1 
Anthology selection of Australian short story writers 
Writer Frequency Volume by pages 
of selection in Torre's Bibliography 
Abdullah/ Matthew 7 1 
E. Anderson 10 2 
J. Anderson 5 0 
T. Astley 16 1 
M. Bail 20 1.5 
M. Barnard 16 1 
B. Baynton 17 0 
D. Campbell 5 2 
P. Carey 28 2 
G. Casey 13 4 
P. Cowan 22 3.5 
V. Daley 10 0 
F. D. Davison 12 2.5 
H. Drake-Brockmann 5 1.5 
E. Dyson 11 0 
B. Farmer 15 0.25 
T. Forshaw 8 2 
H. Garner 16 0.25 
K. Grenville 15 0.25 
M. Halligan 7 0 
B. Hanrahan 11 0 
F. Hardy 8 3 
E. Harrower 10 0.5 
S. Hazzard 8 0.5 
X. Herbert 5 1 
B. James 9 6 
E. Jolley 21 1.5 
H. Lawson 61 0 
M. Lurie 22 2.5 
D. Malouf 8 0.25 
C. Mann 6 1.5 
J. Manifold 7 0 
A. Marshall 22 6.5 
0. Masters 18 0.25 
H. McCrae 5 1 
F. Moorhouse 30 6.5 
J. Morrison 25 5 
G. Mumane 6 0.25 
B. Oakley 8 2 
D. O'Grady 6 2 
V. Palmer 27 3.5 
H. Porter 44 7 
K. S. Prichard 17 3 
H. H. Richardson 17 0 
S. Rudd 21 0 
E. Sc.hlunke 17 5 
C. Stead 19 1.5 
D. Stewart 5 1.5 
D. Stivens 25 6.5 
'Tasma' 6 0 
M. Trist 6 3 
P. Warung 13 0 
J. Waten 20 3.5 
P. White 23 2.5 
M. Wilding 26 6.5 
J. Wright 19 1.5 
F. Zwicky 10 0.25 
Source: figures drawn from sample of sixty short story anthologies pub-
lished between 1950 and 1995 which select material by Australian 
writers indexed against volume pages in Stephen Torre, The Australian 
Short Story — 1940-1980: A Bibliography. Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 
1984. 
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(usually with•one-quarter of a page listed) and because Torre lists the 
contents of collected stories, tending to over-emphasise some writers 
Whose short stories were published primarily in collections. 
While the anthology introduction is one mechanism that 
constructs its object, prescribing as a natural condition the positively 
objective, organic and representative 'literature' which it appears to 
describe, frequency of selection, as tabulated here, is another mecha-
nism in the establishment and maintenance of certain writers and 
'schools,' constructed in the physical contents of anthologies over 
time. The 'Bulletin style,' for example, is constructed massively (and 
almost single-handedly) in the anthology selection of Henry Lawson 
with sixty appearances, assisted by Price Waning with thirteen and 
Steele Rudd with twenty-one. Selections in the high teens of writers 
working, roughly speaking, in the 1940s indicate the solid antholo-
gising of the 'Coast to Coast style.' The distinctive frequency with 
which 1980s 'Women Writers' are selected - for example, Thea 
Astley, Beverley Farmer, Kate Grenville, (each fifteen times), 
Barbara Hanrahan (ten times), Elizabeth Jolley (twenty-one times), 
Olga Masters (eighteen times) and Fay Zwicky (ten times) - indicates 
the successful revision of the canon as a result of the constitution of 
the category, 'Women's Writing,' while the remarkable rate at which 
the `Balmain School' writers appear - Murray Bail (twenty times), 
Peter Carey (twenty-eight times), Morris Lurie (twenty-two times), 
Frank Moorhouse (thirty times - third in frequency after Lawson 
and Porter) and Michael Wilding (twenty-six times) - likewise sug-
gests the successful establishment of the school after Brian Kiernan's 
anthology, The Most Beautiful Lies. Such a high frequency, how-
ever, is partly explained by the recent publishing move towards the 
strategic representation of schools of writers in anthologies in which 
editors select between three and five stories by writers. Kiernan's an-
thology, for example, with five stories by each writer partly accounts 
for the high frequency of selections of stories by Bail, Carey, Lurie, 
Moorhouse and Wilding. 
While some Australian short story anthologies devote up to 
half of their contents to infrequently selected writers, producing 
some random effects, the table above indicates that the contents of 
most are generally conservative and maintain a familiar list of writ-
ers. This is despite the typical introductory claims that anthologies 
recognise, to use Goldsworthy's metaphor quoted above, 'recent and 
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significant changes in the condition of the track.' Some anthologies, 
however, deliberately construct different contents in order to revise 
the category of Australian short fiction or, put another way, the 
Australian literary canon - or at least the canonical list of Australian 
short fiction writers. In doing so they do what all anthologies do - 
circumscribe and lay claim to the terrain of Australian short fiction 
in the literary field - but in the way they establish an oppositional 
history in their introductions and in their construction of new con-
tents they attempt to consecrate new personnel and a revised canon. 
Two of the most successful revisions, which are the focus of Chapter 
Five, have constituted new categories in the sub-field: historical and 
contemporary 'Australian Women's Writing' and the fiction and 
personnel of 'The Balmain School.' 
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5 
'Beautiful Lies': the establishment of 
'Australian Women's writing' and 
'The Balmain School' 
[P]ublication has depended upon some form of selection 
process, as indeed it does within this very anthology. Not 
everyone gets into print, and those who do, must meet 
certain criteria. Dale Spender' 
This anthology ... is something of a map of social 
concerns. 
Frank Moorhouse2 
During the Australian short story anthology boom of the 1980s, 
writers, editors, publishers and critics engaged in two successful in-
terventions in the literary field to establish two new categories, 
namely, the broadly characterised genre of 'Australian women's 
writing' and the more tightly specified texts and personnel of 'The 
Balmain School.' The construction and consecration of these new 
categories was, I shall try to show, highly dependent on anthologies. 
It is probable that such interventions were responsive to shifts in 
other fields to do with, for example, the growing political credit of 
feminism, in the case of 'Australian Women's Writing,' or to do 
with the declining cultural credit of modernism, in the case of 'The 
Balmain School.' My concern here, however, is not to show which 
over-determining social practices stimulated changes in the literary 
field but to show how anthologies of Australian short fiction 
brought certain personnel, specific content and broad genres to 
prominence in the literary field. 
'AUSTRALIAN WOMEN'S WRITING' 
The 1980s construction of the category of short fiction called 
'Australian women's writing' depended on two moves, each made 
by means of anthologies: the retrospective constructing of a histori-
cal tradition of short fiction by Australian women; and the institut-
ing of a canon of generically characteristic contemporary short fic-
tion by Australian women. Both of these moves, broadly speaking, 
were characterised by a separatist rhetoric which distinguished 
women's writing from its supposed opposite: dominant, main-
stream men's writing. 
The emergence of the new category of Australian women's 
writing in the literary field seems to parallel the development of the 
women's movement which, in the 1970s and 80s, took a self-con-
sciously separatist stance in the political field. This stance seems to 
have determined the tendency by anthology editors to construct a 
particular kind of 'tradition' for Australian women's writing which 
was established in their anthology introductions. Introductions 
tended to monumentalise women's writing as a separate category in 
a highly polemical way. Hand in glove with this, of course, was the 
specific project to select and publish short fiction written exclusively 
by women which served to construct the content of the category. 
There is, however, a difficulty in scrutinising Australian 
women's writing in particular. My discussion here of the way an-
thologies of Australian women's writing constructed a tradition or 
revised the canon is not an attempt to suggest that the construction 
of this new category is unusual, that previously existing categories, 
like the nationalist short story, were somehow 'authentic.' Rather I 
want to try to expose the sorts of strategies by which any kind of 
'literature' is constructed. But the construction of Australian wom-
en's writing is especially revealing because it depends on a shift in 
the terms through which the contemporary canon is constructed. 
A basic assumption that now determines the struggle over 
what counts as contemporary short fiction, as it is presented in an-
thologies, is that texts are thought to be expressions of social identity, 
particularly as defined by gender or ethnicity. Thus the struggle over 
credit in the literary field is not to do with various kinds of texts but 
with the social identities ascribed to the writers of various kinds of 
texts — by 'Australian women writers,' Australian men writers,' 
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'indigenous writers,' ethnic writers,' gay and lesbian writers,' 
'Generation X writers,' and so on. 
It is only because social identity has become a criterion of 
judgement in the literary field, perhaps as a result of political shifts 
in the over-determining political field, that revisionist anthologies 
have retrospectively constructed 'the tradition' in terms of social 
identity. Social identity, in other words, has become the basis on 
which some writers are supposed to be over-represented in 
'Australian short fiction': men, for example, are supposed to have 
supplied the content of the category, and thereby dominated the 
field, by virtue of being men and, as a direct consequence, women 
are supposed to have been dominated in the field by virtue of being 
women. Such a view, as John Guillory notes in his study of canon 
formation, assumes that texts represent individuals and, even more 
problematically, represent social groups. So the predominance of 
short fiction by male writers in nineteenth-century and early twenti-
eth-century anthologies, for example, becomes the simple result of a 
discrimination against individual women on the basis of gender. 
More questionably, all women in this period are identified collec-
tively as though they were discriminated against in the same way 
and as though they shared common interests and resources in the 
first place. It is more likely, Guillory argues that 
Mlle reason more women authors ... are not represented 
in older literatures is not primarily that their works were 
routinely excluded by invidious or prejudicial standards 
of evaluation, 'excluded' as a consequence of their social 
identity as women. The historical reason is that, with few 
exceptions, women were routinely excluded from access 
to literacy, or were proscribed from composition or publi-
cation in the genres considered to be serious. 3 
To apply this view of exclusion to Australian short fiction in 
the literary field, the nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-cen-
tury predominance of male writers in the field is more a conse-
quence of restrictions on production by women than of limitations 
on consumption by women. This is not to say that women were not 
writing, but that fewer women than men had access to the means of 
literary production. As a consequence, fewer women than men were 
producing texts that might be published. But if we construct a view 
of the canon in terms of gender, Guillory argues, the simply low 
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numbers of texts produced by women then 'discovers' the obvious 
fact that the older the literature, the less likely it will be that texts by 
socially defined minorities exist in sufficient numbers to produce a 
"representative" canon' (Guillory, Cultural Capital, 15). This is 
because the only canons which are 'representative' of social 
identities, that is, thought to reflect the beliefs or values of some 
social group, were usually produced by personnel drawn from the 
sorts of elites with the social and material wherewithal, whatever 
their gender or ethnic background happened to be, to maintain the 
dominance of their own cultural products in the public domain. 4 
In order to explain the small number of female writers of pub-
lished Australian short fiction we should look to the social and po-
litical conditions in which the literary field operated in the nine-
teenth century and early twentieth century rather than to a hege-
monic conspiracy theory of female subordination. Similarly we 
should look to social and political shifts in the access of women to 
literacy and to independent incomes, that is, to the means of literary 
production as well as to the now-dominant market of female book 
buyers and readers, to explain the emergence of a contemporary cat-
egory of Australian women writers in the sub-field. What is interest-
ing about the emergence of this category is that the retrospective 
gender-based anthology does neither. Instead it constructs a tradition 
in which 'Australian women writers' were always there, waiting to 
'represent' all women. It is to this retrospective construction that I 
now want to turn, before looking at the way anthologies construct a 
canon of 'contemporary Australian women's writing' on this tradi-
tional base. 
Revisionist anthologies by Connie Burns and Marygai 
McNamara and by Dale Spender, both published in 1988, are typical 
of the 1980s construction of the tradition of short fiction by 
Australian women. Common to both projects is the tendency to 
reify 'the tradition' as a positive object which is situated by the an-
thology introduction in some kind of contest with its supposed op-
posite, short fiction by Australian men. The central characteristic of 
this reifying tendency is on the one hand the construction of a co-
herent corpus of previously marginalised 'women's short fiction,' 
finally privileged in the content of the anthologies, and on the other 
the construction in the anthology introductions of `men's short fic-
tion' which is supposed to be generically uniform, 'mainstream,' and 
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in some way an active force in the 'eclipsing' of women's writing. I 
shall attempt here to single out some of the strategies used in the 
simultaneous construction of the positive object, 'Australian wom-
en's short fiction,' and its supposed eclipsing other, 'Australian 
men's short fiction.' 
The cosmological metaphor governing Connie Burns and 
Marygai McNamara's anthology Eclipsed uses exactly the kind of 
naturalising strategy that is a typical feature of anthologies, else-
where expressed by geographical, curatorial or organic tropes, as I 
have tried to show in Chapter Four. In the case of Eclipsed, 
[t]his anthology brings to light the creative ability of 
Australian women writers who have been 'eclipsed' in 
the traditional study of Australian fiction. 5 
The usefulness of the naturalising strategy is that it submerges the 
function of the anthology as the apparatus that constructs its own 
positive object beneath the apparent function which is merely to 
'bring to light' an object which always existed but was merely some-
how previously unavailable. So far as Eclipsed is concerned, this ob-
ject is the coherent body of work by 'Australian women writers.' 6 
But Burns and McNamara's cosmological metaphor does double 
duty here, both naturalising Australian women's writing as a coher-
ent object and naturalising its antithetical relation to its eclipsing 
other, 'Australian men's writing.' 
It is only this other body that obscures Australian women's 
writing and which the anthology figuratively removes in order to 
reveal its object to the reader. Burns and McNamara derive consid-
erable leverage for their project from their figuring of the role of the 
anthology simultaneously as the moment at which the eclipse 
passes and as the site in which the previously eclipsed object is to be 
found. Doing both at the same time suppresses the constitutive role 
of the anthology as the content-forming temporary agreement on 
whatever counts as the tradition of Australian women's writing that 
results from two editors working for their own interests and the in-
terests of the publishers of the anthology in the literary field. 
The naturalising of the contents of Eclipsed that results from 
the figurative removal of the eclipsing object relies on an imagined 
object, 'Australian men's writing,' and its imagined removal. The 
anthology could be thought to remove this object to the extent that it 
selects no texts by men but this does not constitute removal, merely 
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absence, nor does it prove the coherent objectivity of 'Australian 
men's writing' either in itself or as an obstacle to an Australian 
women's writing whose coherence remains equally doubtful. 
'Australian men's writing' remains for Burns and McNamara only a 
positively absent object, defined only by its 'overshadowing' of 
women's writing. But in constructing this object the editors are un-
able or reluctant to construct any positive content. Women's writing 
is not overshadowed by any specific men's writing but by the imag-
ined 'beliefs and conventions that have promoted men's writing for 
the last two hundred years' (Burns and McNamara, eds Eclipsed, ix). 
Such a claim acknowledges the constructed and contested character 
of cultural production: men's writing dominates the literary field as 
a result of particular beliefs and conventions that determine the 
matrix of practices in the field. But this is not an admission of the 
social basis of production. Rather, it targets the dominance of men's 
cultural products as social constructions determined by 'beliefs and 
conventions that promote men's writing' but naturalises women's 
cultural products as unproblematically positive ones: the beliefs and 
conventions that have promoted `men's writing' prevent 'women's 
writing' - which is writing that just does exist - from shining. In 
order to naturalise their object Burns and McNamara need to avoid 
specifying any particular 'men's texts.' Men's texts' operate simply as 
a generalised and coherent category of texts that obstruct 'women's 
texts': to itemise them would risk undermining both their supposed 
coherence and their supposed obstructiveness. 
The absence of 'Australian men's writing,' however, does not 
diminish its strategic function in the anthology as the obstacle 
which has until now denied readers access to Australian women's 
writing. Without 'Australian men's writing,' it turns out, 
Australian women's writing, 
has always been there; it has just been lost from sight. 
Australians have not had ready access to this eclipsed 
wealth of Australian women's fiction. This anthology 
helps to correct this by bringing a sampling of Australian 
women's fiction back into the light. (ix) 
Burns and McNamara, by admitting to the function of their anthol-
ogy in bringing the natural object called 'Australian women's fiction' 
to light, foreground the politicised nature of the anthology as an at-
tempted canon revision. But in so doing they plead guilty, so to 
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speak, to the lesser charge in order to submerge the problematic basis 
of their 'sampling' of Australian women's fiction and avoid a few 
sticky questions. On what basis, for example, is the anthology a sam-
ple, on what basis is material selected from the supposed 'eclipsed 
wealth of Australian women's fiction,' and what exactly is the im-
plied larger object of which the anthology is supposed to be a sam-
ple? Further, when it is 'this anthology' rather than Burns and 
McNamara that 'helps' to bring 'women's fiction back into the light,' 
the editors are able to suppress their own agency in determining the 
anthology contents and at the same time suggest that the light that 
their anthology 'brings Australian women's fiction back into' is a 
natural and general object when, in fact, the exposure that they at-
tempt to achieve for their object is as constructed as the object itself. 
The eclipse trope allows Burns and McNamara to avoid the 
appearance of constructing their object because the anthology ap-
pears to be not so much a selection as a residue which remains after 
they have 'brought to light the creative ability of Australian women 
writers who have been 'eclipsed' in the traditional study of 
Australian fiction.' But subordinate to and welded onto the natural-
ising trope is a concern with the institutional status of their object, 
'Australian women's fiction.' This appears to be an object not so 
much because of its status as eclipsed or else brought to light, much 
as the anthology introduction makes of this, but because its status as 
content rests on the fact that it has 'been 'eclipsed' in the traditional 
study of Australian fiction.' The construction of 'the tradition' is cen-
tral to the project of Burns and McNamara. 
The emphasis of this anthology is on the tradition of 
women's writing. It is the women writers of the past who 
have been previously neglected ... [and] we tended to 
select those works more relevant to traditional women's 
concerns as these were often the very works that had been 
neglected in the past. ()di) 
As well, l[t]his anthology has tried to make the tradition of 
Australian women's fiction more accessible' (xv). The questions, of 
course, are what kind of access does the anthology provide and to 
what kind of tradition? 
The retrospective construction of a previously inaccessible 
tradition, while it appears to be paradoxical, becomes conceivable 
when it is located as an institutional practice, typically in terms of 
177 
literary study according to the rules of academic literary practice, as 
Burns and McNamara suggest in their emphasis on 'the traditional 
study of Australian fiction.' Traditional study' makes it possible to 
think of their paradoxical newly-minted tradition of Australian 
women's fiction according to the rules of academic literary practice. 
Like a syllabus list, their anthology projects a sense of the unity of 
Australian women's fiction as an object for study within a pedagogi-
cal, literary-critical framework. And this unified object is open to a 
kind of 'traditional study' or scrutiny of one kind or another (Burns 
and McNamara do not specify) that typifies general academic textual 
practices of the kind engaged in by critics and students of texts. The 
anthology, then, is located in terms of its own traditions but these 
are only the traditions of study, in other words, traditions of the aca-
demic institution, not the traditions of 'Australian women,' if such a 
homogeneous group exists. In constructing this kind of tradition 
Burns and McNamara 
suppress ... the context of a cultural work's production and 
consumption ... [and] produce ... the illusion that 'our' cul-
ture (or the culture of the 'other') is transmitted simply by 
contact with the works themselves. (Guillory, Cultural 
Capital, 43) 
That the retrospective construction of a tradition of Australian 
women's fiction does this is not to say that previous anthologies of 
fiction necessarily selected a somehow more genuine content that 
faithfully connected to the context in which that content was origi-
nally produced and consumed. All cultural products including short 
fiction anthologies are always arbitrary constructions that are suited 
to one social setting or another, always producing, in John Guillory's 
terms, one illusion or another about 'our' culture or the culture of 
the 'other.' Guillory's point is that the academic literary syllabus, and 
likewise the anthology, deracinates the cultural object (Australian 
women's fiction) in order to stitch together its own homogenous or, 
as Guillory puts it, speciously unified tradition (34 and 42-43). 
In Eclipsed, as in all anthologies, Burns and McNamara do ex-
actly this, constructing a homogenous tradition of Australian wom-
en's writing for the purposes of literary study, at the same time sup-
pressing their involvement in the process of 'bringing to light' the 
'eclipsed wealth of Australian women's fiction.' But how this wealth 
is defined, like all discovered treasures, depends precisely on who 
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brings it to light and whose light is doing the illuminating, on how 
they preserve and display it and on who gets to write about it. 
While Burns and McNamara attempt to suppress the role of 
the anthology in the construction of Australian women's writing, 
Dale Spender usefully if somewhat ingenuously implicates herself, 
foregrounding the function of her own 'respectable' anthology, T he 
Penguin Anthology of Australian Women's Writing, as a means of 
establishing the category Australian women's writing. 7 
Only when all the women writers of Australia are 
brought together is it possible to identify common pat-
terns and themes, and to speak of a distinctive female lit-
erary tradition. Yet surprisingly, this simple exercise of 
gathering the women together and of constructing their 
tradition has not been undertaken before. (Spender, ed. 
Penguin Anthology of Australian Women's Writing, xiii, 
emphasis added) 
Spender is right in claiming that no anthology before 1988 had 
attempted to construct a tradition of Australian women's writing, 
and in claiming that it is by identifying common patterns in some 
group of texts that she is able to claim the right to distinguish a 
female tradition, presumably one that is different from a male one. 
Her assertion is most useful, however, for what it assumes 
about this process. Spender pretends, for a start, that the anthology is 
the site at which 'all the women writers of Australia' [and shouldn't 
that be texts by all the women writers?] are brought together.' But 
Spender's content is by no means exhaustive, and the problem of se-
lection is something that she later acknowledges (xxviii-xxix). It is 
Spender's content, secondly, that determines the sort of 'common 
patterns and themes' she is able to identify, 'identifying' here taking 
on the meaning of 'discovering' positive, objective features which 
'emerge' (xxviii) from the content. By emphasising the explicit func-
tion of the anthology in constructing the tradition of Australian 
women's writing, however, Spender is able to suppress the con-
structedness of the object (the anthology contents) from which she 
appears only to construct a tradition. But the kind of content she de-
cides on (and against) fundamentally determines any sort of tradi-
tion she might like to make. So it is no surprise 'to find women's 
views and values at the centre of the literary stage' (xiv) when it is 
the project of the anthology to situate them in precisely this way. 8 
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And Spender's conclusion pretends that the exercise of identifying 
'common patterns and themes' (based on her subjectively deter-
mined content) is sufficient to define a 'distinctive female literary 
tradition.' 
Spender devotes a considerable part of her introduction to 
supporting this false claim. For example: 
[i]f the women do not feature in the mainstream literary 
records, it cannot be because they have not written or be-
cause what they have written does not warrant inclusion 
... their omission is ... a reflection of their refusal to con-
form to the masculine image of the mainstream (xiii, 
emphasis added); 
women's writing provides another, often subversive per-
spective (xvii, emphasis added); 
this collection ... assumes the unfair treatment accorded to 
the writing of Australian women (xxxi); 
and 
when they are placed together ... it can be seen that it is the 
norm and not the exception for women authors to raise 
their voices against female subordination. (xxxiii) 
Like Burns and McNamara, Spender constructs an imaginary other, 
in this case the dominant, conventional, canonical, masculine 
mainstream, in order to situate her object, Australian women's writ-
ing, as an oppositional kind of cultural product and position in the 
literary field. By making this assertion, Spender constructs not only 
her object but also the mechanism by which it was supposedly sup-
pressed. Non-selection of Australian women's writing in previous 
anthologies is the result of the subversiveness of female writers 
who, as a consequence, become retrospectively oppositional, the vic-
tims of a conspiracy by dominant male writers.9 
While Spender relies on the same strategy as Burns and 
McNamara, sketching her own absent other, 'Australian men's writ-
ing,' her account is more sophisticated because she constructs at the 
same time the oppositional 'solidarity' of her selected content: wom-
en's writing is not by definition simply subversive but coherently so 
because 
women have focussed on the price of inhumanity and the 
shared experience of sisterhood .... That this particular tra- 
dition of censure, subversion and solidarity stands outside 
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the dominant conventions is no doubt a contributing fac-
tor in the disqualification of women from the canon. 
(xxxii) 
Spender fails, however, to specify the dominant conventions of her 
imagined category, Australian men's writing, and does not show 
how it ignores 'the price of inhumanity,' a difficult proposition to 
defend. She has difficulties with the logic of her propositions too. 
Who or what is it, for example, that women writers have censured 
or subverted and equally who or what is it that men writers have 
failed to censure or subvert? And if we suppose for a moment that 
Spender's men writers have in fact failed to censure or subvert 
something or other it remains unclear in Spender's account how 
this failure maintains the dominant conventions (presumably of 
Australian literature), whatever these conventions might be in par-
ticular. Just why 'solidarity' goes with 'censure' and 'subversion' in 
Spender's account is simply a category mistake: while a collective of 
agents might claim solidarity for themselves as a group because of 
their tendency to censure and subvert the prevailing social order so 
might a collective of complacent agents who are happy to maintain 
it. And just why solidarity, along with the tendency to censuring and 
subverting, is a feature of women writers and not of men writers 
remains unclear. It would appear that men writers possess no such 
solidarity despite their 'mainstream domination' of the literary field. 
Spender presents herself with the rather odd paradox that 
men's writing is at the same time lacking solidarity and a conspira-
torial force in the disqualification of women's writing. While this 
has its problems it allows her to present a coherent positive object 
that has dominated women's writing, 'Australian men's writing,' 
without ever having to specify its contents. Australian men's writ-
ing is simply what Australian women's writing is not. Australian 
women's writing, for example, does not romanticise the bush while 
Australian men's writing presumably does (xviii). The strategic 
function of defining the object in this way is that Spender is able to 
weld her object, Australian women's writing, as constituted by her 
selected personnel, onto the powerfully charged perception of 
women as until now politically dominated or else disadvantaged by 
men.") As a result Australian men's writing has until now some-
how 'disqualified' Australian women's writing. 0 
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Spender's account does more, however, than simply position 
Australian women's writing as the voice concerned with 'the price 
of inhumanity,' censuring and subverting the dominant conven-
tions in the cultural products of men (if this is what she means in 
the quotation from page 32 above). It positions this writing - 'a 
distinctive female literary tradition' - as literature. To do so is to 
claim for Australian women's writing, Spender's constructed object, 
a highly consecrated (Spender would say canonical) status in the lit-
erary field and, by the way, to claim for Spender and her anthologis-
ing projects a position as an authoritative consecrating agent while 
doing so. What makes Spender's selection particularly literary re-
mains unclear, as it does in any anthology which lays claim to the 
power to consecrating (or deciding what counts as) 'literature': 
Spender's 'literature' just is what is objectified as literature in the an-
thology introduction and specified in the contents of the anthology, 
and possesses force so long as the introductory claim and contents 
are taken up by agents ready to deploy them for their own purposes 
in the literary field. 
Both the process of constructing the object, Australian wom-
en's writing, and the process of promoting the anthology as the 
proper site for this object are deeply embedded in Spender's intro-
duction, as they are in any anthology introduction. What marks 
Spender's construction of her object so clearly, however, is her at-
tempt to draw the battle lines in the literary field in terms of gender 
- women's writing opposed to men's - rather than in terms of na-
tion. But the construction of a category like Australian short fiction 
is equally political, equally dependent on the particular conditions of 
the field from which the category emerges or, better, struggles, 
equally the result of the specific projects of subjective agents. But the 
construction of a category like Australian short fiction seems to be a 
less obvious process than the construction of Australian women's 
writing because the category relies on a more or less naturalised and 
therefore apparently objective conception of nation rather than the 
contentious conception of gender. What makes Spender's anthology 
so useful is that it represents one moment in the attempt to natu-
ralise gender as a basic concept with which agents in the literary field 
negotiate texts. 
Spender constructs her content along the lines of gender, as 
though her anthology incorporates 'all the women writers of 
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Australia' (xiii) by opposing it to an imaginary, unspecified and ab-
sent other, Australian men's writing. The anthology does not, of 
course, incorporate all the women writers of Australia or even texts 
by all of them. Spender delays any explanation of the process of se-
lection and organisation until page 28, fifteen pages after her 
assertion that her anthology brings all the women writers of 
Australia together. How does she narrow down the field? For a start, 
no Australian woman writer born after the arbitrarily chosen date of 
1939 is selected (xxix). And writers whose texts are already known 
and easily found are not selected. As a consequence the anthology 
constructs a particular sort of 'tradition' with writers like Germaine 
Greer, for example, but not Elizabeth Jolley, Barbara Baynton but not 
Judith Wright, and without recent writers born after 1939. Spender's 
'tradition' presents clear problems. Women writers born after 1939 
can be expected to persist in 'focussing on the price of inhumanity' 
just like those born before 1939, thus making it difficult to specify 
what is distinctive about the 'distinctive female literary tradition' of 
women writers born before 1939. There appear to be two 'distinctive 
female literary traditions,' namely, Spender's tradition as con-
structed in her anthology and the tradition of those women writers 
who appear to have been frequently anthologised elsewhere. Not 
least of all, Spender uncovers the considerable problem she faces in 
constructing a tradition which is, by definition, a way of thinking or 
acting or body of knowledge accumulated and handed down over 
time rather than constituted in Spender's single moment. 
For all the problems involved in her project, it is useful to 
consider this moment. Spender organises the anthology 'in order to 
show the ways in which the writing of Australian women [at least 
the ones born before 1939 and not previously selected in the 
"mainstream" anthologies of male editors] has grown and devel-
oped' (xxviii). To do this she presents the texts 'in chronological se-
quence based on the date of the author's birth ... [which] allows for 
the overall pattern to emerge and for the tradition to be constructed' 
(xxviii-xxix). While at first it appears that the overall pattern 
emerges from this material, which only means that the pattern 
emerges in a certain way according to the organisation of the mate-
rial, Spender's constitutive model soon confuses the process: 'the 
material,' it turns out, 'should reflect the range of genres and styles 
which are embodied in the Australian heritage' (xxix). What is sup- 
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posed, at first, to look like a pattern deductively emerging from a 
(problematic) list becomes, after all, a previously existing object - 
'the Australian heritage' - now inductively demonstrated by that 
list. Spender's tradition, not surprisingly, is constructed not as it 
emerges from her selection but as it is dictated by her model. But the 
interesting feature of the ambivalence, where at first 'the overall pat-
tern emerges from the material' and then 'the material reflects the 
genres and styles embodied in the Australian heritage,' lies in the 
rhetorical purchase Spender gains from the confusion. If in 
Spender's account the tradition is embodied by the material and the 
material is embodied by the tradition, whatever embarrassment this 
might cause to a logically-minded editor, her anthology at least be-
comes the moment where the embodying is done. 12 
The positioning of the anthology itself as a major moment in 
the construction of the object, Australian women's writing, depends 
on the claim to the over-determining significance of the literary 
field that usually follows this claim. 13 Spender devotes considerable 
space in her introduction to claiming this significance for the literary 
field in general and her anthology in particular. 'It is affirming,' she 
believes and, given her selective project, not surprising, `to find 
women's views and values at the centre of the literary stage shaping 
the issues and the form of expression' (xiv, emphasis added); but 
then, 'it is through the accumulated wisdom of the women writers 
presented here that the values of the culture can be reflected, and 
revised, and reaffirmed' (xxiii, emphasis added) and, rather more 
ambitiously, it appears that the women in the collection 'all recog-
nised the crucial role that literature could play in shaping a society' 
(xxxiii, emphasis added). Exactly how Spender knows that each 
writer recognised this crucial role remains a mystery, but what is 
significant about the claims is that 'the values' at the centre of the 
literary field are supposed to determine 'the values of the culture,' 
and indeed to 'shape society.' Whether or not such a claim is taken 
seriously by agents operating outside the literary field, Spender's 
claim that Australian women's writing determines the 'values of 
the culture' which 'shape society' across other fields has the effect of 
implying at least the centrality of that object in the literary field. 
And, needless to say, claiming such centrality for her object in gen-
eral also claims Spender's centrality in the literary field. 
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Spender's project in The Penguin Anthology of Australian 
Women's Writing is a kind of canon revision which attempts to es-
tablish the tradition of Australian women's writing and the central-
ity of this object and its representative texts in the literary field. The 
oppositional terms used by Spender are, I suggest, borrowed from 
the earlier project to establish a contemporary body of texts by 
women. I say 'the earlier project' with some caution, however, given 
that anthologies of contemporary writing by women do not neces-
sarily attempt to construct or revise the canon or even attempt to 
construct similar kinds of categories or objects like 'women's short 
fiction.' 
For the purposes of discussion I have arranged four antholo-
gies of fiction by Australian women in chronological sequence based 
on the date of publication. This does not, however, allow for any 
'overall pattern to emerge' or for any kind of conspiracy theory to be 
constructed. If there is any consistent thread in the anthologies it is 
in the claim to the heterodox character of any collection of the short 
fiction of Australian women writers. More importantly, by arrang-
ing the anthologies in chronological order I want to show how it is 
difficult to construct a developmental model to explain the strong 
position of contemporary Australian women short fiction writers in 
the literary field. If anything, it is possible to make the case that an-
thologies present an incoherent and non-developmental account of 
Australian women short fiction writers. Anthologies simply do not 
make a concerted attempt to canonise any coherent group of 
Australian female short fiction writers. What they do, however, is to 
maintain the general category called 'Australian women writers' in 
the literary field. 
Against the grain of any model I might like to propose regard-
ing the progression or development of anthologies of Australian 
women writers of short fiction, Anna Gibbs and Alison Tilson's 1982 
Frictions, the earliest anthology I shall discuss, is also the most so-
phisticated. Gibbs and Tilson begin their introduction usefully by 
emphasising the problematic character of their project: it's diffi-
cult to define what makes a "feminist writer," in the course of 
editing this book we've found it equally difficult to define 'feminist 
writing'!" And it is exactly the choices they make, they insist, that 
construct 'feminist writing' as a category. Gibbs and Tilson take great 
pains to problematise their anthology, first of all because 'all writing 
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is political - including the kind that wishes to appear neutral - and 
because] "making sense" of something is a social (and therefore 
political) procedure' (Gibbs and Tilson, eds Frictions, 2), and secondly 
to emphasise the material conditions of textual production: 
Itlextual production' is an effect of both writing a nd read-
ing, and the term also emphasises the material conditions 
under which writing is circulated. Publishing houses and 
distribution networks determine not only which writing 
circulates publicly, but how it does so. The cover of a book 
tells people which section of the bookshop or library it fits 
in, whether it's fiction or non-fiction, belongs to 'high' or 
'popular' culture - tells people, in short, how to read it. 
For us, to publish with a feminist press is to indicate the 
kind of intervention we wish to make into various social, 
political and literary economies. (2) 
And my approving quotation here indicates how well the editors 
appeal to a certain kind of audience. 
By problematising their project, the editors foreground their 
position as agents in the consecration of certain texts, and in so do-
ing circumvent the sorts of criticisms I have already mounted 
against other editors. Frictions constructs a self-consciously prob-
lematic and anti-positivist category of heterogeneous works by 
women which, the editors hope, will generate frictions one with an-
other so that the contents are never fixed or controlled. But this does 
not release their project from the same sorts of constitutive func-
tions as the other anthologies that I have already considered. To use 
the terms provided by Gibbs and Tilson, Frictions, however self-con-
scious, is an intervention in the literary field which constructs a 
body of feminist (or, problematically, 'feminist') and 'anti-tradition-
al' (3) texts characterised largely by experimentation. But the anthol-
ogy also includes more conventionally structured narrative pieces by 
frequently anthologised 'mainstream' writers like Elizabeth Jolley, 
Sheila Anderson and Kate Llewellyn. Frictions is not, however, 
'mainstream': it seeks to 'over-represent' texts by women because 
'women are still under-represented in most mainstream antholo-
gies' (2, emphasis added). Like Spender's mainstream, the main-
stream trope used by Gibbs and Tilson projects the contents of the 
anthology in a relation of opposition, except here it is 'feminist' and 
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experimental opposition to its imaginary other, presumably 'non-
feminist' and traditional anthologies. 
While the absent mainstream to be opposed is a less obvious 
strategy in Frictions than in The Penguin Anthology of Australian 
Women's Writing, it works in substantially the same way, provid-
ing an imaginary other in order to project what Frictions is not. 
More significantly, Gibbs and Tilson mount an untenable model of 
anthologies as representations. But what sort of representation is it 
that Frictions provides, and for whom? Let's suppose that by inter-
vening in a small press publication like Sybylla with a small if de-
voted clientele of readers the editors may succeed in 'over-represent-
ing' a certain group of texts by certain women for certain other 
women. In such a case Frictions indeed represents, that is, shapes 
and presents, the texts of a small group of producers for a slightly 
larger group of consumers, including those producers. This is typi-
cally the case for producers of 'high art' in the cultural field or, as 
Pierre Bourdieu calls it, in the sub-field of restricted production in 
the field of cultural production, 'in which producers produce for 
other producers,' typically according to 
a generalised game of 'loser wins', on a systematic inver-
sion of the fundamental principles of all ordinary 
economies: that of business (it excludes the pursuit of 
profit and does not guarantee any sort of correspondence 
between investments and monetary gains), that of power 
(it condemns honours and temporal greatness), and even 
that of institutionalised authority (the absence of any aca-
demic training or consecration may be considered a 
virtue). 15 
The largely experimental contents, restricted distribution and mar-
keting of Frictions as a hard-edged, abrasive book with an upbeat 
black and white cover signal the anti-popular position of Gibbs and 
Tilson's intervention at the 'restricted' edge of the literary field. 
Frictions, in other words, is functionally opposed to popular prod-
ucts, including anthologies like Spender's Penguin series which at-
tempt - even if they fail - to reach a wide market of consumers in 
what Bourdieu calls the field of large-scale production. 
Given its position as a restricted product for a small group of 
consumers, what sort of representativeness can Gibbs and Tilson 
claim? The anthology can claim representational validity only for its 
187 
restricted producers and consumers, but not for 'women' and, as the 
editors warn in their problematising of `feminism,' not even for 
'feminists.' But the anthology cannot even be called a site for repre-
sentation. First of all, the restricted scope of the anthology, like the 
restricted scope of the university literature syllabus and the imagi-
nary canon it constructs, is not a representative place. Further, 
'representation' as it is misapplied to anthologies by Gibbs and 
Tilson pretends that anthologies are representative places, as though 
the texts selected are 'immediately expressive,' as John Guillory puts 
it, 'of the author's experience as a representative member of some 
social group' (Guillory, Cultural Capital, 10) and as though the 
institutional practices according to which the anthology is consumed 
are equally available to all (in this case, all women) along the lines of 
some kind of democratic model (30 and 37). Clearly this is not the 
case: Frictions counts as an intervention in the literary field and 
possibly in the political field as well for a specific social group. Of 
course, this is not to say that the project of the editors in 
representing a certain list of texts by certain writers for a restricted 
field of consumers is irrelevant, only that it is restricted. But it is 
false and misleading to suggest that this makes Frictions 
representative in any wider sense. The interesting function of the 
claim to representativeness is that it locates Frictions, in a move 
which I have attempted to show is typical of anthologies, as an 
intervention in the literary field as though the literary field over-
determines social relations across other fields. Such a move by Gibbs 
and Tilson, a move similarly made by Spender, repeats the ambit 
claim made by Harry Heseltine in his Penguin Book of Australian 
Short Stories, a claim that has the strategic effect of claiming for the 
anthology a central place in the literary field at least. 
While the misconception of representation in Frictions serves 
a useful function in attempting to position the anthology at the cen- 
tre of the literary field, Elizabeth Riddell's highly problematic con- 
ception of representation in her introduction to Suzanne Falkiner's 
Room to Move appears to have stymied the entire project. 
There are thirty-two stories in this collection and accord-
ing to my cherished principles, which are against discrim-
ination and segregation in the literary life, sixteen of them 
should be by women and sixteen by men. However, ... 
men have had the best publishing chances in this country 
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• from the time of colonisation up to the second World 
War, and ... it is still easier for a second rate male writer to 
get into print than it is for a first rate female writer to do 
the same. 1 6 
If it is curious that she discriminates and segregates even though she 
is opposed to this in principle, Riddell at least foregrounds the fact 
that some kind of principle determines the selection. 17 In this case it 
appears to be a kind of affirmative action in favour of writers who 
are women, an attempt to make it easier for 'first rate female writers' 
to get into print. Riddell quickly adds that 'she would ideally prefer 
writers to be writers, without dividing them into sexes' but is pre-
pared to discriminate on the basis of sex (Riddell, 'Introduction,' in 
Falkiner, ed. Room to Move, vii). When she does this, Riddell 
thinks of the short story anthology as a site in which various 
individuals might be chosen to represent or not to represent a social 
group (in this case, women). The anthology, that is, pretends to be a 
kind of representation which misconceives representation as 
though all women are represented by it. 
This is a misconception of representation for two reasons, as I 
have tried to show above. Anthologies, firstly, are not wide-reaching 
artefacts in the political field but reasonably specialist ones, produced 
and consumed in the literary field frequently although not always in 
a setting dictated by pedagogical instruction. And, secondly, the fic-
tion selected for anthologies is not necessarily immediately expres-
sive - that is, representative - of the experiences of individuals as 
members of particular social groups. But when Riddell presents 'first 
rate female writers' in print and 'divides writers into sexes' she 
transports into the literary field an imaginary role for the anthology. 
Room to Move becomes an imaginary site in which the sorts of 
struggles over resources and privileges typical in the political field 
take place. So when a text fails to be selected it is not simply a result 
of making discriminations between texts - choosing this story but 
not that story - but a discrimination in the political sense against the 
writer, supposedly against 'first rate female writers.' It is possible to 
think this because the text is not thought to be an artefact mediated 
by a range of cultural agents and mediating between them at all but 
rather, as Guillory puts it, is thought to be immediately expressive of 
the writer's experience as a representative member of some social 
group (Guillory, Cultural Capital, 10). As far as Riddell is concerned, 
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the text is the unmediated consciousness of an individual who 
represents women. 
If Riddell's view of discrimination usefully reveals the over-
determined political bias of the anthology, it helps to conceal the 
other functions typical of anthologies which construct the appar-
ently unproblematic, objective category, in this case 'Australian 
women's short stories.' Riddell emphasises the view that what gives 
a text value is 'getting into print' and the 'critical acclaim or popular 
interest' that goes with this (Riddell, 'Introduction,' in Falkiner, ed. 
Room to Move, ix-x), 'dividing writers into sexes' in order to 
promote women by giving them 'the best publishing chances' that 
men have been supposed previously to enjoy. But she suppresses 
the role of Room to Move itself in determining who decides which 
writers are 'first rate' and 'second rate.' When 'it is still easier for a 
second rate male writer to get into print than it is for a first rate 
female writer to do the same,' getting into print' becomes a kind of 
discrimination typical of the political field: male writers 'got into 
print' because men dominated the political field. But at the same 
time 'getting into print' is the objective of the anthology itself, which 
attempts to redress the imbalance by discriminating in favour of fe-
male writers who are presumably 'first rate.' 
The charge that previous anthologies have promoted 'second 
rate male writers' at the expense of 'first rate female writers' gives 
Room to Move great leverage in claiming the right to consecrate cer-
tain agents in the literary field. Riddell in her introduction and 
Falkiner in her chosen content are able to demonstrate their 'first 
rate' writers: Falkiner selects texts by writers who, following the in-
troduction, can only be thought of as, in her opinion, the 'first rate' 
or at least the 'best thirty two,' whose work 'represent[s] a balanced 
selection of modern writing by Australian women' and is 'simply 
the best of the stories submitted' (Falkiner, 'Preface,' in Fallciner, ed. 
Room to Move, xi). At the same time, Riddell is able to suppress the 
role of the anthology in promoting these writers because the 'first 
rateness' of some female writers appears to have existed before they 
'got into print,' that is, when they were denied publication in favour 
of 'second rate male writers.' In other words, Riddell is able to have 
her cake and eat it. 'First rate' writers exist whether they get into 
print or not, previously having 'never attracted the critical acclaim 
or popular interest they deserve' (Riddell, 'Introduction,' in 
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Falkiner, ed. Room to Move, ix-x). At the same time publications 
like Room to Move appear merely to confirm the list of the new 
'first rate' who deserve 'critical acclaim and popular interest' in a 
revision of the old 'first rate' male writers who become today's 
'second rate.' 
Riddell's introduction also suppresses the constitutive 
function of the anthology in determining that there are thirty-two 
'first rate female writers' whose work makes up 'Australian 
women's short stories.' Why a limit of thirty-two is appropriate, 
who determined this limit and for what reason remains unclear. 
Riddell's opening claim that 'sixteen of the stories should be by 
women and sixteen by men,' rather than exposing the problematic 
status of the anthology, helps to submerge it. By presenting the 
possibility that the contents could be divided between men and 
women with sixteen stories apiece and then scotching it, Riddell 
presents the illusion that female writers are now well served, 
having the whole cake instead of half. This allows Riddell to 
construct her positive object - there are Australian women's short 
stories - and give value to it - a good collection of female writers 
'just does' need about thirty-two stories because this sort, of 
affirmative action doubles what they usually get. 
What is unusual about Room to Move is that the political bias 
in its construction of Australian women's short stories is both af-
firmed and denied. The anthology presents itself as an attempt to 
promote the writing of women on the basis that 'men have had the 
best publishing chances in this country' because the literary field is 
over-determined by the sexual discrimination that operates in the 
economic, political and other fields which 'still makes it easier for a 
second rate male writer to get into print than for a first rate female 
writer to do the same.' Room to Move in this instance is an inter-
vention in the literary field by political agents operating with a fem-
inist ideology imported from the political field who attempt to des-
ignate and consecrate representatives for women in the literary field. 
At the same time the anthology presents itself as 'simply' a collec-
tion of 'the best of the stories submitted.' In this version, where l[n]o 
effort was made to select stories that represented names, categories 
or political beliefs' (xi), Room to Move is simply a disinterested cul-
tural product operating according to the rules of the now-au-
tonomous literary field. 
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Gillian Whitlock's emphatically conditional and non-repre-
sentative Eight Voices of the Eighties is, given her choice to select a 
variety of genres by only eight women writers, a much more careful, 
self-conscious and problematising project. Whitlock is careful to 
stress the conditional status of her anthology. 
This anthology presents a selection of stories, criticism, 
reviews, interviews and commentaries from the most re- 
cent work of eight Australian women writers: Jessica 
Anderson, Thea Astley, Beverley Farmer, Helen Garner, 
Kate Grenville, Barbara Hanrahan, Elizabeth Jolley and 
Olga Masters. Together these stories and prose writing 
present an array of different kinds of writing and different 
perspectives upon women's writing in Australia now.I 8 
Like Gibbs and Tilson, Whitlock situates her project in the matrix of 
institutional practices that produce various cultural commodities 
('popular fiction,' canonical literature,' women's writing,' and so 
on) and consecrate them for consumption in various ways ('reading 
for pleasure,' intensive reading,' oppositional reading,' and so on). 
Texts, Whitlock explains, are commodities that are produced, mar-
keted, consumed and always subject to the reorientations produced 
by academic, journalistic and publishing institutions over time 
(Whitlock, ed. Eight Voices of the Eighties, xiv). 19 
Whitlock's particular orientation is quite calculated: the con-
ditional content and arbitrary status of her Eight Voices is specifically 
opposed to Spender's transhistorical construction, in The Penguin 
Anthology of Australian Women's Writing, of 'a distinctive female 
literary tradition' of oppositional solidarity in which women's writ-
ing uniformly attempts to subvert male-domination, an opposition-
ally defined positive object I have already attempted to problematise 
above (xix). So far as Whitlock is concerned, 
[i]n describing these eight writers as a community of 
women who are located quite specifically in the terrain of 
white, middle class feminism, we are not negating the 
transforming power of their desire but we are bypassing a 
tendency to subsume women into one sisterly category of 
'woman' despite real differences of race, class and histori-
cal condition. (xxi, emphasis added) 
This tendency, and Spender is the target here, 'scripts [women's] sto- 
ries into a continuing and transhistorical Australian female aes- 
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the tic' (xxi).20 In contrast, Eight Voices merely presents eight voices 
of the eighties, almost always avoiding the problematic claim typical 
of anthology introductions that the anthology contents represent 
some social group or other. This 'bypasses a tendency to subsume 
women into one sisterly category of "woman" but does it bypass the 
tendency of the anthology to construct a positive object? Whitlock 
does not construct an imaginary Australian men's writing or opposi-
tional 'mainstream' against which her eight writers stand, but her 
eight writers are constructed as voices. The disparate material which 
she collects and presents in the volume becomes, like every text, a 
body of work, in this instance characterised as the voices of a c o m-
m unity of white, middle class women. But to what extent can the 
eight selected writers be said to speak on behalf of white, middle 
class feminism and in what sense do the chosen texts by the eight 
writers possess a voice (or even eight voices)? 
The uniformity imposed on Whitlock's eight voices is the 
product of the institutional practices embedded in the way 'writers' 
are thought about. Whitlock chooses eight cultural producers who 
tended in the eighties to write fiction. She then organises her se-
lected texts with fiction in mind. Welded onto this core of fiction 
texts are other kinds of text — 'criticism, reviews, interviews and 
commentaries' — which function to broaden the terrain, to suggest 
the wider concerns of the selected writers and to provide a context or 
even a biographical background against which the fiction might be 
read. But the anthology privileges fiction by organising its material 
around fiction writers who produced other kinds of text rather than 
around, say, reviewers who also produced fiction. By doing so 
Whitlock, for all her care in attempting to locate the selected writers 
'in the terrain of white, middle class feminism' which aims to avoid 
the 'tendency to subsume women into one sisterly category,' is un-
able to maintain the radically contingent status of her material as the 
product of institutional practices and subjective choices and, instead, 
slips into a positivism where the texts become fictionally-defined 
voices expressive of (eight) forms of consciousness. In doing so she 
suppresses the problematic status of her project as a grouping to-
gether of otherwise radically contingent texts. In other words, she 
suppresses the fact that her texts are only made coherent because 
readers are offered a position from which to make certain judge-
ments, supposing that the texts present coherent, psychologically 
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motivated voices. As well, and like all anthologies, Eight Voices 
constructs its material as a canonical embodiment. 
It seems both disingenuous and misleading to deny no-
tions of a canon when dealing with these eight writers 
who have so obviously represented the acceptable and 
popular face of women's writing in Australia. (xvii) 
The anthology, it turns out, does collect together 
'representatives' of 'women's writing in Australia.' The eight se-
lected writers present, and by page 17 'represent,' an object which is 
no longer 'located quite specifically in the terrain of white, middle 
class feminism.' Instead, it 'subsumes women into one sisterly 
category of "woman," 'representing the acceptable and popular face 
of women's writing' which turns out to be a certain kind of nar-
rative fiction as practised (as well as reviewed and commented on) 
by Jessica Anderson, Thea Astley, Beverley Farmer, Helen Garner, 
Kate Grenville, Barbara Hanrahan, Elizabeth Jolley and Olga 
Masters. The function of the anthology in unifying and naturalising 
the various selected texts as 'eight canonical voices,' coherent in 
themselves and with one another by virtue of being collected, is one 
practice in the matrix of practices that have constructed and con-
tinue to construct the 'canonical,' so obvious' and 'acceptable and 
popular' status of Whitlock's eight writers in the sub-field of 
Australian short fiction. What is disingenuous and misleading in 
VVhitlock's account is that this function is suppressed. 
To say this is not, of course, to suppose that Whitlock or the 
editors of any other anthologies are agents in some kind of conspir-
acy but to suggest that the textual practices in which the editors of 
anthologies engage are always interventions in the wide cultural 
field, or the more restricted literary field and the sub-fields within it. 
And every intervention will necessarily construct and consecrate 
one object or another, including Australian women's fiction, 
whether an anthologiser intends to do so or not. The object that any 
anthology constructs is, in other words, a beautiful lie that even the 
most fastidiously self-conscious anthology editor seems unable ever 
to uncover completely. 
It is to the remarkably successful and 'beautiful lies' of 'The 
Balmain School' and Brian Kiernan's The Most Beautiful Lies that I 
now wish to turn. 
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THE BALMAIN SCHOOL' 
Kiernan's project in his 1977 anthology, The Most Beautiful Lies, 
was not, of course, to expose his own anthology as a lie but to fore-
ground the status of his material, firstly, as fiction in the category of 
lies and, secondly, as the best in that category as determined by the 
criterion of beauty. By and large, this is the claim made in most an-
thology introductions. But Kiernan's title reveals a more ambitious 
project than this: The Most Beautiful Lies - A Collection of Stories 
by Five Major Contemporary Fiction Writers: Bail, Carey, Lurie, 
Moorho use and Wilding attempts to promote a specific and re-
stricted list of writers as 'a new movement' of emphatically 'major 
contemporary fiction writers' in the literary field who produced 
short fiction.21 Kiernan's introduction functions to incorporate what 
might be thought to be a group of texts which have little in common 
and in so doing marks his project as an attempt to position Bail, 
Carey, Lurie, Moorhouse and Wilding as the personnel who make 
up a school. Given that Kiernan admits that his selected writers do 
not share sufficiently common stylistic characteristics to support 
such an idea, his task is a difficult one (Kiernan, The Most Beautiful 
Lies, ix). To establish the coherence of the fiction which he selects he 
defines it partly in terms of what it is (a broad category of self-
consciously fictional writing [x]) and what it is not (not mimetic, not 
concerned with character or social situation, discarding the stylistic 
characteristics and content of social realism Exp. 
Kiernan's definition of his object, 'the Balmain School,' in 
negative terms is a strategy typical of all anthologies, as I have al-
ready attempted to show. Kiernan's strategy is to define his object in 
the field, and his position and claim to power as the agent who de-
termines it, by means of 'not-statements' - 'like , but not ...' - 
which, according to Anne Freadman, are the first move in establish-
ing any classification.22 The priority Freadman assigns to the 'not 
statement' over the 'is statement' is, however, questionable. 
Kiernan, for example, begins his construction of 'the Balinain 
School' by defining what it is and then what it is not. The definition 
of the boundaries circumscribing the object follow the assertion of 
an admittedly broad positive characteristic (a category of self-con-
sciously fictional writing). It might be more useful to suppose that 
his object is constituted by the simultaneous circumscribing of what 
it is and what it is not, 'the Balmain School' being identified and 
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separated from other possible schools at the same time. Jacques 
Derrida does exactly this when he collapses the sort of dialectic that 
Freadman's not-statement suggests in his concept of brisure, break-
ing and joining at the same time. It is more accurate to say that the 
not-statement locates a text in a space by establishing boundaries 
and, more importantly, relations of identity within the boundary 
and opposition across the boundary, simultaneously locating what it 
is like and what it is not like. 23 
So- much for the construction of Kiernan's object. But what es-
tablishes the status of his objectified `Balmain School' and its practi-
tioners as the 'major contemporary fiction writers' in 1977 is not ex-
plained. Kiernan makes no attempt to locate his selected personnel 
against their other, that is, against presumably minor contemporary 
fiction writers, and does not refer to any criteria which he might use 
to explain how anyone determines the status of writers as major and 
minor. This silence is, of course, strategic: Kiernan foregrounds 
some of the possible coherent characteristics of his object, 'the 
Balmain School,' but remains silent regarding who determines ma-
jor and minor writers and how they do so. This is because it is by 
claiming the right to consecrate major writers, that is, to decide who 
is to count as major writers in the literary field, as Kiernan does in 
his title, and by being taken seriously by others in the field that the 
major writers are established. 
Kiernan's anthology constructs what he calls in his introduc-
tion 'a new departure, even a movement' (ix), objectified first of all 
by his determining characteristics (a broad category of self-con-
sciously fictional writing which is not mimetic, not concerned with 
character or social situation, and which discards the stylistic charac-
teristics and content of social realism) and secondly by his content. 
But the status of his anthologised object in the literary field depends, 
thirdly, on how it is taken up by other agents in the field and, in be-
ing taken up, how it is opposed to other, apparently social realist, ob-
jects in the literary field. Kiernan's project to construct his selected 
texts and their writers as a school, 'a new departure, even a move-
ment' is realised in the moment at which the object is identified as 
such by other agents in the literary field. Kiernan's 1977 object, 'a col-
lection of stories by five major writers,' becomes, for example, 
Elizabeth Webby's 1981 object, 'the Balmain School.' 24 And so long 
as further agents in the literary field position themselves in terms of 
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this school (even as I do here) it can continue to appear to be a co-
herent object with power in the field, that is, to be an object worth 
valuing, opposing, studying. In other words, it is because of the suc-
cessive uses to which the construction is put to identify various po-
sitions in the field that its objectivity is maintained in the field. 
What is interesting in the construction of 'the Balmain 
School' as an object in the field is that three of the five writers objec-
tified as the personnel who make up this school have had a hand in 
maintaining it in their own anthologies. In the rest of this chapter I 
want to consider how Murray Bail, Frank Moorhouse and Michael 
Wilding attempt in their own anthology introductions to maintain 
'the Balmain School' as 'the establishment' and even a kind of para-
doxical 'avant-garde establishment' in the literary field. 
The fact that Bail, Moorhouse and Wilding have been in a po-
sition to edit anthologies which they use - consciously or not - to 
maintain their status as 'cutting edge' and 'major' contemporary fic-
tion writers offers a broad indicator of their established position as 
writers of short fiction in the literary field. Wilding produced the 
first 'history' of 'the Balmain School' in his introduction to the 1978 
anthology for Wild and Wooley, collaborating with Moorhouse and 
Kiernan. Moorhouse's anthology followed in 1983 with the backing 
of Penguin, followed by Bail's 1988 Faber anthology and Wilding's 
1994 Oxford anthology. It is not surprising that Wilding's early ver-
sion of the establishment of the school foregrounds the interested-
ness of the agents involved, although not the interests of Wilding as 
one of the partners in Wild and Wooley, resulting in a partially 
problematised account. But it is in the later versions published by 
Penguin, Faber and Oxford that the school is most positively objecti-
fied. 
Like all anthologies, Wilding's 'The Tabloid Story Story' in his 
1978 The Tabloid Story Pocket Book constructs a history in which the 
anthology contents are opposed to an equally constructed supposedly 
preceding object. In Wilding's case 'the new fiction' is opposed to the 
sorts of fiction previously maintained by what he calls 'the 
overground scene.' 25 The efficiency of Wilding's 'overground scene' 
lies in the fact that it enables him to suggest the object against which 
he stands and to characterise his own position as a member of an 
underground, at once oppositional and avant-garde. But the 
'overground scene,' like the 'mainstream' men's writing opposed by 
197 
anthologies of writing by women discussed earlier, is an imaginary 
construction. Wilding spends some time characterising this object in 
order to contrast 
the sort of new writing we [at Tabloid Story] wanted to en-
courage - no more formula bush tales, no more restric-
tions to the beginning, middle and end story, no more 
preconceptions about a well rounded tale. (Wilding, 'The 
Tabloid Story Story,' 302) 
Like Kiernan, Wilding establishes his object by referring to what it is 
and is not, 'new writing, but not well-rounded or bush tales.' But 
unlike Kiernan he foregrounds his own self-interest and the inter-
estedness of the other personnel who were involved as editors in 
the initial Tabloid Story project. Where Kiernan appears to be the 
judicially disinterested editor who merely presents the 'five major 
contemporary fiction writers' in The Most Beautiful Lies, Wilding, 
Moorhouse, Carmel Kelly and, not least, Kiernan himself 'wanted to 
encourage' a 'sort of new writing' in Tabloid Story. The first issues, 
according to Wilding, 
used ... stories from the editors and from writers whose 
work we knew, the new fiction that we knew was around 
[W[e shaped the first two issues from the available 
materials - and shaped them to show the sort of new 
writing we wanted to encourage. (302, emphasis added) 
But even while implicating the editors in the process of select-
ing their own work for the magazine Wilding constructs the content 
of the magazine issues and the anthology selections drawn from it 
for The Tabloid Story Pocket Book as already and naturally existing 
positive objects that the editors merely discovered. In doing this he 
operates as all anthology editors do, as I have already tried to show, 
when they suppose that their selection does not construct but merely 
presents the object, 'lyric poetry,' Australian short fiction,' 
'Australian women's writing,' new writing,' or whatever. In 
Wilding's case, 'the new fiction that we knew was around' is a 
highly contingent category that depends on the fact that certain texts 
were known to the editors, and presumably were not being pub-
lished elsewhere. This certainly makes it 'available' but in order to 
be thought of as 'new fiction' it must be positioned in the literary 
field. While it appears that the Tabloid Story editors come across this 
'new fiction' it is, in fact, only because they determine it to be op- 
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posed to 'overground' publishing, presumably because not pub-
lished, that it can be described as new, that is, opposed to the pre-
sumed old. Even then, the Tabloid Story editors cannot be said to 
have come across the 'new fiction' because the 'new fiction' is con-
structed in its newness, first by not having previously been pub-
lished, but secondly only when it is published by the implicitly 
'underground' Tabloid Story. 
It is precisely in the positioning of Tabloid Story as an alterna-
tive publication that its contents can be thought of as the 'new fic-
tion,' that is, as opposed to the contents of supposedly 'overground' 
publications of 'old fiction.' From this position, as Wilding admits, 
the editors did shape 'the available materials to show the sort of new 
writing we wanted to encourage.' But it is not simply by being 
shaped that 'new fiction' is constructed. Rather, it is in the opposi-
tional position taken by the Tabloid Story editors and in their de-
termination that unpublished texts, by definition 'not overground,' 
are suitable content for publication, made 'new' by being published 
in the alternative 'underground' Tabloid Story, that Wilding's object 
is constructed. What is transparent in Wilding's account is that the 
conditions which construct his highly determined object, 'new fic-
tion,' are clearly evident, partly because he foregrounds the subjec-
tivity that determined the publication of 'writers whose work we 
knew' but also despite his assumption that 'the available materials' 
just are 'the new fiction.' 
Like most anthology editors, Wilding sketches a history of 
Australian short fiction in order to provide a framework which lo-
cates his 'new fiction' in an alternative genealogy which opposes an 
imaginary object, 'established, enshrined, protected ... realistic, up-
country, outback, bush stories' (304). Wilding spends considerable 
time constructing this imaginary other in order to produce a rhetori-
cal weight of material that appears to obstruct the emergence of the 
genealogical ancestor for his alternative 'new fiction,' experimental-
fantastic stories which reflected 
an eclecticism, a richness of literary culture: which became 
reduced to the narrow, utilitarian, insular, aggressively 
anti-experimental, philistinely parochial 'write Australia' 
line: something caused not so much by the nationalistic 
[eighteen-] nineties writers, but by the new nationalist 
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theorists, critics and publishers and magazine editors 
from the 1930s through the 1950s. (304) 
Wilding needs to construct an imaginary other here but he also con-
structs the cultural matrix of establishment theorists, critics and pub-
lishers and magazine editors which, he asserts, maintained it. He 
needs to construct this target not just because Tabloid Story con-
structs an object opposed to previous, supposedly `overground' ob-
jects, but because it constitutes an ongoing 'underground' move-
ment by agents opposed to `overground' theorists, critics and pub-
lishers and magazine editors. 
The rhetorical pressure required to construct this bogey is evi-
dent in the complex sentence quoted above. Wilding loads his con-
structed object by simplifying what it is, an 'eclectic,' rich' 'literary 
culture,' and emphasising what it is not by the use of a surprising 
number of odd intensifiers - 'the narrow, utilitarian, insular, aggres-
sively anti-experimental, philistinely parochial "write Australia" 
line' - and the over-heated punctuation - 'a literary culture: reduced 
to the 'write Australia' line: something caused by theorists, critics 
and publishers and magazine editors.' While the weight of unusual 
adjectives - 'aggressive anti-experiment,' philistinely parochial' - 
might persuade his readers of the horror of his imaginary other, it is 
the syntactic density of the sentence that is most convincing. This 
terrible object is so dangerous that it threatens to escape Wilding's 
sentence. Wilding's 'rich literary culture' is opposed: by what? After 
the first colon: by 'the narrow, utilitarian, insular, aggressively anti-
experimental, philistinely parochial "write Australia" line.' But 
there's more: Wilding uses the second colon to overload the syntax: 
making it appear as though it is impossible to contain the causes be-
hind the 'write Australia' line in a simple way in the sentence. And 
just in case the reader is not convinced, Wilding's 'write Australia' 
puns on the 1950s White Australia policy in order to harness the po-
litical credit of the late '70s embracing of cultural diversity - 'an 
eclectic, rich culture' - and to discredit the supposedly monocultur-
alist character of 'nationalist theorists, critics and publishers and 
magazine editors.' 
In constructing 'alternatives to the Lawson tradition' (306) 
'The Tabloid Story Story' also harnesses the mythical position of T he 
Bulletin as the publication which supposedly single-handedly pub-
lished and thereby consecrated the texts of 'the nationalist school' 
200 
(and no other kinds of texts). At this point in 'The Tabloid Story 
Story' Wilding hands over to Kiernan, the editor of issue 15 of 
Tabloid Story, hosted by the Bulletin: 
The Bulletin had been the vehicle for a generation of 
writers immediately before and after Federation who had 
wanted to make it new in terms of their experience and to 
break through the prevailing conventions - Henry 
Lawson, Barbara Boynton, Edward Dyson, Steele Rudd .... 
For myself as acting editor, this was an historically 
symbolic opportunity to present the new fiction of the 
[nineteen-] seventies in the magazine that had carried the 
new fiction of the [eighteen-]nineties. (314, emphasis 
added) 
The positioning of Tabloid Story, issue 15, as the symbolic successor 
to an apparently oppositional school promoted by the Bulletin pro-
vides Kiernan with considerable leverage, allowing him to piggy-
back his claim that Tabloid Story presents 'the new' and 'the break 
through' on the usually accepted but no more substantiated claim 
that the Bulletin did the same. In doing this he relies on the same 
claim made by Hadgraft and Wilson, in A Century of Australian 
Short Stories, that the 'Bulletin style' somehow resists convention-
ality.26 The strategic point of this claim is that the content of Tabloid 
Story becomes, true to its genealogy, alternative, new, experimental, 
fantastic. 
Wilding and Kiernan's history of Tabloid Story foregrounds 
their position as cultural producers and the magazine and subse-
quent anthology as cultural products in the literary field in an an-
tagonistic relation to an imaginary 'overground' and 'narrow, utili-
tarian, insular, aggressively anti-experimental, philistinely parochial 
'write Australia' line.' The specific concern to situate Tabloid Story as 
a moment in a struggle in the literary field prevents them from 
making the typical claim of anthology introductions that the 
anthology is an intervention in the literary field which over-deter-
mines social relations across other fields, a claim which attempts to 
make the anthology into a moment of major social importance. 
Frank Moorhouse's 1983 The Mood of Contemporary Australia in 
Short Stories: The State of the Art is, in contrast and as his title 
suggests, a much more ambitious project which seeks exactly to 
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position the sub-field of Australian short fiction at the centre of the 
broader social field. 
The Mood of Contemporary Australia in Short Stories, accord-
ing to its back cover blurb, 'reflects the robust hedonism of contem-
porary Australian society:27 The blurb, presumably the work of a 
Penguin publicist, borrows from Moorhouse's statement that 
'Australia appears to be still a robustly hedonistic society, but per-
haps through art ... we will add sensuality to the robust hedonism' 
(Moorhouse, ed. The Mood of Contemporary Australia in Short 
Stories, 3). It would seem that the Penguin publicist sets more store 
on anthologies as types of evidence which document Australian 
society than on Moorhouse's hope that anthologies might change it. 
But 'Australia appears to be still a robustly hedonistic society' only 
because Moorhouse's highly subjective selection makes it appear so. 
Just as Zola believed that the fictional evidence in his novels sup-
ported his Naturalist social theory, Moorhouse confuses his own 
textual material for evidence of positively social facts. 
Unlike most anthology editors, Moorhouse elevates the im-
portance of what I have earlier called an ambit claim, that is, the 
claim that anthologies 'reflect' or 'represent' the concerns of society, 
by making the claim at the beginning of his introduction, 'The State 
of the Art of Living in Australia': 
[n]ot only is this book a look at the art of story-telling in 
Australia, it also looks at the art of living in Australia. 
This anthology ... is something of a map of social 
concerns. (1) 
Such an ambit claim has the strategic effect of suggesting that, be-
cause the anthology is so significant that it maps wide social con-
cerns, it most likely holds an important place in the literary field at 
least. Such a place is implied in Moorhouse's ambitious claim that it 
is 'the burning edge of the art form' (1). What is unusual is that, 
unlike most anthologies, his claim to produce 'a map of social con-
cerns' makes up the bulk of the introduction: his content is, he be-
lieves, 
a clue to the flux of our times ... written about as a way of 
coping with it and as a way of recording it (2, emphasis 
added);28 
About a third of these stories are from experiences that in- 
fringe upon conservative conventions, and the other two 
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thirds I see as coming from mainstream experience. This 
seems to me to reflect accurately the way Australians live 
(2-3, emphasis added); 
If you join the lines of association, the outer and inner 
connections of these stories, you have a picture of the 
Australian sensibility and an indication 'of the state of the 
art of living in Australia. (5, emphasis added) 
While the claims in Moorhouse's introduction may at first glance 
appear to be a joke, 'The State of the Art of Living in Australia' is a 
serious attempt to situate the anthology in two ways. The anthology 
is, firstly, 'a clue,' record,"picture' or 'indication' of Australian soci-
ety, where fiction becomee a kind of evidence which, secondly, 
'comes from' real, objective facts. The introduction, in other words, 
constructs the selected fiction as evidence as though it is produced 
'from' and 'reflects accurately' something called the 'experience' of 
'representative' non-conservative and mainstream writers. What is 
most striking about the positivism in Moorhouse's account is that 
the subjective, selective and contingent nature of his material might 
well have served his claim to constructing an avant-garde anthology 
at the 'burning edge' in the literary field in which the radically con-
tingent nature of his project might have matched the avant-garde 
status of his radically contingent and subjectively determined con-
tent. Instead, it would appear that the anthology relies on the sort of 
intensive reading advocated by Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn 
Warren in Understanding Fiction, a kind of reading I attempt to 
describe in the next chapter. In Moorhouse's version the properly 
instructed reader is supposed to be able to discern the sorts of 'outer 
and inner connections of the stories' that Moorhouse can see in or-
der to 'join the lines of association' and, presto, discover 'a picture of 
the Australian sensibility' drawn immediately from experience. 
Because Moorhouse seeks to position himself at 'the burning 
edge' of contemporary fiction in the literary field he does not at-
tempt to construct a literary tradition out of or against which his ob-
ject, 'the mood of contemporary Australia in short stories,' might be 
thought to emerge. This is because his account foregrounds the sup-
posed function of fiction as the contemporary record of practices in 
the broad social field. By foregrounding the function of fiction as a 
kind of objective social record Moorhouse is forced to suppress the 
other view of his anthology as an intervention, his attempt to stake 
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a claim in the literary field — to claim, in other words, the right to 
mediate as an editor between producers and consumers in his 
particular selection of texts. This leads Moorhouse to suppress the 
specific function of the anthology in the literary field in order to 
position it in the wider social field, claiming that it functions as a 
body of evidence which is central to the wider social field and in 
doing so he establishes the significance of his project in the literary 
field at least, whether or not his claim is taken seriously or even 
heard in other fields. By positioning the anthology as an artefact that 
is so significant as to be supposedly beyond the literary field, 
Moorhouse obviates the need to construct a tradition because the 
anthology is supposed to be not so much the latest in a line of 
anthologies that construct and maintain 'the art of story-telling in. 
Australia' as 'a map of social concerns.' And as a map of social 
concerns it relies less on presenting itself as the last word on some 
kind of literary tradition than on presenting itself as the most up to 
date, 'burning edge' record of somehow objective social facts. 
While Moorhouse emphasises the function of his anthology 
as a kind of record in the social field not dependent on the construc-
tion of a literary tradition, Bail and Wilding, his `Balmain School' 
colleagues, clearly locate their anthologies precisely in the literary 
field and in so doing construct a literary tradition against which 
their own school becomes a high point in the development of 
'Australian short fiction' in the field. Not incidentally, the publish-
ing houses behind Bail's The Faber Book of Contemporary 
Australian Short Stories and Wilding's The Oxford Book of 
Australian Short Stories require as much. Both publishing houses 
are in the business of constructing ready-reference guides and trade 
on the prestige of their names. In the case of The Faber Book or 
Oxford Book and the Bail or Wilding editorship, both publishing 
houses and writers benefit from the mutual reinforcement of the al-
liance, the publishers gaining from the status of their established 
writers in the literary field and the writers gaining from their status 
as writers-as-editors for prestigious publishing houses. But in pro-
ducing 'Australian short stories' anthologies Faber and Oxford are 
both in the business of maintaining their strong positions in the 
literary field as prestigious institutions that determine what counts 
in the field. This includes defining 'the tradition' even if only to 
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determine the contemporary 'best' that evolves from or even 
opposes it. 
In his 1994 The Oxford Book of Australian Short Stories, 
Michael Wilding sets out to construct a tradition out of which his 
particular selection of contemporary stories can be thought to 
emerge. His selection begins with Lawson, who 'established the en-
dUring model of a laconic minimalism of language taut with irony 
and repressed emotion.'29 But Wilding downplays the usual defini-
tion of 'the tradition' in stylistic terms in favour of a definition char-
acterised by social purpose. Lawson, it turns out, 
had a specificity and iconographic memorability that 
justly led to his reputation as the foremost chronicler of 
the characteristically Australian; but it was always a politi-
cally informed, socially critical account of Australia that 
he presented. Barbara Baynton's stories continue in the 
Lawson tradition, the same world of struggle and hard-
ship and impoverishment; but whereas Lawson's natural-
ism partook of a prograrnatic political analysis, Baynton's 
world opens out into a gothic drama of emotional horror 
that is profoundly sceptical of the 1890s vision of social 
cooperation. (Wilding, ed. Oxford Book of Australian 
Short Stories, xi, emphasis added) 
Wilding claims the fundamental importance of 'a politically in-
formed, socially critical account of Australia' in order to link his 
stylistically disparate material: Lawson's 'social criticism' finds its 
echo in Baynton's 'social scepticism.' But the rhetorical persuasive-
ness of Wilding's account rests not so much on the way he traces 
this supposedly central characteristic as on the way he conflates 
Baynton's 'gothic drama of emotional horror' with Lawson's 
'politically informed, socially critical account of Australia.' These dif-
ferent kinds of stories occupy 'the same world of struggle and hard-
ship and impoverishment' and as a consequence Baynton's chrono-
logical position means that she 'continues in the Lawson tradition.' 
What suppresses any questions about this claim is Wilding's 
careful syntactic arrangement of Lawson and Baynton's respective 
characteristics. Lawson is conditionally characterised as 'the foremost 
chronicler' but his fundamental characteristic is 'social criticism.' 
Similarly, Baynton's stories are conditionally characterised in terms 
of 'struggle and hardship and impoverishment,' enough to link her 
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to 'the same world' as Lawson, but her fundamental characteristic is 
an 'emotional horror that is profoundly sceptical.' Wilding's account 
combines Lawson and Baynton in a conditional leap-frogging 
relationship that has the strategic merit of allowing him to discount 
style in favour of social concern. Like Heseltine before him, 
Wilding's problem is that he attempts to construct a continuous tra-
dition which includes stylistically disparate material, specifically Hal 
Porter's stylistic experimentation and linguistic sophistication (12). 
Murray Bail's 1988 The Faber Book of Contemporary 
Australian Short Stories is an altogether different sort of project, 
dealing with the construction of a tradition which his selected sto-
ries can be thought to oppose. His anthology, like anthologies of 
Australian women's writing, specifically consecrates contemporary 
writers, including Carey, Moorhouse and Wilding. In order to do 
this he makes use of the sorts of strategies found in most antholo-
gies. The contents are arranged chronologically according to the date 
of birth of his selected writers, although Bail begins with Barnard 
rather than Lawson, implying a different developing corpus of work 
than usual. Bail's introduction begins with the construction of the 
traditional Australian short story which his selection ostensibly op-
poses. 'Traditional' here refers to fiction which relies on a dry, terse 
style, after Lawson. 
Writers allowed the landscape to do their hard work ... the 
very mention of the flat horizon or a few dry sticks was 
enough to provide that air of stoicism or impending 
tragedy ....Keep it plain, nothing fancy was the prevailing 
instinct. Marjorie Barnard's 'The Persimmon Tree' of 
1943, the first story in the present anthology, offers an 
amazing rejection of this." 
In constructing his imaginary other, 'a drought' or a 'dry tangle of 
conservatism,' (Bail, ed. Faber Book of Contemporary Australian 
Short Stories, xv, xvi) in order to oppose it with Barnard's 'amazing 
rejection,' Bail operates in exactly the same way as other anthology 
editors, as I have tried to show above. What is different in Bail's 
account is that his history of 'the traditional' and 'new' is marked by 
'stories from the 1950s on[, which] are generally far more 
accomplished than those pre-war' (xvi). In order to consecrate his 
contemporary selection Bail sketches a monolithic identity for his 
imaginary other, 'traditional short stories': they incorporate on the 
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one hand 'The Bulletin style' 1890s stories of Hadgraft and Wilson 
and on the other Wilding's 'new nationalist theorists, critics and 
publishers and magazine editors from the 1930s through the 1950s' 
(Wilding, 'The Tabloid Story Story,' 304).31 
In order to suggest the homogeneity of this constructed object 
Bail uses two strategies. He borrows, firstly, from the mythology of 
political conservatism: Australian short story writers, like political 
activists, had to 'push back the dry tangle of conservatism' (Bail, ed. 
Faber Book of Contemporary Australian Short Stories, xvi) because 
the dominant fiction 'matched the political climate: a drought time 
of conservatism, conformity and censorship, the R. G. Menzies era' 
(xv, emphasis added). Apart from the difficulty this presents for Bail 
- where it is the 'stories from the 1950s,' that is, from 'the Menzies 
era,' that are supposed to be 'far more accomplished than those pre-
war' - the status of the literary field diminishes, becoming simply a 
sub-field of the political field. The reason for reducing it in this way 
is that it allows Bail to harness the fiction of 'The Balmain School' to 
the 1970s wagon of political reform in 'the VVhitlam era.' The second 
way in which Bail attempts to insist on the homogeneity of his 
imaginary other depends on Patrick White's dismissal of 'Australian 
literature' as the "dreary dun-coloured offspring of journalistic 
realism" - justifiably, a much-quoted phrase' (xv). But why exactly is 
White justifiably much quoted? Bail sees White's phrase and its 
frequent repetition as justified because White's project was exactly 
the same as Bail's own. 
In 'The Prodigal Son' White attempts to position himself as 
the heir to the literary throne and to do so needs to construct an ob-
ject that he can oppose. His first step is to do exactly this in order `to 
prove that the Australian novel is not necessarily the dreary, dun-
coloured offspring of journalistic realism.' 32 'The Australian novel' 
becomes, as a consequence, an object of contention which newcom-
ers like White are free to claim. His second step is to claim that his 
own fiction does in fact 'create completely fresh forms out of the 
rocks and sticks of words' (White, 'The Prodigal Son,' in Lawson, ed. 
Patrick White, 271), and as a consequence White is able to claim 
proprietorial rights over 'the Australian novel' on the basis of his 
original, fresh altemativity. And because h e defines the imaginary 
opposite and defines it specifically in order to overthrow it, 'the new 
Australian novel' precisely cannot be 'the dreary, dun-coloured 
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offspring of journalistic realism.' The fact that White succeeded 
explains both why Bail uses the same strategy, piggy-backing his 
claim to status in the literary field on White's previous and 
successful claim, but more importantly why he takes White's 
version of 'traditional Australian literature' to be an unproblematic 
description rather than a strategic construction. The matter-of-
factness of White's 'dreary, dun-coloured realism' is a product of 
White's own and Bail's subsequent success in using it to claim that 
'the new' just is better than 'the old,' a fresh alternative to 
convention, in the same way that Spender's 'subversive' fiction or 
Gibbs and Tilson's 'anti-traditional' fiction just is better than the 
conventional and male 'mainstream.' 
Both strategies position Bail's '1970s writers' as the heirs to the 
throne. Writers of 'The Balmain School' become the equivalent in 
the literary field to the liberalising personnel who dominate the po-
litical field in the early 1970s and become the second wave, after 
White, who are precisely not producing 'dreary, dun-coloured real-
ism.' As Bail puts it, a 'new generation in the 1970s could survey the 
progress from something like a cleared plateau' (Bail, ed. Faber Book 
of Contemporary Australian Short Stories, xvi). 
Bail's plateau metaphor, like most of the naturalising 
metaphors deployed in anthology introductions, attempts to sup-
press the role of his particular anthology as a means of elevating cer-
tain personnel and texts. Bail claims that his selected personnel and 
texts are simply the ones that are to be found on the plateau. But 
more than this, the plateau implies that '1970s writers' are somehow 
naturally elevated above 'pre-1970s writers' and that they occupy a 
position from which they can review the 'progress' made by their 
forbears. Bail's generational trope further naturalises his '1970s 
writers' as rightful heirs but also suggests a rather more complicated 
plateau than would at first glance appear. Is the plateau simply the 
contested high ground of the literary field, an unchanging terrain 
occupied by various agents over time, or is it constructed, sediment 
on sediment, from the debris of previous contests, the metaphorical 
pile of all the preceding personnel and texts that have struggled to 
occupy the literary field? In the first version Bail simply claims the 
right to occupy a position on the objective plateau. In the second his 
anthology is rather more implicated in the process of constructing 
the field. In this second version his anthology is built on the ruins 
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of the field, unearthing selected archaeological treasures like 'The 
Persimmon Tree' and displaying them alongside new works on the 
rubble of all that has been dismissed. 
Read in this way, Bail's introduction runs the risk of f ore- 
grounding the function of the anthology as a primary institution in 
the construction of the field and he spends considerable time at- 
tempting to avoid this, constructing a history of the emergence of 
'The Balmain School' in which he suppresses his own involve- 
ment. This is the particular function of his '1970s writers.' Bail, like 
Kiernan in The Most Beautiful Lies, becomes the objectively de 
tached observer rather than the subjectively implicated participant. 
A new generation in the 1970s could survey the progress 
from something like a cleared plateau .... For all the gains 
there appeared to be a gap between what they saw being 
published and what they themselves had experienced - 
and written. Connected, and almost more serious, was the 
curious, continuing lethargy in many of the stories. They 
were surrounded by a quite formidable wall of such sto- 
ries, so it seemed. To penetrate, to at least offer alterna- 
tives, energised their writing. Being in the minority en- 
couraged extremes of form. There was the feeling of hav- 
ing to wave to attract attention. Many in this younger 
generation consciously, deliberately, wrote against the 
residue of stolid realism. There were cases of rewriting the 
established classic, the avant-garde strategy of provocative 
revision. The new writing was helped along by the young 
writers themselves becoming editors, being invited to edit 
anthologies and so on, and an increasing critical interest. 
(xvi) 
While Bail's history foregrounds some of the institutions that 
helped to construct 'The Balmain School' - 'the young writers be-
coming editors, being invited to edit anthologies' and becoming the 
subject of 'increasing critical interest' - his detached third-person de-
scription of 'the new' or 'younger generation' enables him to sup-
press his own position as one of the young writers who became an 
anthology editor as well as the constitutive function of The Faber 
Book of Contemporary Australian Short Stories itself. Both circum-
stances are, of course, central moments in the process of construct-
ing 'the Balmain School.'33 
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What is most interesting about his narrative, however, is that 
his 'new generation' of a 'minority' of 'young writers' provides him 
with the leverage to characterise 'The Balmain School' as extreme, 
provocative and avant-garde in order to position it against `dun-
coloured realism.' The purpose of this is to allow the avant-garde 
new generation to 'penetrate' the 'formidable wall of dun-coloured 
realistic stories' or 'at least offer alternatives.' In other words, Bail 
positions 'The Balmain School' as the avant-garde in order to over-
throw the prevailing realist establishment and claim for himself 
and the school a central position in the literary field, the position as 
the establishment. In doing this Bail's account of the transformation 
of the avant-garde into the establishment is both a description of 
this process, as though it has already happened, and an enacting of 
the process itself, occurring as the anthology is taken up and used. 
To isolate the strategic practices of anthology editors as I have 
attempted to do here is not to suggest a conspiracy theory of textual 
production where some agents in the literary field like anthology 
editors operate in a consciously self-interested and self-promoting 
way, although some no doubt do. Rather, it is to suggest that all of 
the social practices that operate in the field are institutionally located 
and at the same time contested, that every instance of textual pro-
duction and reception is an instance of a position in the field, that 
no text, writer, publisher, editor, critic, reader is ever autonomous, 
innocent or disinterested in the field. But what is revealing about 
the contemporary, and temporary, success of anthology editors in es-
tablishing Australian women's writing and 'The Balmain School,' as 
I have tried to show here, is that the strategies which they use to 
create their various objects are reasonably durable and not markedly 
different from those typically used by anthology editors since Francis 
Palgrave's early construction of The Best Songs and Lyrical Poems in 
the English Language. 34 
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6 
Studying writers: will the real literary 
writer please stand up? 
There has been no attempt ... at making the book a repre-
sentative collection or a collection of masterpieces. 
Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren.' 
Anthologies have played a major part in the construction of forma-
tions like Australian women's writing and the Balmain School. But 
there are other related institutional practices that do the same thing. 
For most of us, our first and often only experience of short fiction 
takes place in the classroom. Selection of an anthology for a school 
English syllabus does no harm to sales. Indeed many anthologies are 
specifically designed for this market. 2 The fact that the short fiction 
of selected writers is frequently delivered to students by way of 
anthologies means that the 'primary text' experienced by the student 
of English is usually mediated by the institutional relations that 
characterise the school, besides the institutional relations that 
characterise publishing. 
How 'primary texts' are taken up and used in the classroom 
depends on the literary training and pedagogical practices of the 
classroom teacher and also on the so-called 'secondary texts' student-
readers use to deal with the 'primary text.' To suppose that there is 
such a thing as a 'primary text,' however, imagines that some texts 
are closer than others to some kind of origin, perhaps to the con-
sciousness or original genius of the writer, as though the text is the 
closest possible approximation to an unmediated ideal expression. 
Needless to say, 'primary texts' are the same as 'secondary texts.' A 
short story collection or novel, like a critical analysis, functions in a 
similar way, determining what consumers do with texts. But what 
consumers do with texts is strongly determined by the school 
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context in which readers learn to use texts. One of the reasons that 
Brian Kiernan succeeded, with The Most Beautiful Lies, in his claim 
to consecrating Five Major Contemporary Fiction Writers in 1977 
was that Kiernan operated from an influential academic position at 
the University of Sydney. Another was that other academics took 
his claim seriously by putting his anthology on their Australian 
Writing and Creative Writing courses. David Malouf also operated 
out of the University of Sydney at that time in a position from 
which, as I shall attempt to show, he attempted to influence the way 
in which his own work should be received, acting as a producer of 
both short fiction and critical commentary that prescribes the sorts of 
features readers ought to note in the fiction. 
In looking at anthologies and study guides in the classroom, 
at the way they define what sorts of stories are to count as, say, 
'Australian short stories,' at what sorts of writers are to count as 
'Australian short fiction writers,' and at how they determine how 
students should read and write about them I want to consider their 
prescriptive function in two ways: firstly in terms of the prescriptive 
claims made by anthology editors and study guide writers in deter-
mining what counts as the appropriate content of 'Australian short 
fiction'; and secondly in terms of the prescriptive claims made by an-
thology editors and study guide writers in determining what stu-
dents ought to do with this content. 
ANTHOLOGIES FOR STUDENTS 
Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren's Understanding Fiction, 
the great ancestor of the pedagogical anthology of short fiction, offers 
a usefully transparent example of the explicit New Critical claim to 
the authority to legitimate the contents of and canonical attitudes to 
'literature.' An appreciation of the peculiar authorising force of 
Understanding Fiction requires an understanding of the academic 
and publishing context in which it operated. It was, after all, the 
younger cousin and companion piece to the earlier canonising en-
terprise, Understanding Poetry, the first in a three-pronged foray 
into academic anthologising, which was already selling well when 
Brooks and Warren began Understanding Fiction.3 The 
Understanding anthologies sought to authorise the particular con-
tent and teaching methodology of American undergraduate courses 
and had a healthy slice of the college-text market with an average 
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yearly print run of 15 000 copies for each title.4 Understanding 
Fiction announces its credentials to the prospective buyer - aca-
demics looking for teaching texts - on the front cover, repeated on 
the title page with the additional information that Clearith Brooks is 
associated with LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY and Robert 
Warren with the UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, just in case. This 
is followed by the 'Letter to the Teacher,' a sales pitch aimed 
precisely at the market, the academics who decide which texts to put 
on undergraduate reading lists. 
The 'Letter to the Teacher' shows how Brooks and Warren 
thought of 'literature,' although they fastidiously avoid the term. 
They seem to conceive of this in two ways: first, relationally, as the 
product of the political relation of the teacher or critic to the student; 
and, secondly, as a positive category in its own right, as determined 
by the content of the anthology. The first, relational, conception of 
'literature' receives substantial attention in the 'Letter' while the ba-
sis of the second, positive, constitution of 'literature' as the natural 
content of the anthology remains submerged. 
Brooks and Warren begin their 'Letter' in the fashion typical 
of anthology introductions by dealing with the problem of defining 
'good' fiction, placing rather more emphasis on the matter of decid-
ing what they mean by 'good' than what they mean by fiction. 5 In 
fact the problem of defining fiction is deferred until Section I, 'The 
Intentions of Fiction,' where 'an elaborate definition' is thought to 
be unnecessary as it 'would necessarily be complicated and abstract' 
(Brooks and Warren, eds Understanding Fiction, 1). Brooks and 
Warren charmingly opt instead to 'work toward an understanding 
of our subject through an investigation of particular instances' (1), 
forgetting rather conveniently how selective their particular 
instances are in the first place. Having deferred the problem of 
'fiction,' which turns out to be just the category that they want it to 
be as prescribed by their particular instances, Brooks and Warren 
confidently deal with what they mean by 'good' fiction, which turns 
out to be the kind of fiction that is amenable to the sort of 'intensive 
reading' that Brooks and Warren know how to do. 'Good' fiction, in 
other words, is the stock of material with which critics and teachers 
can work if they follow the lead provided by the anthology editors, 
not a difficult task given that Brooks and Warren provide some 
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easy-to-read interpretation, discussion points, questions and even 
assignment tasks after each story. 
The political position of the editors, who dominate readers 
and students simply by claiming the power to determine what 
counts as 'good' fiction, is not articulated in the 'Letter.' Brooks and 
Warren simply decide on the definition of literary criticism and 
who gets to define it. And the ease with which they are able to au-
thorise 'good' fiction according to the rules of 'intensive reading,' 
where 'teacher knows best,' indicates the institutional character of 
their positions as teacher-critics in the definition of literature. That 
they succeeded in authorising 'good' fiction was a result of the fact 
that they were able to supply English teachers with the kind of 
content and critical apparatus that the massive post-war American 
student population could 'study.' But their text was taken up by 
English teachers for another reason as well. The dominant position 
of Understanding Fiction in the pedagogical market also depended 
on the dominant position of Brooks and Warren as New Critics, 
that is, on credentials that were imported from the academic field. 6 
Brooks and Warren, in other words, get to authorise 'good' fiction 
because of their prestige as critics and because of the dominant posi-
tion of their anthology in the pedagogical market. 
Although Brooks and Warren avoid the term 'literature,' the 
'Letter' is a direct staking of their claim as teacher-critics to control 
the content of and analytical approaches to literature. So what 
counts as 'good' literature and what are the 'best' methods to deal 
with it? Institutionally opposed to that competing broadly humanist 
view in which literary criticism 'merely encourages the student to 
systematise his views somewhat,' Brooks and Warren advocate 
'reading analytically,' in order to 'broaden' and 'refine' the interests 
of the reader because, `if the views [of the reader] remain substan-
tially unchanged, if the interests which he brings to fiction in the 
first place are not broadened and refined, the course has scarcely ful-
filled its purpose' (viii, emphasis added). Such a view has immense 
practical implications for the academic seeking to secure his subject 
matter (literature) and clientele (students) as well as his authority 
over them because, by Brooks and Warren's definition, all students 
— simply by virtue of being students — need to be 'substantially 
changed' by their expert tuition in the mysteries of literature. For 
Brooks and Warren, then, literature is a relational category: it is a 
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certain body of texts possessing forms amenable to certain kinds of 
analysis which the teacher-critic knows or possesses and, specifically, 
that the student by definition does not or, better, must not possess 
until instructed in the art of 'reading analytically.' Literature, in 
other words, is the product of the power of the teacher-critic over 
the student. 
Understanding Fiction is an interesting expression of this idea 
for two reasons. On the one hand, the 'Letter to the Teacher' articu-
lates the function of the anthology as it should be used in a relation 
of domination of the student by the critic or teacher and, on the 
other, itself practises that relation both by delivering to the teacher 
certain texts, interpretations or discussions of these texts (as well as 
discussion questions for authoritative use in the classroom) and by 
imposing on the teacher the views of Brooks and Warren as author-
itative critics themselves. Knowing literature and knowing how to 
read intensively or analytically (vii) go together, and one can prove 
one's mastery of the category and the practice by having critical stan-
dards that are different from, for Brooks and Warren implicitly bet-
ter than, one's students. And Brooks and Warren always win the 
contest because they are always in a position to show that they have 
standards which are different from those of students. They demon-
strate this in a little exercise regarding Kipling's 'The Man Who 
Would Be King.' This story illustrates the method of 'intensive 
reading' and the necessary characteristics of what Brooks and 
Warren consider to be 'good fiction.' 
Brooks and Warren's discussion of 'The Man Who Would Be 
King' reveals the political basis of their method. Literature, or 'good 
fiction,' possesses secret formal characteristics that are not immedi-
ately noticeable, and the critic or teacher's role is to introduce the 
=sophisticated student reader to the skills of spotting these charac-
teristics. Brooks and Warren begin by unilaterally prescribing the 
reasons why untutored readers enjoy Kipling's story: they like it be-
cause of the romantic setting and violent action. But 
[a] little reflection should bring [the reader] to the conclu-
sion that ... he demands a certain modicum of 
characterisation, a certain concern with the psychological 
basis of action, a certain interest in moral content. And a 
little further reflection should lead him to the conclusion 
that his liking for the story may depend upon the organic 
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relation existing among these elements — that his interest 
did not depend upon the element of violent plot, or the 
element of romantic setting, taken in isolation. (viii, 
emphasis added) 
Brooks and Warren's priestly induction of the student into the mys-
teries of the literary critic's 'intensive reading' depends here on two 
assumptions: that 'good fiction' is organic and based on psychologi-
cal notions of character; and that the 'good reader' is the reader who 
can find organic relations between things, especially if he is more in-
terested in the organic relations between psychologically grounded 
entities than 'simple' elements of plot or setting. 
The political clout of Brooks and Warren's position depends 
in large part on the simple domination of the student by the teacher, 
but also on the methodological emphasis they place on the curious 
skill of finding an organic relation between obscure elements in the 
text. The quotation above also reveals a sleight of hand regarding 
the reader's liking for romantic setting or violent plot, which are af-
firmed, but not proved, to be isolated elements. Finding some form 
of organic relation between them is quite possible but presumably 
inadequate because such elements are obvious, and what counts in 
'good fiction' are elements that are not obvious, that depend on the 
critic's or teacher's superior knowledge. Brooks and Warren show 
their hand on the following page when they assert the value of 
'fiction which does not merely emphasise the elements of violent 
action and romantic setting but which also leads to some under-
standing of the inner lives of other people' and charge the reader 
who is content with 'merely external differences from the circum-
stances of his own experience' with escapism (ix). It seems to be im-
portant to have the capacity to find some elements in fiction, and 
even to have the capacity to confuse reading about characters with 
understanding the inner lives of people, and then to be able to inte-
grate these elements into some coherent whole, but not to have 
other capacities, such as liking such 'simple elements' as mere vio-
lent action or romantic setting or even being able to integrate such 
simple elements. 
The view of fiction as something which exhibits an organic 
wholeness (or can be read to exhibit such wholeness, a distinction 
Brooks and Warren do not, of course, make) clearly underlies the se-
lection of the anthology's content. To the extent that they make any 
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reference to their mechanism of selection, Brooks and Warren sup-
press their predilection for similar kinds of psychologically moti-
vated fiction, admitting only that 'the editors have, in large part, 
chosen stories which are popular and widely anthologised ... [rather 
than] making this book a representative collection or a collection of 
masterpieces' (xiii). The statement is interesting for the questions it 
begs. For whom are the selections thought to be popular? Why does 
'wide anthologising' justify inclusion and what effects does selecting 
previously anthologised selections have? In what sense are the se-
lections not representative, not representative of what and not for 
whom? Which were the selections not 'in large part' chosen for be-
ing popular and widely anthologised, or representative or master-
pieces, and on what basis? And which of the selections are thought 
to be masterpieces and on what grounds? Clearly, Brooks and 
Warren submerge the grounds of their selection more than they ex-
plain them and generally imply rather than state their predilection 
for psychologically motivated realism. So far as the Contents pages 
indicate, however, the editors invariably pick stories of 
psychological realism from nineteenth-century writers (Balzac, Poe, 
Hawthorne, Flaubert, de Maupassant, Chekhov, and so on), and 
generally pick similar material from twentieth-century writers 
(Joyce in a realist mode, Mansfield, Hemingway, Thurber, and so on) 
with an occasional alternative (Kafka, Pirandello). 
It is only in their discussion of the critical analysis of theme, 
in the last and defensive pages of the 'Letter,' that Brooks and 
Warren admit to their dependence on the fiction of psychological 
motivation as 'their first article of faith...[because] the structure of a 
piece of fiction, in so far as that piece of fiction is successful, must 
involve a vital and functional relationship between the idea and the 
other elements in that structure - plot, style, character, and the like' 
(xv, emphasis added) or, read prescriptively the other way about, to 
be successful a piece of fiction must involve a vital and functional 
relationship between the idea and the other elements in that struc-
ture - plot, style, character, and the like. By obvious inversion, 
'corrupt' fiction (the term is Brooks and Warren's) is 'brutally de-
based by insensitive style and crude characterisation and arbitrary 
psychology' (xvi). Clearly, Understanding Fiction constructs fiction 
as a category of writing typified by the presence of characters which 
can be understood as psychological realities, chooses its positive con- 
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tent accordingly and preaches a form of analysis in which readers 
construct a reading of this content as apparently unified and inte-
grated stories by discerning and synthesising into an organic whole 
often arcane but never immediately obvious elements. 7 But what is 
important is that the making of the positive content of the anthol-
ogy, the constituting of the object - 'fiction' - is suppressed in 
Brooks and Warren's disclaiming statement above about what they 
have not attempted and, at best, is only traceable in the references to 
the intensive reading of the psychological motivations of characters 
in organic texts. 
The editorial strategy of suppressing any reference to the prac-
tices of constituting the object by the very means of anthologising is 
a typical characteristic of the academic anthology introduction, as 
Alan Golding notes in his study of American poetry canonisation. 
Typically, he notes, the introduction to a poetry anthology - Helen 
Vendler's Harvard Book of Contemporary Poetry is his target - 
'gives precedence to the canonising power of poets' and points out 
that, in Vendler's case, such a 'stance serves to downplay the exclu-
siveness of the view of American poetry that the anthology repre-
sents, an exclusiveness constructed not at all by poets with Vendler 
as innocent bystander and reporter, but by Vendler herself' (Golding, 
From Outlaw to Classic, 48). The anthology, Golding argues, is a 
primary institution in the canonising network of magazines and 
presses, to which should be added that whole range of supply- and 
demand-side institutions of cultural production I have outlined in 
Chapter Three, from institutions that generate actual books and 
authors to those institutions of consecration that venerate them, as 
well as those institutions that construct the reader and ways of 
reading. The feigned innocence of the anthology editor, in the case 
of Vendler, or silence, in the case of Brooks and Warren, regarding 
their function as agents with canonising power is, of course, 
functional. To acknowledge the role of the anthology in canon for-
mation would be to diffuse its power: the transparently canonising 
anthology would negate its function as a monument, admitting in-
stead to a status, at best, as a provisional selection and, at worst, as a 
mere object of contention. 
In contrast to Brooks and Warren's Understanding Fiction, 
the institutional scope of Alan Mahar and John Powers's Prose 
Writing for Australians: An Anthology of Feature Articles and 
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Short Stories is decidedly smaller. While they might appear to target 
the market of 'student writers' they refer to in their Preface, the bulk 
of their claims are directed to the English or Creative Writing 
teacher who, after all, decides on the 'set texts' for her course. 8 
Mahar's 'Fiction Introduction' is interesting not only for its attempt 
to appeal to the browsing teacher but for its exhaustiveness. 
The intending writer will find examples of the bush yam; 
the epistolary story; the surprise ending; the character 
sketch; the mood story; humour of situation, exaggeration 
and imagination, including the macabre; the convention-
ally structured story; the apparently unstructured 'slice-of-
life' and the language construct of some contemporary 
short fiction. Also to be found will be examples to show 
the effects of different points-of-view; different tense and 
mood; narration, dialogue, description, image, symbol 
and allusion. 
Notes to the collection will also provide advice 
from established writers on how to get started, how to 
structure a story and the importance of re-writing and 
editing. (Mahar, 'Fiction Introduction,' in Mahar and 
Powers, eds Prose Writing for Australians, 141) 
Mahar takes two bites at the cherry here, in order to attract two kinds 
of buyer: the teacher looking for examples of generic variety and the 
teacher looking for examples of various stylistic techniques. He ap-
pears to put his money on the marketability of a selection of various 
genres, but also provides an end-note to 
indicate the aspects of style and structure that influenced 
selection ... to emphasise the variety of stylistic and struc-
tural features that deserve consideration in the analysis of 
prose fiction. (312) 
This is followed by a list of categories — plot, character, description 
and setting, point of view, and so on — and the stories which pre-
sumably illustrate them. 
The way Mahar arranges his introductory pitch explicitly or-
ganises the shape of 'short fiction': short fiction in general becomes 
all of and only those texts which fit into his categories. His cate-
gories, in other words, determine what counts as short fiction, and 
what counts are bush yarns, epistolary stories, surprise endings, 
character sketches, and so on, as exemplified by his particular selec- 
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tion. The fact that his selection can also be used to illustrate different 
points-of-view, different tenses and moods, narration, dialogue, de-
scription, image, symbol and allusion is secondary. Stylistic and 
structural features do not determine but are determined by the con-
tent, which in turn is determined by his categories. Strangely 
enough, while Mahar appears to imply that categories and styles are 
mutually inclusive, so that bush yarns, for example, might illustrate 
various ways of plotting or characterising, it seems that categories 
are mutually exclusive, so that character sketches, for example, can-
not be mood stories. 
The simultaneous inclusiveness and exclusiveness in 
Mahar's pitch is a symptom of his attempt to maximise the appeal of 
the anthology. Both lists are, in fact, spurious. His first list, of nomi-
nally generic categories, is defined in terms of content (bush yarns, 
humorous stories) and in terms of style (epistolary, conventionally 
structured stories) while his second, nominally stylistic, list makes 
unclear distinctions between point of view, description and narra-
tion on the one hand and image and allusion on the other. But the 
function of the two lists is not a logical one, to provide an apparatus 
by which the texts might be examined. Rather, it is rhetorical, to sug-
gest the largest possible number of literary terms that might appeal 
to academically-trained browsing teachers. This attempt to appeal to 
as many potential buyers as possible can be seen in the way Mahar 
discusses his specific selection of content. 
The selection, at first glance, is not designed to illustrate a va- 
riety of genres or stylistic techniques after all but to produce 
[s]ympathetic material, stories which encourage readers to 
draw inferences rather than being satisfied with the ex-
plicit statements of the text. Thus 'reading between the 
lines' through increasing alertness to reference, allusion 
and style is encouraged by the selection. (141) 
This 'reading between the lines,' as I have attempted to show above, 
typifies the kind of reading practice endorsed by Brooks and Warren, 
illustrated in their content and made available for instruction 
through their discussion questions for authoritative use in the class-
room. At a second glance, however, 'Mlle primary intention has 
been to provide modern, short examples of variety in language, or-
ganisation and theme' (142). Prose Writing for Australians, it seems, 
is a heck of a cake, including in its ingredients broad generic cate- 
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gories and a variety of styles suited to some kind of close reading, 
with examples of various themes thrown in for good measure. 9 
Prose Writing for Australians, however, is more explicitly 
pedagogical than most anthologies. In the instructional material ti-
tled 'Writing Prose Fiction' that follows his selected content, Mahar 
exhorts the users of the anthology to write in a particular way, based 
on the 'models ... found in this collection': writers should 
start writing about what you know and what you have 
experienced and then distort it. And the distortions are 
introduced to heighten the drama and to establish pat- 
terns ... which emphasise similarities and contrasts .... 
[and] when patterns, similarities and contrasts are 
produced revelations follow, truths are revealed. (300-01, 
emphasis added) 
What Mahar's prescriptiveness reveals here is not simply what the 
editor or teacher wants the 'student writer' to do, that is, to pattern 
her writing, but also what the editor or teacher is doing, that is, se-
lecting particular texts in order to mark out what counts as worth-
while because patterned or, better, readable as patterned (based on 
images, say, or symbols or allusions, that is, on a particular kind of 
'reading between the lines'). 10 Having constructed such 
'patternability,' Mahar takes it to be proof that, 'ffliterature is highly 
ordered .... It is a crafted thing ... [by which we can] identify causes, ef-
fects and patterns of behaviour' (304). I do not wish so much to 
question whether this claim is true or not as to foreground the way 
Mahar submerges his own function as an agent in the construction 
of this characteristically patterned object he calls 'literature.' 
Mahar's tautological method is to construct 'literature' as pat-
terned kinds of texts in his selected content and to privilege this ob-
ject in his following prescription to read and write patterned kinds 
of texts. In doing this, he pretends that his construction is a positive 
object that is described rather than prescribed by his prefatory 
'Fiction Introduction,' selected contents and 'Writing Prose Fiction' 
post-script. It is Mahar's authority as an editor for 'student writers' 
which enables him to disguise this process. Mahar appeals to 
teachers by providing them with a familiar pedagogical method - 
'reading between the lines' - and a set of texts which repay such a 
method. The practice of 'reading between the lines' in order to 
uncover patterns, then, constructs patterned stories which Mahar 
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and in turn the writing teacher can then exhort students to emulate 
when in fact it is the prescriptive construction of Mahar's patterns 
that projects patterned stories onto 'student writers' in the first place. 
It may be true to say that literature is highly ordered, but one reason 
it is so ordered is because dassroom texts like this one so construct it. 
In maintaining his emphasis on 'reading between the lines' 
Mahar clearly identifies his location as a pedagogue consecrating a 
restricted kind of textual production in the literary field which pro-
duces kinds of patterned texts that repay close reading for imagery, 
symbolism or allusion. For Mahar, like Brooks and Warren, 
'literature,' it seems, is not available to just anybody but depends on 
the secret knowledge made available by selected critics. 'Character 
and action may be of interest, but,' Mahar believes, 'the way they are 
presented is of greater interest because it is the definitive charac-
teristic of the story' (305). In order to reinforce this claim Mahar de-
pends on the concept of 'referentiality.' Good writers, he suggests, 
are referentially allusive, 'sufficiently aware' of the cultural heritage 
to produce texts that allow 'perceptive responses,' which seems to 
mean responses that recognise certain kinds of extra-textual allu-
sions (310). His advice to 'student writers,' accordingly, is to study 
reference texts: 'reference texts would handsomely repay an hour in 
a good library becoming familiar with them' (310). 
The degree to which Mahar's 'referentiality' depends on 'good 
library reference texts' emphasises his location in the literary field as 
an agent seeking to maintain the status of a particular kind of cul-
ture which is already established or canonised. Reference texts like 
The Oxford Companion series record a particular kind of 'cultural 
heritage,' being more likely to refer to Macbeth, say, than to 
Goldfinger. More than this, however, Mahar's strategic reliance on 
'reference texts' to shore up his prescriptive claim that 'literature' is 
patterned, particularly in terms of allusive references, locates the 
practice of prescribing what counts in the literary field alongside if 
not dependent on the institutional power of the 'good libraries' and 
textual commentaries or 'secondary texts' of the academic field. 
Two anthologies that similarly target the market of English or 
Creative Writing teachers and their 'student writers' are Garry 
Disher's 'instructive' Personal Best and Helen Daniel's 'fascinating 
insight into the literary imagination,' Expressway, both published in 
1989.11 Both anthologies attempt to foreground the identity of the 
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writer in the process of constructing texts. Disher attempts this by 
inviting his contributors 'to nominate the published story they con-
sider the best they have written - or the one for which they have 
most affection' and letting them 'have their say' in a discussion that 
precedes their story (Disher, ed. Personal Best, 1). Daniel attempts 
this by inviting writers to produce a short story that responds to 
Jeffrey Smares painting, 'Cahill Expressway,' which functions as 'a 
single starting point, a focus' (Daniel, ed. Expressway, ix) that enables 
the student to compare the `writerly imaginations' of the various 
writers and gain 'a fascinating insight into something like a national 
literary imagination' (x). 
Given the frenzy of bicentennial short story anthology pub-
lishing in 1988, it is likely that the novelty in the method of selec-
tion of the two 1989 anthologies was designed to appeal to a jaded 
book-buying market. Both emphasise their departure from conven-
tional anthologies in their full titles: Personal Best: Thirty 
Australian authors choose their best short stories and Expressway: 
Invitation stories by Australian writers from a painting by Jeffrey 
Smart, and both Disher and Daniel suggest in their introductions 
that their anthologies represent radical departures from conven-
tional anthologies. According to Disher, 
[i]n most short story anthologies the stories are chosen by 
an editor, who is not a fiction writer but a critic, academic 
or teacher with tendentious aims or particular standards, 
themes or criteria in mind (Disher, ed. Personal Best, 1); 
while for Daniel, because 
these are all new stories, written [e]specially for this collec-
tion, [it is] surely the first time that such an Australian 
collection by major contemporary writers has appeared. 
(Daniel, ed. Expressway x) 
The result, for Disher, is that, Islignificantly, few writers chose a 
standard anthology piece' (Disher, ed. Personal Best, 1) while, for 
Daniel, Expressway is 'a unique reading experience' (Daniel, ed. 
Expressway, ix and xi). 
As I have tried to show in the previous chapter, anthology ed-
itors construct their object by reference to its imaginary other. What 
is interesting about the anthologies of Disher and Daniel is that the 
object which they both attempt to construct is not a revised history, 
genre or canon but a new kind of anthology, outside and supersed- 
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ing some kind of imaginary anthology tradition characterised not 
only by 'standard anthology pieces' but by standard editorial prac-
tices. 
In foregrounding an imaginary anthology tradition, construct-
ing this object in order to locate his anthology outside it, Disher use-
fully problematises the institutional practices that underlie the selec-
tion and publication of particular texts or kinds of texts by particular 
writers. He asks, for example, 
[w]hy has the editor chosen these writers or works, we 
want to know, and not others? ... If a canon exists, who 
chooses it, and can it ever be fixed, given the constant 
changes in writing, reading and critical tastes? How might 
another editor - with different tastes, or of a different 
class, race, gender, age group or historical period - have 
chosen? ... I decided simply to choose writers I admire. 
(Disher, ed. Personal Best, 1) 
By foregrounding his own subjectivity Disher certainly emphasises 
the subjective basis of his anthology, but this is nevertheless a strate-
gic move to question the objective status of other anthologies, not 
his own. Disher's self-confessed subjective editorial selection appar-
ently distinguishes Personal Best from 'most short story antholo-
gies.' Because he invited thirty writers, he claims, and avoided se-
lecting thirty stories, Personal Best is a radically alternative anthol-
ogy with 'few standard anthology pieces.' 
The 'standard anthology piece' is, however, a difficult thing to 
find, as I attempted to show in Chapter Four. I argued there that if 
anthology editors do maintain a 'standard' it is by selecting the same 
list of writers rather than the same short stories. In this regard, 
Personal Best 'consists mainly of established writers' like most an-
thologies. 12 Disher's subjectivity also appears to distinguish him 
from the usual 'editor, who is not a fiction writer but a critic, aca-
demic or teacher with tendentious aims or particular standards, 
themes or criteria in mind' (1). By defining himself in terms of what 
he is not, not a critic, academic or teacher, Disher's selection appears 
to be somehow above 'tendentious aims or particular standards, 
themes or criteria' as though his consciousness exists in a cultural 
vacuum. But of course Disher does, in fact, construct his anthology 
according to some kind of 'tendentious aim or particular standard, 
theme or criteria.' How? By selecting writers who have commented 
226 
'astutely' on writing, who would choose atypical material and who 
would convey the variety of Australian short story writing (2). At 
the same time, however, 'the stories are the writers' own, free of 
prevailing notions about quality and representativeness' (3). Even 
so, the 'liberating' of the selection from 'notions about quality and 
representativeness' should not obscure the fact that the selection 
remains highly determined by Disher's emphasis, however 
subjective, on astute commentary and the selection of atypical 
material in order to ensure some form of variety. And the themes 
that Disher disavows reappear in his organisation: grouping or 
pairing 'stories that inform one another or offer varying approaches 
to a theme or subject' (3). 
By creating an imaginary 'anthology tradition' which is sup-
posedly subject to the 'tendentious aims or particular standards, 
themes or criteria' of 'critics, academics or teachers,' thus locating his 
selection as an alternative, Disher invites us to suppose that his se-
lection of writers and the subsequent selection of short stories by 
them occurs in some kind of vacuum, free of culturally determined 
values, social expectations or political concerns. Daniel, similarly, lo-
cates her anthology outside the 'anthology tradition,' this time as 'a 
unique reading experience ... a collective novel ... [with] the kind of 
unity and integrity we would normally associate with a work by a 
single writer' (Daniel, ed. Expressway, xi). But where Disher tends 
consciously to problematise some of the practices that underlie his 
selection, Daniel reveals much about her own position as an agent 
in the construction of 'major Australian writers' in an unwitting 
way. She begins her introduction, for example, by asking the reader 
to 
[i]magine privilege: standing in front of a single painting 
with a gathering of major Australian writers and becom-
ing privy, one by one, to the way each writerly imagina-
tion engages with it. Imagine this is an orderly gathering 
conducted in silence, in privacy, without consultation, 
but at the same time an eloquent symposium of eye and 
word and imagination .... Imagine a fascinating insight 
into something like a national literary imagination at 
work. This was my readerly dream, now become literary 
reality in Expressway. (ix) 
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Daniel constructs her 'literary reality' by 'gathering major 
Australian writers.' And to make this gathering into a 'national lit-
erary imagination' she organises her material in order to establish 
'the kind of unity and integrity we would normally associate with a 
work by a single writer.' What makes this coherence possible is 
Daniel's 'readerly dream,' practically embodied by constraining her 
invited writers to respond to Smart's painting. Such a project estab-
lishes Daniel as the central agent in the project, choosing the 'single 
starting point or focus,' in other words, subordinating the `writerly 
imaginations' of 'major Australian writers' to her coherent con-
sciousness. In doing this it is Daniel who determines the 'unity and 
integrity' of the work. Daniel shows some reluctance in this role: 'I 
object strongly to any reader simply accepting the sequence [of sto-
ries] on paper. Indeed I insist that the reader make choices and per-
sonally determine the sequence' (xiii). Of course, this insistence 
stresses the subjective and contingent experience of particular read-
ers dealing with the text in particular ways at particular moments, 
but it does not diminish the real force of the institutions which de-
termine the way readers currently tend to read books. 
One such institution is Daniel's Contents page which instructs 
the reader to 'consider some stories as companion pieces: there are 
certain 'chronologies' and themes that suggest links between certain 
stories, while the independence of other stories is emphasised by the 
physical demarcation of the writer and story title from the others; 
and Morris Lurie's 'Art is Dangerous, Not So?' which begins and 
ends the collection persuades the reader to make comparative read-
ings of the stories, encouraging the kind of 'contrapuntal fiction' 
that Daniel promotes (xiii). Daniel's insistence that 'the reader make 
choices and personally determine the sequence' sits uncomfortably 
with her art gallery metaphor, which takes for granted the conven-
tions which rule public viewing by individuals, at once a social 
event, 'an orderly gathering,' and something that is 'conducted in si-
lence, in privacy, without consultation.' The function of Daniel's 
metaphorical gallery experience is to conceal her curatorial role. Just 
as the exhibition curator silently structures the experience of the 
viewer, Daniel constructs the experience of the reader which de-
pends on imagining as Daniel imagines in order to gain a second-
hand glimpse of the privilege which she enjoys as the anthology 
228 
editor. There is, however, more leverage in her gallery metaphor 
than this. 
Why does Daniel spend so much time persuading the anthol-
ogy reader to imagine along with her? Her 'imagined privilege' em-
phasises the final, public experience of curated works in a gallery, or 
the final, published reading of selected and organised stories in an 
anthology. By describing the experience of the collected stories of the 
selected writers as finished, the final 'eloquent symposium' which is 
somehow also an 'orderly gathering conducted in silence, in privacy, 
without consultation,' Daniel mythologises the production of litera-
ture as a spontaneous outpouring of genius, in this case of twenty-
nine geniuses, as though reading stories is equivalent to 'standing in 
front of a single painting with a gathering of major Australian writ-
ers' who are immediately prepared to tell stories (and who presum-
ably do not quarrel over who goes first). By pretending that there are 
no mediating processes that intervene in the production of the short 
stories which make up the anthology, Daniel suppresses the negotia-
tions, the consultation, the social and physical conditions which un-
derlie the process of inviting certain writers to produce a story based 
on Smart's painting. 
That specific institutional and material conditions underlie 
Expressway can be seen, however, in the way Daniel refers - 
incidentally - to problems in the construction of the anthology. For 
example, 'nine [writers] found the idea appealing but, to my sorrow, 
either other commitments eventually prevented their participation 
or the idea simply did not work out for them' (ix). Such a failure ap-
pears to exclude the nine invited writers from becoming nine of 
Daniel's 'major Australian writers' but, more than this, indicates 
that 'the way each writerly imagination engages' with Smart's paint-
ing is subject to some measure of success and failure, depending on 
unexpressed criteria used by the writers, Daniel or both. The failure 
of the nine writers, in other words, foregrounds the institutions of 
judgement which police the 'orderliness' of the gathering. 
Presumably the stories of the twenty-nine invited writers finally in-
cluded in the anthology are 'successful.' How Daniel 'drew up an 
invitation list' (ix) and how certain contributions were accepted and 
rejected remains unclear. Much clearer, however, are the institu-
tional and material conditions which determined the selection of 'a 
single starting point, a focus.' 
229 
Originally I chose a painting with a crowd of figures in an 
urban setting which, for reasons of no relevance here, I 
was unable to use. While I thought Cahill Expressway had 
many possibilities, I had some misgivings about choosing 
it simply because it had already appeared on the cover of 
Peter Carey's The Fat Man in History. I feared this connec-
tion might intrude for some writers, trespassing on their 
own responses to the painting. (xii, emphasis added) 
Of course, the factors that determined Daniel's use of Cahill 
Expressway rather than another painting are precisely to do with the 
legal conception of cultural or intellectual property that attempts to 
constrain what agents can and cannot do with texts in the literary 
field, to do with matters of trespass — Daniel's term — which might 
be 'of no relevance here' only because her project is precisely to con-
struct 'an orderly gathering' as though it is autonomous, 'conducted 
in silence, in privacy, without consultation.' But the threatened 
'intrusion' of Carey's short story collection on the invited writers' 
'responses to the painting' indicates that there is no such autonomy. 
In its place, despite Daniel's 'orderly gathering,' the anthology be-
comes one moment in the disorderly overlapping of cultural prod-
ucts which copyright law attempts to police. Smart, Daniel and the 
invited writers are acknowledged and protected by the copyright ap-
paratus of the book, but not Carey or, for that matter, the engineers 
who designed the subway entrance to the Cahill Expressway. 
Whatever their other merits, the disorderly and contingent 
construction and valuing of what counts as 'Australian fiction' re-
mains more or less suppressed in the pedagogically-oriented an-
thologies of Mahar and Powers, Disher and Daniel. Each editor con-
structs a coherent anthology which appears to represent an objective 
content which is policed in various ways: in Mahar's case, in terms 
of particular ways of reading in order to write allusively according to 
some kind of valued set of references; in Disher's case, in terms of 
his own subjective consciousness set against 'the tradition;' and, in 
-Daniel's case, in terms of the coherent, immediate and orderly re-
sponse of various writers who combine, as a result of her common 
stimulus, to form a single 'national literary imagination.' 
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WILL THE REAL DAVID MALOUF PLEASE STAND UP? 
GENERAL REFERENCES AND STUDY GUIDES 
The construction of an object made coherent in terms of ways of 
reading or in terms of an individual consciousness is also, of course, 
the particular project of general reference and study guides. I want 
now to consider how these kinds of texts construct objects in the lit-
erary field, looking at one such object, 'the work of David Malouf.' 
On the face of it, literary reference guides describe the writers 
and titles who count in the literary field, producing an introductory 
overview of the personnel and texts that dominate the field. But it is 
more accurate to say that their function appears to be descriptive. 
The amount of space devoted to particular writers and titles con-
structs their significance. More than this, the way that writers, texts, 
genres, schools and periods are described constructs their apparent 
objectivity as items that are then able to count in the field. I want to 
look at the way in which literary reference guides do this, firstly, by 
foregrou_nding the highly regionalised constraints on the way guides 
are used and, secondly, by examining some apparently descriptive 
entries on David Malouf. 
Readers are situated in relation to reference guides, where the 
guide becomes an authority, a text to be consulted or referred to in 
order to verify the particular characteristics of a writer, text, genre, 
school or period. Readers stand in the same relation to reference 
guides as students stand to teachers. The way a reader uses a refer-
ence guide, as a result, is heavily determined by the practices of 
study, in which the student defers (willingly or not) to the authority 
of the teacher or reference guide editor. The possible uses of guides, 
as a result, are determined by the 'stock of knowledge' which, on the 
one hand, student-readers carry into their social practice and, on the 
other, is also specific to the particular. Qc.11- gs. in which, reference 
guides are used. The use of a guide is especially determined by re-
gional characteristics to do with the space in which the guide is lo-
cated and the way space is disposed within the guide. This means 
that the use of the guide is determined by characteristics operating 
outside as- welt as- inside the text. This is evident in the location of 
entries and the relationships between them, the way reference 
guides are organised as alphabetical lists of cross-indexed writers, 
texts, genres, schools and periods, but it is also evideritqq, the physi-
cal access students have to reference guides. Student-readers usually 
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refer to a guide to locate a writer, text, genre, school or period that 
has already been prescribed for study. While this involves locating 
the writer, text, genre, school or period in terms of the space made 
available in the guide and on the library shelf, spaces which act as 
guides to the importance of the writer, text, genre, school or period 
in the field, it also involves locating the writer, text, genre, school or 
period with and against other writers, texts, genres, schools or peri-
ods by determining which cross-references are to count. But, most 
importantly, it involves the very identity of the writer, text, genre, 
school or period as particular kinds. This is because the guide func-
tions as an instantiation while appearing to be a summation, pro-
ducing the legitimate writers, texts, genres, schools or periods and 
what are to count as important features of them while appearing 
only to describe them. 
Two reference guides from the Oxford stable, whose series of 
'Histories,' Companions,"Guides' and 'Books dominate the literary 
reference market in Australia, provide useful examples of this 
process. Let me illustrate how they variously construct 'the works of 
David Malouf.' Adrian Mitchell's comments on David Malouf in 
the 1981 Oxford History of Australian Literature, at one extreme, and 
comments in Laurie Clancy's 1992 Reader's Guide to Australian 
Fiction, at the other, indicate just how differently reference guides 
construct the same kinds of category, in so doing framing the 
reader's perception of Malouf. Mitchell's short entry on Malouf's 
fiction is based on the first two novels, John no and An Imaginary 
Life, and constructs 'the work of Malouf' as 'a fiction [that is] 
characterised by cool deliberation and meticulous craf tsmanship.' 13 
Mitchell's version of the work emphasises Malouf as a stylist who is 
'overly studied' and 'self-indulgent to a fault' (Mitchell, 'Fiction,' in 
Kramer, ed. Oxford History of Australian Literature, 171). As far as 
An Imaginary Life is concerned, 'while it is a book of considerable 
intelligence and skill, the studied elegance of its style betrays it, for 
the precious writing becomes brittle rather than refreshing' (171). 
Eleven years later, the score card has changed considerably. Clancy's 
1992 Reader's Guide recognises Malouf as a 'mature writer,' whose 
seven works (including a short story collection), as opposed to 
Mitchell's two in 1981, construct a definite 'line' through the works 
in order to organise a coherent corpus.14 The Malouf of the 1981 
Oxford History is still principally a poet (referred to in an entry over 
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four pages long) rather than a novelist (referred to in less than one 
page). The 1992 Malouf is constructed as a novelist, partly because 
the reference genre dictates this - the guide is a guide only to 
Australian Fiction - and partly because since 1981 Malouf has only 
published fa works in prose. 
It would seem to be simply the mass of seven prose works 
that exerts pressure on Clancy's writing team to construct a coherent 
corpus. The entry is characterised by references to Malouf's 
'superficially quite different' but actually 'similar' or 'usual' han- 
dling of 'imagination' from one novel to another, by references to 
'continuities' by which the disparate material of Child's Play (which 
includes Eustace and The Prowler) and the short stories in 
Antipodes are 'united,' and by an insistence on 'antithetic images' 
and 'carefully structured sets of binary images' that are 'usual in 
Malouf' (Clancy, A Reader's Guide to Australian Fiction, 283-86, 
especially 285-86). The tendency here to conflate 'the works of David 
Malouf' and 'David Malouf might seem to be a mistake that charac- 
terises much literary discussion. But the 'sets of binary images' that 
are 'usual in Malouf function to gather greater coherence about the 
object that the guide appears to describe. When the 'sets of binary 
images' are 'in Malouf rather than in his works, the object that ap- 
pears to have been described - a series of comments on certain 
works written by and called 'David Malouf' - gains the psychological 
autonomy that readers tend to ascribe to physically existing 
individuals, as though readers are somehow 'really' reading Malouf. 
Because reference guides provide readers with a sketch of co- 
herent objects, usually organised in terms of the alphabetically listed 
name of the writer, text, genre, school or period, the need to 
organise seven novels and collections of shorter fiction may well 
determine the coherence of the Reader's Guide version of 'the 
works of Malouf.' But why is the coherence that is 'usual in Malouf' 
to do with 'antithetic images' and 'carefully structured sets of binary 
images'? To answer this question I'd like to return to Mitchell's ver- 
sion. Mitchell emphasises Malouf's preoccupation with perception. 
Both novels use a first-person perspective. John no fails because 
'[t]he narrative appears to attend to the arranged manner of expres- 
sion rather than to the perceptions recollected' (Mitchell, 171). An 
Imaginary Life deals with 'the transforming powers of the sympa- 
thetic imagination ... of being, finally, what one perceives' (171). 
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Writing in 1981, Mitchell constructs 'the works of MaLou? in terms 
of perception rather than the possibilities of reading the novels in 
terms of 'antithetic images.' He differs noticeably from more recent 
accounts like Clancy's 1992 Reader's Guide and detailed study guides 
like Philip Neilsen's 1990 Imagined Lives and Ivor Indyk's 1993 
David Malouf that depend, as I shall attempt to show below, on 
Malouf's own account of his fiction in his 1984 article 'Three 
Tallcs.' 15 
Publishers like Oxford University and the University of 
Queensland Press which operate in the Australian under-graduate 
literary study guide market help to determine what is meant by 
'Australian fiction' and to determine who counts in the literary 
field. This might suggest that publishers simply select the personnel 
and texts that count in Australian short fiction, as though the field is 
the product only of commercial market-driven interests. But 
publishers like Oxford and UQP are operating, as I have tried to 
show in Chapter Three, as only one publishing institution in a 
matrix of institutions in the field of cultural production, in this case 
in a specifically pedagogically orientated market. This means that 
they are as much responding to the needs of teaching institutions as 
determining them. So when UQP and Oxford reference and study 
guides list 'the works of David Malouf' they respond to the 
inclusion of 'the works of David Malouf' on syllabuses, helping to 
maintain an oeuvre which has usually got there, as Mark Davis 
notes, as a result of 'a sustained campaign by an academic ... [to] 
make [the] writer's career' - the flip side of which is that 'those who 
fail to attract the right sort of academic attention are likely to be 
overlooked as "serious" or "literary" writers.' 16 The further step in 
this process is that when UQP and Oxford list 'David Malouf' they 
help to make that object lstudyable/ maintaining its usefulness as an 
item on the syllabus and thereby promoting Malouf's continued 
inclusion on syllabuses. Malouf's durable status in reference and 
study guides, in other words, responds to and at the same time helps 
to maintain his strong showing on 'Australian Literature' 
undergraduate courses. In a survey of ten university undergraduate 
course guides which detailed course offerings dealing with 
Australian writers' texts, nine selected a novel by Malouf at least 
once (see Table 2). Such a strong representation on undergraduate 
courses indicates Malouf's established position as an object for 
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critical attention, but the efect of this representation on publishers 
is not simple. While Malouf's novels appear in thirteen of fourteen 
courses offered at the ten universities, no single novel title 
dominates. This determines the format of study guides on Malouf. 
Guide publishers, editors and commissioned writers respond to the 
variety of selected titles for undergraduate study by structuring 
guides in two ways, in terms of inclusive titles and in terms of 
themes. This helps to maintain the shelf life of the guide. But by 
doing this guides in turn help to maintain 'the works of David 
Malouf' as a whole, providing commentary on every novel title just 
in case it is selected for study. And it is this inclusiveness which 
helps to construct the appearance of coherence for 'the works.' 
Table 2 
Selection of novels by David Malouf for 'Australian Literature' undergraduate 
courses 
University* 	 Number of novels selected 	 Number of courses ofered 
Macquariet 	 1 	 1 Newcastle 	 1 	 1 Sydney 	 1 	 1 Western Sydney* 	 1 	 1 Wolongong 	 2 	 2 Deakin 	 1 	 1 La Trobe 	 0 	 1 Monash 	 2 	 2 Melbourne 	 3 	 3 Tasmania 	 1 	 1 * Only handbooks which included text lists are shown t Malouf was selected for 'Contemporary Australian Literature' but not for 'Twentieth-Century Australian Literature.' * Malouf was selected as one of three writers for 'Australian Authors: Special 
Study,' along with Patrick White and Judith Wright. 
Source: 1997 University undergraduate course guide handbooks. 
As at 1990, the UQP Studies in Australian Literature series 
counted Malouf, Randolph Stow, John Shaw Neilson, Michael 
Dransfield along with 'Aboriginal Literature,' Women's Poetry' and 
'New Australian Poetry' as worth studying, while in 1993, the 
Oxford Australian Writers series counted Malouf, Peter Porter, A. D. 
Hope, James McAuley. UQP had Joseph Furphy, Judith Wright, 
George Johnston, Olga Masters, Gwen Harwood, David Ireland, 
Henry Handel Richardson, Xavier Herbert, Peter Carey, Patrick 
White, Thea Astley, Thomas Kennealy, Elizabeth Joley and 
Christina Stead in the pipeline while Oxford had put their money 
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on Martin Boyd, Bruce Dawe, Helen Garner, Gwen Harwood, 
Elizabeth Jolley, Henry Lawson, Les Murray, Kenneth Slessor, 
Christina Stead, Patrick White and Judith Wright. These study-
guide 'A' lists mirror and confirm the loose listing of Australian 
short fiction writers typically selected in anthologies, selecting a 
wider range of personnel only because the study-guide lists include 
writers of poetry and longer fiction. The writers in the Oxford and 
UQP lists who are infrequently anthologised are Boyd, Furphy, 
Kenneally and Stow (see Chapter Four, Table 1). 
Unlike anthologies, however, the specific emphasis in the 
study guide, as I shall attempt to show, is not to construct a genre but 
to construct a psychologically coherent object, for example, 'David 
Malouf,' as the origin of characteristic features that are discernible in 
and can be shown to operate consistently across a number of works. 
To show how study guides do this I want to consider study guide 
treatment of Malouf's John no and the way this novel is organised 
into a framework of `Malouf's characteristic work.' 
Two publications by the University of Queensland Press in 
1990 indicate the clear hand of supply-side institutions in the con-
struction and consecration of Malouf. The first, a reissue of John no 
along with previously uncollected short stories, poems essays and 
an interview, attempts to position Malouf as 'one of the finest 
writers in contemporary literature' and reproduces 'primary 
material' that 'show[s] the range of his remarkable achievement.' 17 
The second, a much more sophisticated rendering of Malouf by 
Philip Neilsen for the UQP Studies in Australian Literature series, 
attempts to show how the various novels deal coherently with 
several over-riding oppositions, between the self and the other, the 
made and unmade place, the centre and the periphery. 
James Tulip's 'Introduction' to John no attempts to harness to 
this early novel the prestige established by Malouf's subsequent aca-
demic reputation. John no reveals 'a sophistication to the mind of 
the writer, an appealing self-consciousness, and a subtle awareness 
of the boundaries of autobiography and fiction having to be mutu-
ally crossed' (Tulip, 'Introduction' to Johnno, ix). The pressure 
brought to bear on Tulip's claim that John no fits into Malouf's 
overall concern with boundaries and transformation (a point I shall 
come to in a moment) is revealed in the syntactical contortion in 
the verb-dense phrase, 'awareness having to be crossed.' Tulip 
236 
positions Johnno in Malouf's corpus by foregrounding its concern 
with oppositions, boundaries and transformations. In so doing he 
harnesses his introduction to the orthodoxy that elsewhere 
maintains that oppositions, boundaries and transformations 
characterise Malouf's work. 
The idea that Malouf's fiction deals with tensions between 
and possible resolution of oppositions is attractive, especially for the 
kind of literary critic whose job it is to synthesise often disparate 
material into a coherent whole. This is Philip Neilsen's project in 
Imagined Lives: A Study of David Malouf. Neilsen's account of op-
positions in the fiction of Malouf derives, interestingly enough, 
from Malouf's own critical account written in 1984 of his work, 
which he claims is situated 
in that opposition between suburbs and wilderness; be- 
tween the settled life and a nomadic life; between a 
metropolitan centre and edge; between places made and 
places that are unmakeable or not yet made; between the 
perceiver ... and all sorts of things which are 'other.' 18 
Ostensibly, Malouf is talking about his poem, 'The Year of the 
Foxes,' but he may as well have been trying to produce an analytical 
framework for An Imaginary Life. Neilsen refines the perspective 
thoughtfully provided by Malouf to establish three basic oppositions 
in Malouf's fiction: wholeness! incompleteness; culture! nature; and 
change! stasis. This framework allows Neilsen to explain Malouf's 
fiction, quite convincingly and even usefully, in terms of these op-
positions and their resolution. 
Wherever there is a complete or partial resolution of op-
positions, this is achieved through one or more of a lim-
ited number of agents: imagination; language; history (or 
memory); the machine; or the organic. Such resolution 
involves transformation or change of some kind; and as a 
result of such change, the protagonist is often enabled to 
approach closer to nature and to come to terms with 
death. The agents of change themselves are often inter-
related, as well. 
This paradigm is already present, in an embryonic 
form, in John no. (Neilsen, Imagined Lives, 46) 
Needless to say, the paradigm is most clearly articulated in Malouf's 
next novel, An Imaginary Life, which might better be called 
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Graph 1 
Critical productivity of David Malouf: number of adicles/reviews per year 
Neilsen's paradigm and which seems to constrain Neilsen's reading 
of the earlier novel. What is interesting here, however, is that the 
paradigm is delivered by Malouf-as-critic in 1984, discussing a poem 
published in 1970, offering a retrospective paradigm which makes 
possible an interpretation of his output, linking the 1970 poem to 
the 1978 An Imaginary Life. 
How Malouf's paradigm comes to influence future inter-
preters of his work depends on his timing as a critic. His 1984 binary 
paradigm retrospectively constructs the 1976 John no, the 1978 An 
Imaginary Life, and the 1983 Child's Play and Fly Away Peter, and 
seems to determine the content of his post-1984 novels. What is in-
teresting is that Malouf's critical productivity peaked twice, between 
1976 and 1978 in the period when he shifted from an academic who 
wrote poetry to a writer who wrote novels, and in 1984 during and 
after which his output emphasises the mapping of 'places,' centres' 
and 'edges' (see Graph 1). 19 
Source: Philip Neilsen, Imagined Lives, 201-06. 
Malouf's surge of reviewing and critical activity between 1976 and 
1978 produced a public and critical persona that was to maintain his 
position in the literary field just as he switched from academic-poet 
to novelist while his critical activity in 1984 enabled him to establish 
and maintain the rhetorical weight - or 'critical mass' - of the binary 
238 
paradigm that was taken up by subsequent literary critics like 
Neilsen. 
Neilsen uses the paradigm to organise Malouf's fiction into a 
coherent 'body of work' and gains his greatest purchase on this 'body 
of work' by developing the body trope revealed in the 'embryonic 
form' of an early work like John no. Once it is possible to read 
Malours 'body of work' in terms of an underlying series of opposi-
tions which are resolved in one way or another, the early and semi-
autobiographical John no becomes the first step in this reading. But 
Johnno is the 'embryonic form' of the paradigm for good reason. It 
is, first of all, difficult to read the novel in Neilsen's terms and he 
struggles to apply the paradigm to it: 
the problem of wholeness/incompleteness represented by 
the duality of the Dante and Johnno characters, and 
Dante's detachment, is partly resolved through language 
and imagination .... But the resolution is for the reader 
rather than for the protagonist .... It is we, not Dante, who 
realise that Dante has been 'changed.' (46) 
Clearly, in so far as texts offer readers experiences which invite some 
form of closure, so that at the end 'we realise that a character has 
been changed,' the paradigm can be said to apply to many texts. But 
the fact that Johnno is such a weak demonstration of Neilsen's 
paradigm is all the more reason to claim the paradigm exists only in 
'embryonic form' in the novel. The paradigm, in this case, is still 
germinating (a guiding trope for Malouf) and therefore understand-
ably difficult to recognise. For Neilsen it becomes recognisable, of 
course, in An Imaginary Life (47). But it is by pushing back the ori-
gins of Malouf's apparently coherent paradigm of oppositions and 
resolutions to the 'embryonic' Johnno that Neilsen is able to present 
Malouf's 'body of work' precisely as an organic body. 
Just how much effort is required to maintain the view that 
Johnno represents the embryonic paradigm is neatly exposed in 
Malouf's recent reintroduction of the novel in his preface to 'a new 
hardback edition' published 'as part of [the University of 
Queensland Press's] 50th anniversary: 20 The preface, published as 
an article by 'the distinguished novelist and poet' in the Weekend 
Australian Review, reasserts the embryonic motifs: John no explores 
the 'notion of parallel lives, alternative fates, ... opposing 
possibilities' (Malouf, Weekend Australian Review, 12). But Malouf 
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also adds a new credential to the novel by claiming that the novel 
presents an opposition between the 'absented,' elusive,"non-
existent' Florence where the novel was written - produced 
retrospectively by the new preface which describes 'the grand, 
rusticated front of the Pitti Palace, the cypress tops of the Boboli 
Gardens, and on the ridge above, airily theatrical against the Tuscan 
sky, the lemon-pale facade of Forte Belvedere' (10) - against which is 
pitched 'poor, shabby, unromantic Brisbane' (12). The terms claim 
for John no a position as a novel which demonstrates Malouf's 
paradigmatic 'opposition between suburbs and wilderness, 
metropolitan centre and edge.' And, in an attempt to reinforce the 
applicability of his paradigmatic opposition of 'places made and 
places that are unmakeable or not yet made,' John no becomes a book 
about the already-made Florence and the not-yet-made Brisbane of 
Malouf's imagination, 'about reading and interpretation, which is 
what links it with much else that I have written.' (12) While the 
claim also links John no with much else - almost everything else - 
that has been written by other writers, the point of Malouf's self-
construction here is to maintain the paradigm, to police the way 
John no can and cannot be read. Johnno should not, for example, be 
read as 'a gay novel,' (10) despite Malouf's timid prefatorial 
references to 'my Florentine friend.' By policing the novel in this 
way, constructing Johnno in terms of his paradigm, Malouf 
Produces a way of thinking about and reading the Maloufian 
oeuvre, the works of the distinguished novelist and poet, which can 
then be taken up by other interested agents in the literary field. 
So far I have assumed that Neilsen's project is a study of 
Malouf's 'body of work,' but Imagined Lives is more ambitious than 
this. It is, more problematically, A Study of David Malouf and, as 
this subtitle suggests, he constructs a reading of Malouf's fiction as 
the traces of a coherent psychological identity and set of experiences. 
This reading can be seen most clearly in the fascinating slippage that 
occurs in Neilsen's attempt to read Malouf and Dante as the writers 
of Johnno. 
At his best Neilsen produces an elegant reading of Malouf's 
construction of Dante's construction of Johnno's construction of 
Johrulo's persona in the novel. 
We learn that Dante has created a fictional character 
called johnno, and has presented him to us in such a way 
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that suits Dante's own purposes .... Similarly, we are 
reminded that Dante and Johrtno are both constructed by 
Malouf. (9) 
Beyond this, Johnno's 'manufacturing of illusions ... to construct an 
image of himself ... mythologises himself' (10-11). Such a view, trac-
ing the text through several narrative layers, enables a number of 
ironic readings. But the complexity of Neilsen's view seems to be-
come unmanageable. At times it is `Malouf (or Dante)' (10) rather 
than Malouf through Dante who controls the narrative. And the 
temptation to read the novel autobiographically tends at times to 
lead Neilsen to confuse Dante with Malouf (8) while at others times 
differentiating them (7). 
Ivor Indyk expresses the same kind of uncertainty about the 
location of Malouf in his fiction. So far as Indyk is concerned, 
Malouf becomes the narrator, Dante in John no, Ovid in An 
Imaginary Life, speaking in the first person. For Indyk, Nile death of 
the father presides over the birth of David Malouf's career as a 
novelist. John no begins with the writer sorting through his father's 
effects.' 21 Who exactly is Indyk's writer, Malouf or Dante? John no 
certainly begins with 'the writer sorting through his father's effects' 
and it is possible to say that this writer is Dante or Malouf or both. 
Indyk gains some interesting mileage for John no from this idea, al-
lowing for multiple ironic readings like Neilsen. But the price is to 
reduce the novel to an autobiographical account that 'begins David 
Malouf's career as a novelist.' Indyk emphasises this reading in his 
opening comments. 'Johnno is the most deliberately autobiographi-
cal of Malouf's fictional works' and '[t]he  detail encourages some 
identification of Malouf with the writer Dante' (Indyk, David 
Malouf, 3). But at the same time it is 'Dante's book' that we are 
reading (3) and, later, 'Dante [who] tells the two stories [of Johnno 
and the father] in a way which makes them complement each other. 
The novel can be seen as an act of restitution by Dante' (8) and it is 
Dante who switches `to johnno as the subject of his novel' (9). Indyk 
slips from the writer Malouf to the writer Dante in such a way that 
they become indistinguishable. Although he denies Malouf 
precedence as the origin of Dante, Indyk maintains a tighter control 
over the relationship between Malouf and 'Malouf's Ovid' (11). 
Even here, though, he allows for some compression of the two 
when the 'closing pages of the novel offer the same kind of 
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consolation to Malouf as they do to Ovid, for they complete the 
work that will carry its writer's name into the future' (18). Like 
Malouf and Dante, the identity of Malouf and Ovid is compressed by 
the way the novel 'carries its [singular] writer's name into the 
future.' 
Indyk struggles to resolve this reading in terms of Malouf's 
use of first-person narratives. The first-person perspective, he ex-
plains, 'is a fickle instrument - since there is no external point of 
reference, [so] its effects are always open to conjecture' (36). The 
main 'danger [is] that readers will go all the way, ... applying it to the 
author himself, so that everything in the text is sheeted home to 
him' (36). And this is exactly what Indyk does, sheeting home the 
problem to a 'Malouf in the text.' But his explication of the texts 
wants to do the opposite, to establish an apparently 'external point of 
reference' derived from his reading of the novels - he calls this 
`Malour as well - that functions to constrain 'conjecture.' Indyk re-
turns to this external point again in his discussion of Child's Play, a 
novel written in the first person from the perspective of the terror-
ist. Here, 'the lifeless style of the terrorist may well be mistaken for 
[Malouf's] own, as if, in this work at least, the imagination had 
dropped suddenly and completely out of his writing' (76). Such a 
possibility cuts against Indyk's argument, which is that Malouf's 
work is consistent and coheres around imaginative tableaux, best 
demonstrated in An Imaginary Life. In order to resist the possibility 
that Malouf's fiction moves in various other directions, or that 
there is no coherent 'Maio& who constrains the fiction, Indyk 
accepts 'the terrorist's style as Malouf's own,' compressing narrator 
and writer again in order to salvage his overall project. '[T]he inert 
detail in Child's Play,' it turns out, 'does represent an anxious aspect 
of Malouf's own art, one which lurks in the catalogues of John no 
and Harland's Half Acre, and at times in the straying focus of The 
Great World' (76, emphasis added). Notice how this 'terrorist style' 
lurks beneath the otherwise distinctive imagination that, Indyk 
claims, characterises Malouf. It is the critic's gift to be able to discern 
such traces, even at the expense of a little confusion between 
authorial presence and narrative voice. 
Neilsen's and Indyk's tendency to confuse Malouf and Dante 
in their discussion of John no cuts against the general thrust of their 
respective discussions. For Neilsen, the coherence of the body of 
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work relies on the oppositions consistently traceable through 
Malouf's novels, not Dante's. For Indyk, coherence relies on a psy-
chological reading of Malouf as the origin of consistent experiences 
that stimulate consistent kinds of material. To support this, the un-
derlying argument in his study is that Malouf's work is characterised 
by common features: emblematic tableaux that allow for equiva-
lences and oppositions (after Neilsen); a concern for masculine expe-
rience; an emphasis on the relation of father and son figures and of-
ten homosexual relations; and a concern with Malouf's own sense 
of exclusion. What is interesting about Indyk's reading is that his 
characteristics incorporate possibly non-psychological technical 
features (like the frequent use of tableaux in Malouf's fiction) into a 
psychological reading of Malouf as a person concerned with 
masculine experience, the relation of father and son figures, 
homosexual relations, and his own sense of exclusion. It may well 
be that Malouf's psychological make-up does stimulate the kind of 
fiction that he writes, but what is important is that Indyk's reading 
constructs the fiction as though it is all and always the unmediated 
coherent trace of the experience of Malouf, the coherent 
psychological individual. The constructing of Malouf as a 
psychological entity apparently originating but actually traced by his 
texts is, of course, a favourite past-time of literary critics who have 
played this sort of game since Malone constructed the poet 
Shakespeare, newly made evident in his sonnets.22 
The versions of 'Malouf' that Neilsen and Indyk construct in 
their studies of 'the man' — Neilsen in A Study of David Malouf and 
Indyk in David Malouf — work to project 'the man' as 'the author' 
who is outside and antecedent to his novels, and at the same time 
expressed through his novels. This 'Maio& polices the works, in-
sisting that readers deal with the works as a coherent and develop-
ing body of material expressive of some psychologically coherent 
perspective, and constraining possible readings by prescribing, for 
example, the centrality of tableaux that produce patterns of equiva-
lence and opposition, a prescription that forces the reader, including 
Neilsen, to re-read John no as an 'embryonic form' of the pattern 
'best' illustrated by An Imaginary Life.23 But at the same time the 
priority of Malouf in the works is derived from the works them-
selves. The 'Maio& that appears to determine Neilsen's and Indyk's 
'works of Malouf' is actually traced from the novels. And the even 
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greater difficulty is that in tracing this `Maloue both Neilsen and 
Indyk collapse their 'Maloufs' into the first-person perspectives of 
the novels. 
For all that their accounts of Malouf are problematic, the 
study guides of Neilsen and Indyk constrain what readers do with 
and how they value the texts. This is, of course, their explicit 
function. The back cover blurb to Neilsen's guide 'explores in detail 
the work of this highly respected writer, demonstrating that both his 
fiction and poetry reveal a distinctive interconnected system of 
oppositions, themes and images ... [and a] number of concerns [that] 
are central to David Malouf.' Indyk's blurb 'presents Malouf as both 
a primitive and a romantic ... [and] explores the hidden logic of 
Malouf's art, revealing an underlying technique that works through 
emblem and analogy.' Both blurbs present the guides as descriptions 
of 'the works of David Malouf,' exploring this object in order to 
reveal what is otherwise hidden. In both, the student-reader 
depends on the critic to distinguish the important patterns in the 
work/ the man, Neilsen 'revealing what is distinctive,' Indyk 
'exploring what is hidden' in the positive object they actually 
construct. Like general reference guides and anthologies, their study 
guides function like all study guides to establish and maintain 
certain personnel, texts and ways of reading them in the literary 
field. This is because cultural products and practices are all and 
always interventions which compete to establish and maintain and 
demolish and suppress the interests of the various social agents who 
operate in the wider cultural field. 
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Great Cultural Centre,' Age Saturday Extra (14 July 1984) 14; 'A First Place: the 
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Mapping of a World,' Southerly, 45 (1985) 3-10; 'Putting Ourselves on the Map,' Age 
Bicentennial Extra (23 January 1988) 1-2. 
20 Introductory blurb to David Malouf, 'The Jotuirto Blueprint,' the Weekend 
Australian Review (29-30 August 1998) 10. 
21 Ivor Lndylk, David Malouf. Melbourne: Oxford UP, 1993, 1, emphasis added. 
22 Margreta de Grazia produces an elegant account of Malone's construction of the 
psychological entity he calls 'Shakespeare' in her study, Shakespeare Verbatim. 
The Reproduction of Authenticity and the 1790 Apparatus. Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1991. 
23 It is Foucault, of course, who uncovers the function of 'the author' in policing the 
text. See Michel Foucault, 'What Is An Author?' in Josue Harari, ed. Textual 
Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism. London: Methuen, 1979. 141- 
60. Foucault's essay is discussed in detail in Chapter One above. 
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The Usual Suspects 
The members of the [Individual Writers' Grants] Committee 
... were appointed by the Australia Council for their 
knowledge of Australian literature and of specific genres of 
that literature (fiction, non-fiction, children's literature, 
drama, poetry), for their known integrity and sound 
judgement, and for their interest in the development and 
good standing of Australian literature. 1 
[Ilt's ... a case of rounding up the "usual suspects." 
Mark Davis2 
At the beginning of this thesis I attempted to show how it is that any 
social actors, and cultural producers in particular, operate with some 
degree of agency within the historically and institutionally constraining 
rules of various fields. Much of my discussion has centred on the way 
that apparently disinterested practices in cultural and specifically 
literary production are highly institutionally determined and self-
interested, to show that every practice is determined by previous 
contests over who and what counts in the literary field. I have 
maintained such a focus in order to foreground those less obvious, 
'soft,' apparently natural institutional practices or interventions that 
contest the publication and reception of particular products, like 'short 
fiction' of one kind or another in anthologies or 'the works of David 
Malouf' in reference and study guides. But in the background there also 
exist those more obvious 'hard' institutions and the social agents who 
operate in and with them that determine which writers make it into 
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print and then into the canon and what sorts of product those writers 
are likely to believe to be worth writing. These are practices, in the end, 
that influence what writers write and what gets to be published. I want 
now to consider some of these practices in order to show how clearly 
even the apparently autonomous and disinterested practice of 'writing 
before publication' is determined by such obvious or 'hard' institutions 
as arts funding organisations, literary juries and writers' festivals in the 
literary field. 
Any attempt to account for the institutions which constrain the 
cultural agents called 'writers' (meaning here people who write 'fiction,' 
'children's literature,' poetry,"literary non-fiction' or 'writing for 
performance' 3) must first dispose of a prevailing myth in the literary 
field - the myth which suggests that cultural agents are autonomous 
and disinterested artists, where art somehow stands outside 
institutional practices. 4 In order to explain how writers in the literary 
field operate institutionally I want to look underneath this myth at the 
interested organisations that determine which agents count as literary 
writers and which texts count as literary texts. My argument is that 
those organisations which control literary grants or subsidies, literary 
prizes, even writers' festival programs determine the usual suspects - 
the kinds of writer and writing that are published and promoted as 
'literary' ones. 
Categories like 'fiction,' children's literature,' poetry,"literary 
non-fiction' or 'writing for performance' are determined by a network 
of institutions including the Australia Council and other state-funded 
arts organisations, writers' festivals, literary juries, television and radio 
literary programs, literary journals, academic journals, monographs 
series, study guides and reference guides, as well as by publishers, 
editors, bookshops, libraries, and so on. The writer within this network 
is, as I attempted to show in Chapter Three, ostensibly a primary 
producer who only appears to supply raw product that is grist for this 
literary mill. Categories like 'fiction,' children's literature,' poetry,' 
'literary non-fiction' or 'writing for performance,' however, are 
themselves raw products that determine the writer's production. This 
relation is neatly exposed in the way that successful applicants for 
funding from the Australia Council Literature Fund are determined by 
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the Fund's classification of genres. It can also be seen in the way the 
Australia Council supports certain kinds of text through its publishing 
subsidy program. 
The Australia Council Literature Fund assesses writers' appli-
cations on the basis of 'literary merit' (also called 'literary excellence'), 
'cultural significance,' originality' and 'the possibility of publication or 
performance' (Australia Council Literature Fund, Individual Writers' 
Grants Assessment Committee Assessment Procedures - 1994, 3).5 
These criteria for the assessment of grants determine what writers 
count as a 'literary' kind of writing in complex ways. It may well be that 
writers 'write to' the Australia Council categories in order to receive 
funding, accommodating themselves to the criteria outlined in 
Australia Council documents. But they also 'write' the categories 
because Australia Council 'fellowships' and other grants, in conferring 
prestige on funded writers, confer the status of 'literary work' on the 
work that such writers subsequently produce. Writers may, in other 
words, write from a prescriptive model of 'literary merit' or 'excellence,' 
whatever that might mean, in order to make themselves more 
attractive in the funding market but, once funded, appear to produce 
the descriptive model of what counts as writing of 'literary merit,' as 
though 'literary merit' existed in the first place. The institutional 
system of 'literariness' is maintained in this process because agents 
'inherit' positions and relationships in the cultural system and, at the 
same time, elaborate their socio-cultural practices in such a way that 
they sometimes modify the cultural system. 6 This suggests that the 
system precedes practices, when in fact the process is a kind of circuit in 
which the system creates practices and is created by them at every 
moment. The work of the funded 'literary' writer, for example, is 
determined by (amongst other things) Australia Council assessment 
criteria and at the same time determines these criteria by producing by 
definition 'literary' work that can only be thought to count as the 
'literary' work the Australia Council funds. 
The emphasis on 'originality' in Australia Council assessments 
also determines the kind of writing writers produce in the literary field. 
Originality is not, of course, anything new, as I attempted to show in 
Chapter Two. Originality occupies an important place in the 
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construction of 'literary work' because it was deployed in the historical 
struggle against mass-market, formula-driven cultural producers by 
self-proclaimed artists producing for the restricted market. Originality, 
in other words, is not a neutral characteristic but a highly charged 
political one which distinguishes between 'high' and 'low' positions in 
the literary field.7 The Literature Fund, in fact, ranks applicants (not 
applications) as 'very high,' high„"middle' or 'low.' The apparently 
neutral but highly situated character of Literature Fund assessments is 
further marked by the attempt to stabilise the indefinable and 
subjective basis on which the Fund measures 'literary merit,' cultural 
significance' and 'originality.' The Fund attempts to stabilise the 
judgements made by the committee in several ways. The committee, 
first of all, includes 
members appointed by the Australia Council for their 
knowledge of Australian literature and of specific genres of 
that literature (fiction, non-fiction, children's literature, 
drama, poetry), for their known integrity and sound 
judgement, and for their interest in the development and 
good standing of Australian literature. (Australia Council 
Literature Fund, Individual Writers' Grants Assessment 
Committee Assessment Procedure— 1994, 1) 
The Fund's selections of 'the usual suspects' are, thereby, neatly self-
justifying. The committee is drawn from players in the literary field 
who understand the 'specific genres' recognised by the Fund and who 
are 'interested' in 'the development and good standing of Australian 
literature.' Even further, the selection of the assessment committee is 
determined by members of the Literature Board of the Australia 
Council who are themselves drawn from the literary field. (Members in 
1995 were Marion Halligan, Brian Castro, Kevin Hart, Joan London and 
Louis Nowra.) 
Writers are always situated in relation to the assessments of the 
Literature Fund, when they are funded as 'original and literary writers 
of cultural significance,' when they are not funded, and even when 
they refuse Literature Fund assessment, whether because they perceive 
themselves to occupy a position above, beneath or outside the category 
of 'original and literary writers of cultural significance' in the cultural 
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field. This situating of writers is a two-way street, determined by 
writers' perceptions of the Australia Council and by Australia Council 
perceptions of various genres and writers. So far as the Literature Fund 
is concerned, 
[t]he genres of romantic and crime fiction are not seen as 
high priorities by the Literature Fund [and if] a writer has 
achieved publication of books in [romantic and crime fiction] 
only ... they are not eligible to submit an application form for 
an Individual Writers' Grant.8 
The Literature Fund takes great pains to establish the boundaries to the 
literary field, particularly by defining what it is not. 
The main focus of the Literature Fund is the creation of 
literary works. It does not assist the following categories of 
works: books aimed primarily at the education market 
(primary, secondary or tertiary); reprints or new editions; 
books which are primarily works of interviews; local or oral 
histories; military studies; instruction manuals; how-to 
books; university theses; bibliographies; dictionaries and 
encyclopaedia; guide books; catalogues; personal growth, 
lifestyle and hobby books; works of physical or natural 
sciences; theology; psychology; cooking; medicine; and law. 
The Fund does not assist the creation of film and television 
scripts.9 
Besides restricting eligible genres, further restrictions are imposed on 
the personnel who might claim to be 'original and literary writers of 
cultural significance' as maintained by Literature Fund eligibility 
standards. In order to apply for 'Grants for Emerging Writers,' the 
lowest rank of applicants, writers are required to have the following 
minimum publications: 
• six short stories or six substantial extracts of full-length 
fiction or literary non-fiction in literary journals and an-
thologies, or general national magazines and newspapers; 
• twenty poems of reasonable length in literary publica-
tions, or at least twenty commissioned/professional en-
gagements by performance poets; 
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• ten substantial articles ... in general national magazines or 
newspapers; 
• one full-length script workshopped by a professional 
company or organisation; 
• one full-length broadcast on radio; 
• a combination of the above. (Australia Council Grants 
Handbook — 1997, 72) 
These restrictions have tightened up since 1995 when eligibility de-
pended on twelve poems, six substantial articles or one full-length 
script workshopped or performed by a professional or amateur com-
pany (Australia Council Literature Fund, Individual Writers' Grants 
Conditions for Application — 1995, 6). While this tightening is a re-
sponse to sharp cuts in Council funding, `to encompass budgetary and 
administrative restraints experienced by the Literature Fund' as far back 
as 1993 (Australia Council Literature Fund, Individual Writers' Grants 
Assessment Committee Assessment Procedures — 1994, 1), its effect is to 
restrict further the already restricted character of production in the 
literary field within the wider cultural field. 
Having restricted the process in this way, applications are as-
sessed by at least two members of the Literature Fund Individual 
Writers' Grants Assessment Committee who then determine whether 
an application is 'worthy of a grant or not.' The application is 'then 
placed on the so-called preliminary "Yes" or "No" List of applications' 
(Australia Council Literature Fund, Individual Writers' Grants 
Assessment Committee Assessment Report — 1995, 3). In culling the list 
the procedure of the Committee is to review each judgement. The 'No' 
list is read aloud to the whole Committee and 
further assessment of such applications then took place and, 
as a result, some applications were placed on the 'Yes' list .... 
The same procedure was followed for the 'Yes' list in each 
program and, following rereading of applications, a final list 
of those recommended to receive grants was established 
within budget parameters. (3) 
What is revealing here is that, while the procedure appears to offer 
some kind of less partial if not impartial judgement, the assessment is 
not disinterested, because the Committee members are pre-selected, by 
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agents whose interest is to maintain 'literariness,' for their knowledge 
of Australian literature,' for their known integrity and sound 
judgement, and for their interest in the development and good 
standing of Australian literature.' Further, it cannot be autonomous 
because the budget is determined, in the end, by agents outside the 
literary field. 
Besides being determined by budget constraints imposed by 
agents in the political field, the actions of the Australia Council 
Literature Fund are also determined by the commercial practices that 
control the economic field. The Literature Fund responds to market 
pressures by supporting kinds of text from which publishers typically 
make weak returns, but in so doing also determines the market by 
constructing two kinds of publication, the non-subsidised commercial 
one and the literary one. In neither case is the Australia Council 
autonomous. Literature Fund subsidies support publication of certain 
kinds of text and publication can then, safely enough, be used to 
measure the effectiveness of its Individual Writers' Grants program. 
Publishers 
are eligible to apply for publishing subsidies ... in the fol-
lowing genres: first and second works of fiction; first and 
second works of literary non-fiction (defined by the Fund as 
autobiography, biography, essays, histories, literary criticism 
or other expository or analytical prose); poetry (except 
selected and collected titles); drama scripts; and anthologies 
of Australian literature. 
Publishers can apply to the Literature Fund for as-
sistance to publish up to ten eligible titles in their literary 
publishing program. Up to $3 000 per title is available to 
assist with production costs for first and second works of 
fiction or literary non-fiction, and up to $1 500 to assist with 
production costs for single author drama titles and single 
author poetry titles. Publishers may also apply for assistance 
towards payment of up to $3 000 for living Australian 
writers' fees for anthologies of Australian creative writing. 
(Australia Council Grants Handbook— 1997, 75-76) 
253 
There is, clearly, an economy that structures publication subsidies. 
Subsidies for the publication of fiction or literary non-fiction are re-
stricted to first or second works, while poetry, drama and anthologies 
enjoy less restricted access to subsidies. By restricting fiction and non-
fiction subsidies to first or second works, the Australia Council 
provides some incentive for publishers to publish new writers, re-
sponding to the typically weak market performance of books by first-
and second-time writers of fiction and non-fiction, but at the same time 
it subsidises poetry and drama publishing regardless of the typically 
weak performance of these genres in the book market, thus helping to 
maintain established poets and dramatists in the field. Literature Fund 
subsidies, in other words, operate hand in glove with individual grants 
to consecrate and maintain certain writers and their works in the 
literary field. Grants and subsidies define what sorts of cultural agents 
and products count in the literary field and, in so doing, help to 
construct and maintain the sorts of agents and products that typify this 
field and differentiate it from other fields in the wider field of cultural 
production. 
What this means is that the Australia Council, as one set of 
institutional practices among many, helps to maintain the boundary 
between, for example, the literary fiction of the literary field and the 
romantic and crime fiction of the wider cultural field, whose 
practitioners 'are not eligible to submit an application' because romantic 
and crime fiction products 'are not seen as high priorities by the 
Literature Fund.' Put simply, by differentiating literary practitioners 
from those others who need not apply, the Literature Fund helps to 
construct the categories of 'high brow' writing and writers and their 
other, 'popular' writing and writers. 
This is not to say that the function of the Australia Council is a 
simple gate-keeping one because the practices of the Australia Council 
(and those agents who operate within it, who are funded by it or who 
stand outside it) significantly influence and at the same time are 
significantly influenced by every other interested agent in the field. The 
pressures of such interested agents are deeply sedimen.ted in the 
cultural field - in what Margaret Archer called the cultural system - as 
well as being evident in the habitual socio-cultural practices by which 
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those agents operate." Suppose, for example, that a writer succeeds in 
applying for an Australia Council grant or fellowship (having avoided 
genres like romantic or crime fiction, or instruction manuals, how-to 
books, and so on). Her funding success reinforces her own 
understanding of what counts as writing of 'literary merit' for the 
Australia Council, but it also reinforces a similar understanding for all 
those other agents involved in the grants process, including the 
selection panel and all other applicants. Suppose, further, that my 
application for Australia Council funding is rejected and I choose to 
challenge the judgement of the committee. I might do this by 
communicating with Australia Council Literary Fund administrators, 
possibly arguing my case in terms of the literary merit of my sample 
work and proposal. I might take my grievance to my local House of 
Representatives member or to the Minister for the Arts, possibly 
arguing my case on the grounds of regional representation. I might 
write publicly, by means of a letter to the major daily newspapers or 
literary specialist publications like the Australian Book Review, 
possibly arguing my case in terms of the dubious criteria by which 
applications are assessed. Whatever approach I take, my action exerts 
pressure on the Australia Council and those agents with an interest in 
it. How much pressure, of course, depends on who I am: Les Murray in 
dispute with the Australia Council is likely to exert more pressure than 
me. 
While minnows may produce little pressure on the institution, 
evidence of successful interventions by bigger fish can be seen deeply-
sedimented in the sort of restrictions I have described above. The fact 
that Australia Council criteria rule out romantic and crime fiction, 
military studies, instruction manuals, and so on, or restrict applicants 
on the basis of six published short stories, or twenty published poems of 
reasonable length, and so on, mark previous funding disputes like scars 
where pressure was brought to bear against the selection committee of 
the Literature Fund. There are two interesting features about this 
process. One is that the documentation of criteria by the Australia 
Council suppresses the contingent and oppositional background of the 
very disputes which generated the criteria in the first place by 
presenting the criteria in apparently objective terms — not romantic and 
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crime fiction, military studies, instruction manuals, or whatever - so 
that the scars appear to be benchmarks, merely neutral measurements. 
The other is that embedded in the apparently objective criteria are 
qualifiers like 'substantial,' reasonable-length' and 'full-length' which 
provide the selection committee with just enough discriminatory 
leeway to allow for a practically workable selection process as well as 
room for ambiguity in case of appeals. 
The Australia Council, as a cultural system, then, responds to 
and shapes the socio-cultural practices and positions of those agents 
who operate within it, against it and despite it. This relation can be 
observed in terms of current practices and positions as they influence 
and are influenced by previous practices and positions. This tends to 
make the practices and positions of the Australia Council look like the 
product only of low-level squabbles between writers and committee 
members. But the relation can be observed more widely and deeply in 
terms of interventions in Australia Council activity by agents outside 
the literary field itself, most powerfully by agents from the political 
field. The fact that the Australia Council is a Commonwealth 
government-funded agency, as was its progenitor, Menzies's 
Commonwealth Literary Fund, indicates exactly this kind of political 
intervention in the powerful ideologies underpinning Australia 
Council patronage of an 'Australian literature,' whatever that might be 
and whatever might be the interests of booksellers, publishers or 
readers outside the political field. Government patronage pursues, 
through Australia Council practices, projects ranging from the 
expression of a national identity to the valorising of multiculturalism. 
Recent reductions in the Australia Council Literature Fund budget 
indicate, further, how government policy shapes the literary field. Since 
1993 the Literature Fund has dealt with periodic budget cuts - cuts 
determined by economic recession and the politics of economic 
rationalism - in several ways. First and most obviously, eligibility 
criteria have been tightened, restricting the number of applications for 
funding. This reduces the number of applicants hoping for a slice of the 
Literature Fund cake and makes the selection committee's task of 
sorting the 'Yes' and 'No' piles a little easier, but it doesn't solve the 
fundamental problem of determining which applications go into the 
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'Yes' and 'No' piles. Restricting genres goes some way towards doing 
this, but the effective, and of course least advisable, way is to specify 
what counts as 'literary merit.' The Literature Fund has not taken this 
course for good strategic reasons - mainly because more apparently 
objective criteria tend to demand greater accountability, requiring the 
Fund to devote more resources to defending its funding judgements. 
Reducing the number of eligible applications does, however, have the 
effect of changing the shape of the literary field, most obviously by 
reducing the number of agents who are thought to be bona fide 
members of the field - agents who have written and published six short 
stories, or twenty poems, and so on - but also by positioning agents 
who need not apply as mere aspirants in the field. 
The Literature Fund has responded to recent Commonwealth 
government budgetary pressure by constructing a new and complex 
application system whereby applicants are required to elect the funding 
category for which they wish to apply. This means that applicants are 
free to apply for a senior or A category grant, a junior or B category 
grant, or a Writers' Project grant for $15 000, $10 000 or $5 000, subject to 
the same eligibility guidelines as operated in 1997, outlined above. So 
an applicant who in 1995 applied automatically for a B category grant 
now makes her best guess as to her chances, possibly applying for a 
Writers' Project grant for which she was, in 1995, 'over qualified.' The 
effect of government policy here is that the big fish are, in effect, feeding 
down the food chain. 11 The elegance of the Literature Fund's solution 
is that it obviates the need for the selection committee to specify criteria 
of 'literary merit' and makes it easier to defend funding judgements 
because those judgements should, on the whole, reflect the changed 
make up of the list of applicants. Another new strategy, the mentor 
program for sponsoring young writers, similarly restricts membership 
in the literary field by withholding direct funding to new writers, tying 
funding to already established writers (Davis, Gangland, 134-35). 
Whatever were the intentions of the architects, the program is a form 
of conservative apprenticeship that serves to maintain the power and 
incumbency in the field of those established writers judged to be 
suitable mentors. However necessary it might be for the Australia 
Council to respond to budgetary constraint in such ways, the effect - in 
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so far as the Australia Council determines positions and practices in the 
literary field - is to restrict the personnel and positions and kinds of 
texts and activities that prevail in the field. 
I have attempted in the previous chapters in Part Two to show 
how various texts like anthologies, reference guides and study guides - 
produced most often by literary critics and consumed most often by 
students in the academic field - operate to construct and consecrate 
particular writers and their texts as literary ones. Writers and texts, of 
course, exist prior to this process. How they are generated in the first 
place depends on organised practices like those of the Literature Fund. 
Other organised practices also contribute to the process of constructing, 
maintaining and further promoting the kinds of personnel and texts 
which make up the literary field. Writers' festivals, in promoting 
particular genres and kinds of writer, are a key moment in this process. 
The 1997 Melbourne Writers' Festival is a particularly interesting case 
in point. 
Unlike Helen Daniel's 'readerly dream, now become literary 
reality in [her anthology] Expressway,' the Melbourne Writers' Festival 
cannot be seen as 'an orderly gathering conducted in silence, in privacy, 
without consultation.'12 Indeed, given the fact that festivals involve 
public performance, it is impossible to disguise the consultation and 
negotiation between a large number of agents that is necessary in order 
to create a program in the first place. Helen Daniel recognises this in the 
comments she makes about festivals in her editorial for the August 
1997 Australian Book Review. She indicates here how the 
programming committee, with Daniel in the chair, must deal with the 
difficult task of producing a program in which 'Me author' is selected 
according to her talent 'as performer, as promoter, as marketeer, as 
festival panellist, as interviewee on radio and television - in short as 
public figure.' 13 The public nature of writers' festivals determines the 
selection of a kind of 'writer as performer, who will present well, speak 
well, perhaps provocatively but certainly in a lively way' (Daniel, 
'Editorial,' Australian Book Review, [193] 1). The festival programming 
committee is consequently faced with a difficulty when it comes to the 
claim 'to showcase the art and talent of the writer' because, as Daniel 
puts it, 'there is ... an illogic in terms of the connection between success 
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and quality' (1). 'Success,' presumably, refers to sales success (1) while by 
'quality' Daniel seems to refer to 'literary quality,' including 'the quality 
of the design, ... marketing strategies, ... the timbre of a voice[,] ... the 
prevailing literary fads' (1). Festivals, in other words, promote certain 
kinds of writer who have the capacity to be 'provocative' or 'lively,' 
while 'quality' is secondary. As a result, festivals assist in boosting the 
sales success, Daniel might add the status, of 'provocative' or 'lively' 
writers over 'more reticent or less sell-assured' quality' writers' (1). This 
might suggest that festivals select writers on the basis of merit, however 
that merit might be defined. But festivals are, as Mark Davis notes, 
'highly organised, hierarchical events, carefully designed to appear 
casual and democratic ... while the deeper networks of patronage stay 
well hidden' (Davis, Gangland, 116-17). While this is true, those 
networks are extremely difficult to pry apart in order to get beyond 
anecdotal evidence of mutual 'insider trading' by festival committee 
members, Literature Fund selection committee members, and so on 
(127). 
Daniel's recognition that festivals promote certain kinds of 
'literary writers,' namely literary writers who can be provocative or 
lively on stage, indicates how festivals operate like publishers, re-
viewers, literary critics, literary-prize juries, the Australia Council 
Literature Fund, and so on, as filters which select, promote and thereby 
canonise particular writers, apparently 'sifting the chaff from the wheat 
and making authoritative decisions about which deserve sponsorship 
for distribution and which are to be kept out of circulation.' 14 But there 
is more to the story than this, as I attempted to show in Chapter Three. 
Like publishers and the other 'gate-keepers' in the literary field, festival 
programming committees do not simply 'sift the chaff from the wheat' 
but decide what constitutes wheat and chaff in the first place. Each 
decision taken by these gatekeepers is a more or less habitually 
instituted step in constructing and reconstructing the general typical 
profile for a publishable literary manuscript (the wheat) and a rejected 
one (the chaff) and the appropriateness of potential future manuscripts 
in relation to this constructed profile. 
While the 1997 Melbourne Writers' Festival promotes 
provocative or lively writers - a keynote address by Germaine Greer 
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sponsored by 'Melbourne's top rating radio station,' interviews with 
David Williamson and Louis Nowra, and so on - the program suggests 
that the criteria which guided the selection of genres are much wider. 15 
The Festival includes sessions dealing with fantasy, crime and romance 
fiction, sports and song writing and film, as well as poetry, drama, 
fiction and autobiography (Melbourne Writers' Festival, Official 
Festival Program, 2). But the extent of this apparent breadth, it seems, 
remains 'literary.' The Melbourne Festival sessions deal with literary 
fantasy, literary crime, literary romance fiction, and so on, where 
'literariness' is determined by the network of publishers sponsoring and 
launching their products at the Festival. Some Festival participants are 
sponsored by Penguin, HarperCollins, Hodder Headline, Pan 
Macmillan, University of Queensland Press, Lonely Planet, Random 
House, Allen and Unwin, ABC Books, Brandi and Schlesinger, Hyland 
House, Wakefield Press, Cambridge University Press and Paper Bark 
Press (4). Some sessions are sponsored by Penguin, Allen and Unwin, 
the Australian Film Institute and the Age. The festival is also an oppor-
tunity to launch new books, some published by the bigger houses - 
Penguin and Pan Macmillan - most by 'small' presses (2). Daniel's 
Festival program, more obviously than her anthology, Expressway, is 
determined by the interests of these other agents in the literary field for 
whom the festival is a vehicle for the promotion of a particular product 
- writers and their texts - before a predicted market of 'twenty-five 
thousand book lovers' (1). 
Daniel's involvement in several ways in the organisations which 
select and promote particular writers, texts and genres - as a literary 
journalist and reviewer with the Age, as chair of the Melbourne 
Writers' Festival programming committee, as the editor of Australian 
Book Review, as the editor of Expressway - illustrates very clearly the 
degree to which all agents, operating with particular interests in the lit-
erary field and according to the institutions of the field, determine liter-
ary categories and the very writers and texts to be thought of and valued 
as literary ones in the field. But Daniel's role as an editor of anthologies 
and literary journals and as the chair of the Melbourne Writers' 
Festival programming committee indicates more than this. What is in-
teresting about the institutional determination of literary writing and 
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which writers are the literary ones is that what counts in the literary 
field is determined by agents who more or less disguise their interests, 
usualy under the camouflage of autonomy. Unlike the wider field of 
cultural production, in which agents generaly admit to the conflicts, 
tensions and accidents which determine the production of cultural arte-
facts, the literary field, it would seem, is not the product of interested 
and competing agents operating according to institutionalised practices 
but is somehow independent of them, with a content that is supposed 
to be neutral. This can be seen, for example, in the way Helen Daniel 
describes the Melbourne Writers' Festival in her September editorial 
for Australian Book Review. 
Ostensibly a discussion of 'the agonising choices ahead of 
[festival] audiences,' Daniel's editorial is, in fact, simply an adver-
tisement for the 'agonising choices' available to those attending the 
Melbourne and Brisbane festivals.16 While the sales pitch for her 
festival program is less than subtle - Daniel asserts, 'I haven't even 
mentioned' a variety of sessions which she goes on to mention in some 
detail - her editorial appears to function in a second and more elusive 
way (Daniel, 'Editorial,' Australian Book Review, [194] 1). In it she 
describes the Melbourne Writers' Festival as the festival that has 
'influenced the way writers' festivals generaly are conducted in this 
country. In that sense, the Melbourne Writers' Festival has played a 
crucial role in Australian literary and cultural life' (1). Daniel's case goes 
something like this: if l[w]riters' festivals are becoming increasingly 
important and popular in Australia' (1) and if al other writers' festivals 
are 'derivatives' (1) of the Melbourne Festival, then it is the Melbourne 
progrtinming committee, with Daniel in the chair, that 'plaSrs the 
crucial tole in Australian literary and cultural life.' Whether festivals 
realyAr 'important' or 'popular,' whether Melbourne sets the pace or 
not, is lesssignificant than the way Daniel submerges her own involve-
ment with this 'crucial' Melbourne Writers' Festival. 
• 	 By appearing only to describe the oferings of the Brisbane and 
Melbourne programming committees, Daniel is able to avoid impli-
cating herself as a central agent in the institution. She becomes merely 
an observer. And when she finaly does suggest some involvement 
with the Melbourne programming committee - admitting that it is 'w e 
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[who] force readers to make choices' (1, emphasis added) — she 
immediately follows this admission with the argument that it is not 
the programming committee but individual readers who construct the 
festival because 'every reader must create his or her own program, 
mapping out for themselves [sic] the festival they want to attend' (1). In 
using this strategy Daniel attempts to disclaim any responsibility for the 
fact that it is her program, like her anthology, that constructs Australian 
literature. Her disclaimer here, attempting to suppress her own 
determining role in the literary field, should be a familiar one, a 
strategy that Daniel played out in her insistence in the introduction to 
Expressway back in 1989 that it is not the editor but 'the reader [who] 
make[s] choices and personally determine[s] the sequence' of stories, 
rather than 'simply accepting the sequence [of stories] on paper' (Daniel, 
Expressway, xiii). 
The pains taken by agents in the literary field to pretend that the 
personnel in the field are disinterested and the texts are autonomous 
objects which are simply the best examples of literature seems to be an 
inheritance from the academic field. Since certain kinds of texts were 
appropriated for the purposes of literary criticism and the teaching and 
studying of literature, agents in the academic field have significantly 
determined the content of the literary field. The extent to which the 
academic field permeates the literary in this way can be seen, for 
example, in the way the Australia Council requests 'details of any 
publication (including anticipated awards, inclusion on educational 
curricula, etc, relating to work written with the assistance of [a] grant' 
and, it might be added, with the assistance of a subsidy. 17 What agents 
in the literary field recognise as 'wheat' is, it seems, the kind of 'wheat' 
that is the grist for the academic mill. 
Despite the fact that agents in the literary field are sell-interested 
and that the field is determined in interested ways, the myth of 
disinterestedness remains prevalent. Well-placed literary critical 
personnel like Helen Daniel or Brian Kiernan, whose Most Beautiful 
Lies, as I attempted to show in Chapter Five, successfully determined 
who were to count as the Five Major Contemporary Fiction Writers in 
1977, themselves suppress their interestedness as agents in the field. 
Even the Australia Council Literature Fund assessment procedure, 
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despite the fact that its judgements are obviously subjective and highly 
situated, maintains the autonomous myth, suggesting that it can 
guarantee that the process of selecting candidates for funding is neutral 
because 'the assessment of each grant program took considerable time 
and was undertaken in a very thorough and impartial manner' 
(Australia Council Literature Fund, Individual Writers' Grants 
Assessment Committee Assessment Procedures - 1995, 4). But even 
here, because the Individual Writers' Grants Assessment Committee 
for 1995 
consisted of 18 members appointed by the Australia Council 
and delegated by the Council (in accordance with S 7 (1) of 
the Australia Council Act) to make autonomous decisions 
on the applications received (1), 
the 'autonomous decisions' of the committee depend on the statutory 
authority of the Council, that is, on an over-determining authority 
derived from the political field. This absurd notion that autonomy 
might be authorised, while it attempts to maintain the idea that the 
literary field is not over-determined, instead reveals precisely that over-
determination. 
Recent controversies over literary prizes and an accompanying 
scrutiny of literary juries in the popular press have made it difficult for 
anyone to pretend that literary prizes are impartial, simply recognising 
'the best' in the literary field. Clearly, in awarding prizes juries are 
engaged in evaluating particular texts - however subjectively - in the 
literary field. But prizes are not simply a matter of conferring value on 
a text. In a very real sense prizes assist in the material construction of 
the text in the market place and in the maldng of valued texts, that is, 
in the construction of the literary field as a field which operates 
according to objective values. They are, in a very real sense, engaged in 
the process of value-adding. 
Publishers generally promote books in two ways. Book reviewing 
promotes 'literary' books or, put another way, books selected for review 
are constructed as literary ones. Pre-publicity by way of advertising and 
'author tours' or media interviews promotes 'popular' or 'blockbuster' 
books or, put another way, books selected for 'hard-sell' publicity 
campaigns are constructed as popular ones. At the same time, buyers of 
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literary texts typically respond to book reviews while buyers of popular 
ones ignore them. The same seems to be true of literary awards, 
perhaps because an award operates as a kind of review. The literary 
value-adding effect of awards can be traced particularly clearly, to take 
one example, in the sales performance of David Foster's The Glade 
Within the Grove in the 'literary best-seller' lists (an oxymoron of 
course). The fillip offered by the 1997 Miles Franklin award illustrates 
the degree to which the award continues to maintain its prestige — 
Andrew Riemer, for instance, calls it 'an award ... established to 
recognise solid literary achievement' and a 'prestigious distinction,' 
despite the fallout caused by Helen Demidenko/Darville's The Hand 
That Signed the Paper in 1995.18 Literary prizes earmark certain books 
as suitable for consumption in the literary field. But beyond this they 
promote this literary consumption by making available to publishers, 
writers and so on a vehicle with which to publicise the text and the 
name of the writer. The interviews, re-releasing of titles, second 
reviews and further media discussion of the prize-winner assist in 
maintaining the prestige of the prize and also, importantly, in boosting 
sales. This is as true for one-year-old reds which win the Jimmy 
Watson trophy as it is for books which win the Miles Franklin prize, 
and the makers and marketers of both products use similar strategies to 
maximise sales. This includes, for example, repackaging or possibly 
reprinting the product (bottle label or dust jacket) with a gold medal 
and readvertising the product to announce its prize-winning creden-
tials. 
The effect of literary prizes on book sales is remarkably clear. 
Sales of The Glade Within the Grove, for example, jumped after the 
announcement on 3 June, 1997, that it had received the Miles Franklin 
award for a work of fiction. The previously unlisted novel became the 
highest selling title on the Weekend Australian best-seller list by 28-29 
June. 19 The effect of prizes on sales success appears, however, to be 
short lived. The Glade Within the Grove dropped from the number 
one position to fourth on 9 August and seventh on 13 September before 
dropping from the list entirely by 23 September. The Miles Franklin, in 
this case, offers the writer and winning book decidedly short-term 
exposure. But it has a second and more durable effect in the literary 
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field because it foregrounds an evaluative regime operating in the 
literary field. The Glade Within the Grove, or any other literary prize-
winner, maintains the appearance of a value structure which 
recognises 'quality' products, regardless of the overall sales performance 
of the book. This qualifying - constructing the literary field as a quality 
field - is maintained' by the awarding of prizes regardless of the merits 
of a particular book or writer. In fact, debate over the decisions made by 
juries, like the debate over the Helen Demidenko/Darville Miles 
Franklin prize, serves only to reinforce the power of literary prizes as a 
way of maintaining the credentials of 'literary' products and the field in 
which they have value. The fact that the Miles Franklin jury is thought 
to have made the wrong decision over The Hand That Signed the Paper 
perpetuates the view that the literary field is one in which evaluative 
decisions about quality cultural products can be made - the jury could 
have 'got it right.'20 It is because of the perception that literary prizes are 
supposed to be objective tests of quality or literary value (whether or 
not they really are) that the Miles Franklin has, so far, suffered little 
damage in the literary field. In fact, controversies over recent Miles 
Franklin judgements actually serve to reinforce the importance of the 
prize as an institution which maintains the regime of value - that 
there is 'good' writing to be included and 'bad' writing - romantic or 
crime fiction, perhaps - to be excluded from the literary field. The 
debate about mistakes in the judging process is about particular 
decisions and the make-up of the jury, not whether to judge in the first 
place. As a result, a series of similar 'mistakes' in Miles Franklin 
judging in the next decade might exert a modifying pressure on the 
category 'Australian literature,' but in doing so the Miles Franklin jury 
would simply change 'Australian literature,' not destroy it. 
Describing 'hard' institutions like the Australia Council, literary 
prize juries or writers' festival programming as I have done here tends 
to suggest that these institutions of the cultural system create socio-
cultural practices. But in fact they are as much produced by socio-
cultural practices as they are the product of them. In other words, socio-
cultural practices - those ways of thinking about and dealing with texts 
that are the product of notions such as the authoritative author, the text 
as an expression of a psychologically coherent individual, and so on - 
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are solidified in and by the judgements of institutions like the Australia 
Council, literary prize juries, or writers' festival programming. The 
problem is that, in describing such solidification, it seems as though 
these 'hard' institutions create socio-cultural practices when, in fact, 
they are always and at the same time product and producer of ways of 
thinking about and doing things with texts. 
Perhaps the most solidified socio-cultural practices of 'the literary 
writer' might seem to be traceable to an Anglo-Saxon middle class social 
world view which Australian published writers characteristically share 
(see Davis, Gangland, 133). Evidence for this view can be found in the 
overwhelmingly professional and educated background from which 
most writers come and in which their writing activity originates. 
Professional and pedagogical institutions and practices, what Andrew 
Milner calls 'capitalist authorial relations of production,' are clearly 
discernible in the professional and educated background of the majority 
of literary writers.21 But the diffused influence they exert on textual 
(re)production„ the way they mediate between the agent and her textual 
activity, is not so easy to see. On the basis of fairly limited samples 
Milner demonstrates that the sorts of writers who are supported in a 
capitalist system - that is, a market system that functions in terms of 
royalties and state patronage - tend to have a professional and educated 
background (Milner, Literature, Culture and Society, 110). In support of 
this, Milner compiles the most well-known and largest surveys of 
writers, by Raymond Williams and Richard Altick, to demonstrate that 
'the great majority of nineteenth- and twentieth-century [English] 
writers were both middle class (83.9% for 1800-1835, 84.2% for 1900-1935) 
and university-educated (52.5% for 1880-1835, 72.3% for 1900-1935)' 
while the majority of Australian writers surveyed in 1983 were 
university educated (113-14) (see Appendix, Tables 3-6). But how this 
kind of background helps to construct particular kinds of writer and 
writing is difficult to trace. And Miler's conclusions about the class 
and educational background of literary writers need to be treated with 
caution, given that a pre-conceived notion of literariness is already 
built in to Williams's figures. The figures for Tables 5 and 6 are drawn, 
after all, from the Oxford Introduction to English Literature, by 
definition ignoring a range of 'non-canonical' writers who (and genres 
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which) may well exhibit quite different demographic characteristics. 
What is clear, however, is that the kind of literary writer who is 
recognised by literary academics tends to be produced out of 
professional and educated social groups. Even so, Miler's figures do 
not make it possible to explain exactly how the social and educational 
background that is typical for most writers determines the sorts of 
product writers are likely to believe to be worth writing, or what writers 
write or what eventually gets to be published. This is because any 
explanation depends in the end on an understanding of the 'soft' sorts 
of intricate social, institutional and specifically pedagogical influences 
that construct those cultural agents who (re)produce texts, on an 
understanding of the sorts of habitual socio-cultural practices that just 
seem to be obvious, natural, 'just the way we do things' in the cultural 
field. But it is fair to say, at least, that the sorts of professional and 
educational institutions that control ways of doing things with texts 
also control the textual activities of cultural producers in the literary 
field. 
What I have been trying to show here is that the practices, personnel 
and texts that count in the literary field are the product of complex 
institutional relations, determined within the literary field as well as 
across other fields. My argument is that writing of any kind is mediated 
at every moment by a network of institutions, what Foucault called 
'orders of discourse' or discourse formations, always embodied in the 
practices of agents in the cultural field. All the institutions that 
underlie the way 'the writer' is constructed and maintained, all the 
agents who determine, protect and promote the actual incumbent 
writers — the usual suspects — in the field, all the practices that underpin 
the way texts are written, selected, physically manifested and 
consecrated, advertised and sold, catalogued and loaned, taught, read 
and talked about produce and reproduce them as relatively stable and 
apparently objective items in the field. What we make of writers and 
texts is, in other words, always dependent on the institutions that and 
agents who determine our textual practices. This might suggest that 
social agents are always either corrupt conspirators who play the system 
or else only ghosts in the machine, subject to always-antecedent 
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institutions. But the cultural agent stands in a more complex relation to 
the institutions in the field than this. As I have tried to show, the 
institutions that determine practices of textual (re)production - writing, 
reading, cataloguing, and so on - are embodied in texts and the agents 
who use them. Agents inherit the institutions that determine 
consequent practices but they also maintain these institutions by use, so 
that practices also stabilise consequent institutions. This explains how it 
is that the field changes, however slowly, over time - how, for 
example, various writers and texts achieve or lose canonical status. 
Systematic institutions that determine the cultural practices of agents 
are themselves constantly maintained, challenged or modified by those 
practices. 
In outlining a theory of cultural production and attempting to 
describe it by looking at the institutions and practices of cultural agents 
who, for example, make and use anthologies, reference guides or study 
guides it might appear in the end that I am attempting to reveal the 
process at it is, as though it is possible to destabilise texts and textual 
practices once and for all. But this is not so. All texts, including this one, 
continue to function according to the institutions and practices of the 
cultural field, making themselves always, if only apparently, objects in 
the field, whether we think about it or not. 
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1 Australia Council Literature Fund, Individual Writers' Grants Assessment Committee 
Assessment Procedure— 1994, 1. 
2 Mark Davis, Gangland: Cultural Elites and the New Generatioruzlism. Sydney: Allen 
and Unwin, 1997, 117. 
3 Not by accident, the categories listed here are based on terms used by the Australia 
Council Literature Fund. 
4 On disinterestedness in the cultural field see Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural 
Production: Essays on Art and Literature. Cambridge: Polity, 1993, 75 and especially 154 
where he describes the inverted rule in the field by which the 'loser takes all.' 
5 See Australia Council Literature Fund, Individual Writers' Grants Assessment 
Committee Assessment Procedures— 1994, 3 and 1995, 11. In 1995 the Literature Board of 
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Table 3 
Social origin of British writers according to class (1800-1935) 
Period (according to the date when writers begin to produce their 
significant work) 
Class (father's 
occupation) 
1800-1835 1835-1870 1870-1900 1900-1935 
Upper class 
(nobility, 
gentry) 
26 26 13 24 
Upper middle 
class (bankers, 
merchants, 
etc.) 
36 25 20 10 
Middle 
middle class 
(arts and 
professions) 
74 128 83 137 
Other 34 32 27 49 
Lower middle 
class 
(tradesmen, 
artisans, etc.) 
28 18 18 6 
Total middle 
class* 
198 229 161 226 
Labourers 7 2 3 14 
Total 205 231 164 240 
*totals have been corrected 
Source: R. D. Altick, 'The sociology of authorship,' in Literary Taste, Culture and 
Mass Communication, ed. P. Davison. Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey, 1978,51-52, 
reprinted in Andrew Milner, Literature, Culture and Society. London: UCLP, 1996, 
113. 
Table 4 
Educational backgrounds of British writers (1880-1935) 
Period (according to the date when writers begin to produce their 
significant work) 
Educational 
background 
188-35 1835-70 1870-1900 1900-35 
Little or no 
schooling 
20 13 7 19 
Education 
ended at 
secondary 
level 
64 62 43 54 
University or 
comparable 
institution 
93 147 122 191 
Total 177 222 172 264 
Source: R. D. Altick, 'The sociology of authorship,' in Literary Taste, Culture and 
Mass Communication, ed. P. Davison. Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey, 1978,51-52, 
reprinted in Andrew Milner, Literature, Culture and Society. London: UCLP, 1996, 
114. 
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Table 5 
Social origin of English writers (1480-1930)* 
Period (assigned on the basis of the tenth year after the particular writer's birth) 
Social origin 1480-1530 1530-80 1580-1630 1630-80 1680-1730 1730-80 1780-1830 1830-80 1880-1930 
Nobility 3 3 0 2 21- 2 1 0 1 
Gentry 8 12 9 7 0 8 7 7 
Professional 4 9 13 7 13 11 25 31 30 
Merchants 0 4 1 0 1 1 9 6 2 
Tradesmen 0 3 4 3 2 4 5 9* 5 
Craftsmen 1 5 1 2 1 3 5 4 
Farmers 2 0 2 0 0 4 2 0 2 
Labourers 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Uncertain 3 2 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Total 21 38 33 22 19 25 57 53 53 
*social origin determined by father's occupation 
-I-figure applies to nobility and gentry 
*figure applies to tradesmen and craftsmen 
Source: Raymond Williams, The LongRevolution. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965,255-63, tabulated by Andrew Milner, Literature, Culture and Society. 
London: UCLP, 1996, 111. 
Table 6 
Educational background of English writers (1480-1930) 
Period (assigned on the basis of the tenth year after the writer's birth) 
Educational background 1480-1530 1530-80 1580-1630 1630-80 1680-1730 1730-80 1780-1830 1830-80 1880-1930 
National grammar 
schools 
4 8 12 6 6 4 18 19 32 
Local grammar schools 5 9 9 7 9 8 14 16 8 
Scottish/Irish local 
schools 
0 0 0 0 0 5 4 7 0 
Private schools 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Elementary schools 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Dissenting academies 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 
Home or private tuition 5 2 3 4 2 3 16 7 4 
Uncertain 7 19 9 4 2 5 5 2 3 
Oxford /Cambridge 17 27 28 13 8 8 24 24 32 
Other university 2 2 0 4 0 4 9 15 5 
No university or 
uncertain 
2 9 5 5 11 13 24 14 16 
Total 21 38 33 22 19 25 57 53 53 
Source: Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965,255-63, tabulated by Andrew Milner, Literature, Culture and 
Society. London: UCLP, 1996, 112. 
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